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The local authority credit market is an important source of funding, matching long-term 
financing to infrastructure investment programmes.  This study considers the financial 
innovation of developed-market subnational governments, when raising private funds via 
bond mutualisation, to understand if it improves municipal bond market efficiency.  The thesis 
compares three important alternative means for raising long-term debt, namely direct 
government-backed lending; individual bond issues; and municipal credit-pooling agency 
backed bond issues.  It addresses clear gaps in the existing European municipal bond agencies 
(MBAs) literature ― only one other paper is relevant to Chapter 1 and none on MBAs are 
relevant to Chapter 3.  The database of Chapter 2 is substantially more detailed than any in the 
literature and so provides an insightful empirical output.    
Chapter 1 addresses whether European MBAs offer subnational governments (SNGs) a viable 
alternative to central government debt.  I show that a credit-pooling agency can issue 
domestic bonds at a competitive yield that enables it to offer loans to SNGs more cheaply than 
if they were to borrow directly from a central government agency.  The thesis is motivated by 
the launch of the UK Municipal Bond Agency.  Following a counter-factual that a synthetic UK 
MBA, credit-ranked pari passu with the European MBAs, issues bonds in public markets and 
distributes loans to its members, I show that local authorities could save interest costs relative 
to their existing borrowing.  Chapter 2 finds that credit rating and the required size of credit 
determine whether a US municipality issues its own bonds or participates in a credit-pooling 
agency’s issuing activity.  I estimate interest cost savings relative to issuing its own bonds for a 
participant in a municipal bond bank’s bond issuance.  Chapter 3 investigates whether the 
MBAs take advantage of the failure of Covered Interest Parity (CIP), so that their bond 
issuance in foreign currencies reduces their interest costs.  I estimate that MBAs achieved 
average interest cost savings of between 20.4 and 23.8 bps when issuing foreign currency 
bonds, relative to issuing in their respective domestic currencies over 2009-16.  However, I 
find limited evidence that the MBAs are sensitive to deviations from CIP in timing bond issues. 
Issuing bonds based on a joint and several guarantee, MBAs operate through a coinsurance 
design, whereby financially stronger SNGs subsidise weaker ones.  They indirectly leverage on 
their country’s borrowing capacity, so they require supportive institutions including a highly 
credit-rated national government, a legal system that allows interventions if an SNG falls into 
financial distress, and prudent borrowing by subnational governments.  Most importantly, 
they require the collective buy-in of a peer group that wishes to use this agency to reduce the 
cost of borrowing for the common good.  UK local authorities seem to be reluctant to provide a 
joint and several guarantee for their liabilities and, therefore, the original MBA model fails.  
Differences in the UK from the collectivist culture of the Dutch and Nordic MBAs hamper local 
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Public finance is central to most economies around the world.  In this thesis, I address a 
part of the market that has received little academic attention, namely how does the credit-
pooling of bond issues contribute to the long-term funding of subnational governments 
(SNGs)?  In the forthcoming chapters, I study the role of European municipal bond 
agencies and US municipal bond banks to explore whether they save interest costs for 
their members, relative to other means of long-term SNG finance.  In this Introduction, the 
tradable bond market for the credit-pooling municipal bond agencies is described.   
It represents approximately 9% of all outstanding municipal bonds globally and is 





Keywords: Municipal bond agency; municipal bond bank; joint and several guarantee 














SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND MUNICIPALITIES 
Global subnational 1 government bond issuance represents approximately US$700 billion 
per annum 2 or 11% of all OECD bond issuance.  Yet numerous papers discuss the lack of 
liquidity and price efficiency within these markets 3.  This study considers how credit-
pooling contributes to improving the long-term funding of SNGs to support their capital 
investment programmes.  In particular, it examines the mutualisation of municipal bond 
markets in developed countries through credit-pooling bond-issuing agencies, such as 
Municipal Bond Agencies (MBAs) and Municipal Bond Banks (MBBs).  This Introduction 
describes the context for my research questions by describing the funding of SNGs’ capital 
investment around the world. 
The World Bank defines Subnational Governments as ‘all tiers of government and public 
entities below the Federal, or central, government…that have the capacity to incur debt.’  
An SNG is a decentralised entity with responsibilities and some autonomy for budget, staff 
and assets.  It can raise taxation locally and usually holds local elections for its governance 
bodies; it expresses territorial identity through local government; and it uses public 
resources through local bureaucracy and legislative powers.  The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines three tiers of SNG in a sample 
of 122 countries, representing 89% of global GDP (OECD/UCLG, 2019), as follows:  
1. 624,166 municipality-level governments;  
2. 11,965 intermediate-level governments (e.g. counties, prefectures, regions); 
3. 1,769 state governments (e.g. States, Länder within federations).   
Municipalities represent the most local level of the SNG structure.  Of the above countries, 
36 have a single municipal level, 59 have municipal and regional levels and 27 have all 
three levels of subnational government.  Examples of countries with three levels include 
the UK, US and France.  SNG aggregate data at the OECD level is summarised below.    
 
                                                          
1 USAID (2009) defines a subnational body as any administrative entity below the national 
government or sovereign level.  A municipal bond can be issued by a subnational government or 
local administrative entity.  Throughout the thesis, I use municipal bond as a synonym for 
subnational bond.  
2 This excludes data on China, which are not recorded in government accounts.  Their total amount 
differs, according to reputable sources, and is not released on a regular basis. 




Subnational spending and funding 
The OECD estimates that total SNG capital expenditure in its sample was approximately 
US$1.7 trillion in 2017 (OECD/UCLG, 2019).  These programmes represent 22% of total 
SNG annual expenditure and are funded by long-term debt, primarily through borrowing 
from central government, municipal development funds or banks and bond issuance.  At 
the end of 2013, outstanding SNG gross debt of approximately US$7 trillion accounted for  
14% of gross government debt or 9% of the total GDP of its sample (OECD/UCLG, 2016).  
In many developing countries, subnational debt is constrained by central government 
control.  These countries rely more upon loans and transfers from central government, 
banks and funding agencies.  However, bond issuance is popular in developed countries, 
as shown in Figure 1.  Of the 35 member countries of the OECD, bond financing represents 
at least 30% of outstanding SNG financial debt in 13 countries.   
Figure 1: The Split of SNG Financial Debt of OECD Members 
Source: OECD and national data; calculated 
Bond funding is undertaken as follows: 
1. Issue general obligation or revenue bonds as an individual SNG  
2. Issue bonds as a group, while bearing individual risk  
3. Issue bonds as a group through a bond agency, with joint and several guarantee of 
pool members  





The first method represents the vast majority of global municipal bond issuance.  
However, this does not address mutualisation of bond issues.  This thesis studies  
methods 2, 3 and 4.  It investigates whether these relatively small markets offer interest 
cost savings to participants, improve market efficiency and have potential to grow.  
Issuing bonds as a group with individual risk is only undertaken in the US.  This process is 
described in detail on pages 84-85 in Chapter 2.  Methods 3 and 4 are relevant to the 
discussion of Chapter 1 and are compared in more detail on pages 39-40.   
Figure 2: Share of Outstanding Municipal Bonds by Type 
 
Source: OECD, national sources 
Two methods of individual bond issuance are common.  A general obligation bond is 
backed by the credit rating and taxing authority of the issuer and bond holders are 
dependent upon its good reputation and track record.  This differs from the backing of a 
revenue bond, which depends on the success of the specific project it is issued to fund.   
Examples of issuing bonds as a group, while bearing individual risk, include municipal 
bond banks and municipal finance agencies.  This structure exists only in the US.  The 
aggregated proceeds of pooled bond issues are used to purchase the general obligation 
bonds of participants.  Their credit strength rests in a reserve fund that accrues by over-
issuing pooled bonds by up to 10%, relative to the aggregate demand of municipalities, 
and an implicit guarantee — normally a moral obligation by their respective State — to 
back all issues in their pools in the event of default by any local issuer.  Moody’s normally 
values the State obligation in isolation with a one-to-two notch discount relative to an 




Issuing bonds with joint and several guarantee underlies the new UK and French credit-
pooling agency business models, akin to existing MBAs in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, 
Japan, Canada and New Zealand.  The joint and several guarantee of its members enables 
an MBA's risk to be equated with that of its guarantor or liable institution by the credit 
rating agencies.  Each of the MBAs has processes that relate to individual members in 
distress.  If a liability event occurs, creditors can demand full satisfaction of the claim from 
all guarantors, even if they only approach one of them.  Each member guarantees the 
entirety of the agency's liabilities, with internal processes to share the burden of a claim.   
Examples of issuing bonds with an implicit government bond guarantee include the 
activities of KBN in Norway, BNG and NWB in the Netherlands.  KBN and BNG are owned 
by their respective central governments and NWB is partly owned by the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands.  Its status as a government-related entity implies an implicit government 
guarantee of liabilities.  While no formal government guarantees exist for these three 
agencies, their roles in the Dutch and Norwegian public sectors imply a high probability of 
government support if needed.   
The major municipal bond markets 
The US, Japanese and German markets and the European MBAs represent over 80% of the 
total annual OECD member issuance of municipal bonds 4.  Several smaller countries are 
restricted by laws on municipal bond issuing and have strict prudential fiscal rules 
defined by their respective central governments.  The US is the most mature market with 
a value of bonds outstanding of US$3.8 trillion at the end of 2018, according to the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB).  Of US SNG debt, 95% is represented by 
bonds across municipality, county and State levels.  As a comparison, this is 
approximately 26% of the size of the US Treasury market and 41% of the US corporate 
bond market, according to the Bank of International Settlements (BIS).  US municipal 
bond issuance totalled US$390 billion in 2018, according to the MSRB.    
The Japanese Ministry of Finance estimates total outstanding subnational government 
bonds in Japan at US$649 billion at the end of 2016 (at two levels – municipalities and 
prefectures).  This is approximately 7% of the size of the local sovereign bond market and 
20% of the corporate bond market, according to the BIS.  In 2017, a total of US$58 billion 
of municipal bonds were issued, according to the Japan Securities Dealers Association.   
                                                          
4 China’s municipal bond market has also grown significantly.  According to the Chinese Finance 
Ministry, total SNG debt was 16.5 trillion yuan (US$2.4 trillion) at the end of 2017, 88% of which is 
held in the form of bonds.  The majority of this is the result of Local Government Financing 
Vehicles swapping debt into bonds since 2015, to reduce outstanding debt below the 21 trillion 




The German SNG bond market was estimated to be worth US$364 billion at the end of 
2018 by the Federal Republic of Germany Finance Agency (at two levels – municipalities 
and Länder).  By comparison, this is approximately 24% of the size of the local sovereign 
bond market and 20% of the corporate bond market, according to the BIS.  However, 
borrowing from public sector banks remains the most common means of long-term 
funding for individual German SNGs.  Other countries with a high value of outstanding 
municipal bonds include Spain (US$67 billion – municipalities and regions), Canada 
(US$40 billion – municipalities and provinces/territories), Italy (US$23 billion – 
municipalities and regions) and France (US$18 billion – municipalities and regions) (ref: 
OECD, 2019). 
Figure 3: Outstanding Bond Totals of the Largest Municipal Bond Markets 
Source: BIS, Standard & Poors, SIMFA (global totals exclude China); the y-axis is measured in US$billion;  
data at end 2018 except Japan municipal bonds, which is 2016. 
Municipal credit-pooling agencies 
Twelve developed countries have created municipal credit-pooling agencies over time.   
I estimate that the outstanding global municipal bond agency tradable bond market was 
worth approximately US$540 billion at the end of 2018.  This represents over 9% of the 
global total of issued municipal bonds.  Japan, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries 
combined represent over 90% of this by size.  The largest municipal bond agency in the 
world is the Japan Finance Organization for Municipalities (JFM).  At March 2019, it had 
outstanding bonds worth US$190 billion, according to JFM data.  It is wholly owned by 




rated A+ by Standard & Poor’s and A1 by Moody’s, which is in-line with the Japanese 
sovereign ratings.   
Pooling of credit has the broadest traction within Western Europe.  The European 
municipal bond agency market had a combined gross total of bonds outstanding of 
US$320 billion and annual bond issuance of US$78 billion in 2018.  The two Dutch 
agencies represent 51% of outstanding European MBA funding.  Each MBA (excluding 
Agence France Locale) represents the majority of municipal bonds outstanding in the five 
countries where they are active.  The credit ratings of all European MBAs (excluding 
Agence France Locale) are in-line with those of their respective sovereign and there is no 
record to date of a credit default event. 




Funding (€ billion) Lending (€ billion) 
BNG Implicit government 89.5 80.8 
NWB Implicit government 56.8 47.6 
KBN Implicit government 41.9 30.6 
Kommuninvest Joint and several 38.8 34.8 
Kommunekredit Joint and several 27.9 22.8 
MuniFin Joint and several 26.9 23.0 
Agence France Locale Joint and several 3.0 2.2 
 
 284.8 241.8 
Source:  The agencies’ report & accounts, 2018 in euros  
Other MBAs include seven Canadian Municipal Finance Authorities, which had a 
combined US$19 billion of bonds outstanding at end 2017, all of which are underwritten 
by the joint and several guarantee of their participants.  The New Zealand Local 
Government Funding Agency was founded in 2009 and represents 59 councils.  It is 
growing steadily in terms of market share, with US$5.3 billion of bonds outstanding at the 
end of 2018.  Bond issues are supported by a joint and several guarantee from 
participating local authorities and a US$500 million liquidity facility from central 
government.  Its bonds are rated at AA+ by Standard & Poor’s, in-line with the New 
Zealand sovereign rating.  There are small MBAs in Iceland and Australia. 
Field of the thesis 
Chapters 1 and 3, focus on the bond issuance of the six largest European MBAs.  All of 
these agencies issue bonds for members at two subnational levels (municipality and the 
higher regional/county-level).  In Chapter 2, the US MBBs provide bond funding at the 
municipality-level only.  Their combined long-term bond liabilities total US$20 billion, 





This section reviews the main issues discussed in the literature, before drawing out the 
specific research questions raised in this thesis.  With an overview of the economics of the 
contracting environment, I outline potential frictions within SNG finance, how these might 
impede SNGs from raising capital and how financing mechanisms (e.g. credit-pooling 
agencies in Chapters 1 and 2 and foreign currency bond issuance in Chapter 3) address 
them and enhance access to credit.  Chapters 1 and 2 investigate whether private capital 
markets improve liquidity, information and monitoring, relative to government agency 
lending and individual municipal bond issuance respectively.  However, these markets 
might introduce frictions of their own that affect the contracting landscape.  A different 
set of frictions causes the failure of the Covered Interest Parity condition for foreign 
currency bond issuance.  This is discussed in detail in Chapter 3 to avoid duplication here.  
All frictions are discussed in more detail within the relevant chapters. 
Literature review 
Relevant European literature on municipal bonds and pricing the bond yields is scarce.  
Indeed, the most recent published paper on a European MBA (Schnitzler, 2017) does not 
include a single literature reference to a European paper.  However, a body of work 
covers the US municipal bond market.  While threads of such research are relevant to this 
thesis, the business model in the US is different from that of the European markets.  For 
example, 50,000 issuers and one million municipal bonds are outstanding in the US 
municipal bond market, which contrasts with a much smaller number of regional and 
municipal bond issuers and nine European credit-pooling municipal bond agency issuers.  
Peterson (2003) offers a comparative study of US and Western European subnational 
credit markets.   
Municipal bonds differ from sovereign bonds in two important features: they have higher 
default risk and they are less liquid, in part because information in the market is limited, 
decentralised, and non-standardised.  Drawing on the US literature, the lack of liquidity in 
individual municipal bond markets is summarised and a number of secondary market 
frictions identified.  Against this, some of the features of municipal bond agencies and 





Liquidity frictions and bond transaction costs 
Liquidity has been poor and transaction costs high in the markets for individual municipal 
bonds for many years, predating the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).  These affect the costs 
of issuance.  Direct costs to issuers include the fees paid to bond underwriters and any 
difference between the reoffering price and the price at which bonds are sold to final 
investors.  Such transaction costs represent a large proportion of a bond’s first year’s 
yield.  There are also indirect costs, such as the price concessions that are made to 
investors, who know illiquid bonds may be difficult to sell in the future.  The MSRB states 
that nearly 67% of US municipal bonds are held by individual investors, either directly or 
through mutual funds.  In a market that is dominated by small-sized transactions, Hong 
and Warga (2004) find that most US municipal bonds trade less than once per week and 
bid-offer spreads for retail-sized trades average over 2% of price for both rated and non-
rated issues.  Green et al. (2006) argue that the market for US municipal bonds exhibits 
high levels of price dispersion, even for similar trade sizes.  Harris and Piwowar (2006) 
show that the average municipal bond traded just 15 times in total over its life.  It is not 
until the 99.9th percentile of their sample that they find municipal bonds that trade up to 
six times per day.  They demonstrate high dealer mark-ups and transaction costs and a 
lack of investor transparency.  Transaction costs decrease with trade size and liquidity 
increases with credit quality and decreases with investment complexity, time to maturity 
and time since issue.  Trading spreads average 2% for US$20,000 trades, falling to 1% for 
US$200,000 trades.  Marlowe (2013) also records a lack of liquidity in the US municipal 
bond market and claims that 10-20% of the municipal bond yield spread is attributable to 
liquidity risk.   
Ang and Green (2013) show that the costs of trading US municipal bonds for retail 
investors are more than double institutional levels and double the costs of trading 
corporate bonds.  Round-trip costs for a retail investor buying and selling a bond are in a 
2-5% range.  A typical municipal bond trades just twice a year, due to trading costs and 
the heterogeneity of the bond issues.  Access to information in municipal bond markets 
and liquidity in trading involve externalities and other forms of market failure, such as a 
lack of standardisation and dissemination of financial information, which hinders 
comparisons across different bonds; the cost of information search; and bond complexity 





Information asymmetry frictions  
Municipal bond prices may take days to respond to changes in market information, 
interest rate movements or macroeconomic announcements.  The absence of timely 
financial information about a borrower adds adverse selection risk.  Investors must be 
concerned not just about the risk of the underlying credit, but also that the seller has 
private information.  They pay less for investments that carry non-transparent risks and 
may demand more advantageous prices to overcome these risks, further raising costs to 
the bond issuer.  Green et al. (2007) argue that limited transparency in the US municipal 
bond market renders slow price discovery and benefits to intermediaries from the search 
costs imposed on investors.   
The US municipal bond issuers are a large and diverse group.  This heterogeneity limits 
information flow, because of the fixed costs of gathering information, and inhibits 
liquidity by reducing the probability of a coincidence of needs between buyer and seller at 
any time.  Municipal bond investors lack access to uniform standards of information 
disclosure and flow.  Government accounting standards provide less transparency than 
their corporate counterparts, and compliance requirements vary by State.  Financial 
reports from SNGs may be released with lags after the close of their fiscal years and are 
rarely available in a format that can be easily compared across SNGs and time.  The lack of 
a central source of information on the financial situation of individual issuers, the costs of 
attached derivatives, fees in debt issues and net issuing costs make it difficult for 
individual investors to make well-informed investment decisions.  Furthermore, when 
SNGs negotiate with financial intermediaries to issue debt, they often have less expertise 
and relatively few resources to guide their decision-making.  This is detrimental not only 
to investors, but also to the SNGs. 
 
Demand-side heterogeneity frictions  
Different investor types respond differently to market shocks, according to their 
respective long-term motivations.  Open-ended investment funds, in particular, are 
vulnerable to volatile short-term investor inflows and outflows, which can lead to ‘gating’ 
or suspension of fund trading and revaluations of a fund’s investment holdings in extreme 
circumstances.  The 2019 suspension of the LF Woodford Equity Income Fund is a recent 
example in the equity world.  In the corporate bond literature, Manconi et al. (2012) show 
that forced sales of bonds by open-ended funds, facing investor redemptions, and 




the GFC, while dealers offered limited market liquidity, due to defined minimum leverage 
ratios.  Timmer (2018) shows that mutual funds and banks buy debt securities pro-
cyclically and long-term investors behave counter-cyclically.  Goldberg and Nozawa 
(2018) argue that shocks in liquidity demand are associated with mutual fund flows.  
Once again, new banking regulations play a role in these markets: tighter regulation now 
hampers dealers’ ability to use their balance sheets to absorb short-term order 
imbalances.  This is echoed by Baranova et al. (2019), who observe that dealers, mutual 
funds and institutional investors in the UK corporate bond market have different 
motivations to trade.  They amplify shocks to bond price falls in response to credit risk 
and risk-free rate shocks, which depend on agents’ proximity to regulatory constraints 
and incentives.  As prices fall, some agents may be forced to sell financial assets, so as not 
to breach constraints.  On the other hand, dealers have limited capacity to absorb the 
sales. 
   
Tax-driven heterogeneity frictions 
Asset ownership decisions are significantly influenced by investors’ tax rates and tax 
policy, at least in the US.  As an example, heterogeneity in the taxation of asset returns can 
create ownership clienteles for municipal bonds.  Babina et al. (2017) show that tax-
induced ownership segmentation limits risk-sharing.  The constraints of the ownership 
clientele impact the asset price response to variations in asset supply, and make the price 
more sensitive to movements in idiosyncratic risk.  Cross-State variation in local tax rates 
results in different levels of in-State ownership.  In States with high tax-induced 
ownership segmentation, they find a greater susceptibility of municipal bond yields to 
supply variation and heightened sensitivity of bond yields to local uncertainty.   
There is no obvious tax advantage for investors from investing in municipal bonds or 
MBA bonds in the European markets, but the tax advantage of US municipal bonds plays 
an important role in their attractiveness to different types of investors.  Chapter 2 
describes eight different tax categories of municipal bonds: from Federal and State tax-
free through to Federal bank qualified and Federal alternative minimum tax eligible.  The 
different categories offer varying advantages, which influence borrowing costs, to 
different types of investor.  In general, the bond’s yield spread regresses most negatively 





Frictions in bank lending to SNGs 
Chapter 1 compares bond issuance versus subnational government borrowing.  USAID 
(2009) contrasts the two, highlighting differences in size of funding, maturity, interest 
costs, transaction costs, collateral requirements and methods of sale.  Many subnational 
governments can meet their capital needs by assuming and repaying commercial debt, 
such as bank loans.  By successfully repaying bank loans, they establish a positive credit 
history, which is an important first step towards the ability to make municipal bond 
issues.  This experience informs interventions to support bond market development. 
However, key supply-side frictions in the municipal lending market structure can restrict 
liquidity.  These include tighter bank regulation since the GFC, bank/investor information 
asymmetry-related costs, and search costs.  The GFC has restricted banks’ margins and 
balance sheets and has been followed by the higher capital requirements of Basel III 
regulation (e.g. leverage ratio, capital ratio and a need to hold sufficient high-quality 
liquid assets to cover foreseen total net cash outflows over 30 days).  Tighter regulation 
and low nominal interest rates make lending less attractive for banks, by lowering their 
margins and restricting the supply of credit and its subsequent investment.  While a 
government-owned lending institution, such as the UK Public Works Loan Board (PWLB), 
does not suffer obvious credit frictions (its funding source is the UK Treasury),  
Chapter 1 highlights that greater regulation has reduced the competitiveness of specialist 
municipal lending banks globally, which means that SNGs may have to seek loans through 
a standard commercial bank, which might not be so well attuned to the detailed 
requirements of their related investment programmes.  For example, Schnitzler (2017) 
highlights that Swedish commercial banks charge higher credit spreads to smaller, more 
indebted SNGs than larger ones.     
Micro-level drivers are relevant to choice: Rauh and Sufi (2010) show that firms shift 
from bank loans to publicly traded bonds, as their credit quality increases, while Crouzet 
(2017) observes a trade-off between the flexibility of bank borrowing in the case of 
financial distress against the lower marginal costs of large bond issues and claims that 








Credit-pooling bond agencies: advantages versus new frictions   
Versus individual bond issues: the SNG benefits from flexibility in the timing and size of 
borrowing from a counterparty or issuing their own bond individually, relative to 
participating in pooled issuance programmes.  However, MBAs and MBBs claim to 
improve access to funding markets and bond liquidity (Katzman, 1980; Kidwell and 
Rogowski, 1983).  Because of the heterogeneous nature of various SNGs in terms of size 
and credit rating, credit-pooling agencies offer different benefits to their participants and 
some SNGs benefit more than others from MBB participation.  In the US, smaller 
communities with poorer credit ratings benefit the most when issuing debt through MBBs 
(Katzman, 1980; Cole and Millar, 1982; Kidwell and Rogowski, 1983).  On the other hand, 
a large US municipality 5 may command an equal or higher credit rating than that of an 
MBA or MBB.  It might believe that debt issued in its own name is sufficiently liquid and 
improves investor name recognition, as well as having a desire to develop its own credit 
history.  Seeing limited benefit from joining a pooled bond issuance, it may choose to issue 
its own debt.  While a large bond issuer can generate savings in the market from open 
tender, the credit-pooling agent has a niche role to fulfil for smaller and less experienced 
SNGs.  For example, individual municipal bonds are issued through bond underwriters, 
who charge fees and generate gains (a cost to investors and issuers) from reselling these 
bonds to investors.  Many individual US municipality bond issues are small, which leads to 
relatively high transaction costs (e.g. legal, distribution, printing, advertising and bond 
underwriting) as a percentage of total proceeds.  On the other hand, the municipal bond 
bank offers economies of scale and bond issuing expertise.  This is attractive to a 
municipality that may lack the financial knowledge, size or credit rating to issue bonds on 
an irregular basis. 
A restriction for municipalities, joining the bond issuance programmes of an MBB is the 
relative lack of flexibility in timing.  Most MBBs issue series of bonds two-to-four times 
per year and the issue process is time consuming, as the MBB invites participation and 
screens applications.  By contrast, many individual SNGs issue at a time of their choosing 
in normal market conditions, notwithstanding costs and relative credit ratings. 
Credit-pooling agency bonds typically trade in secondary markets at a yield premium to 
their respective sovereign bond yield curves, despite being rated in-line with the 
sovereign’s debt.  This is attractive to investors.  Their bonds can only be issued if the 
                                                          
5 I refer to municipality in the US literature throughout, because this is the target market of the 




agency attains a minimum credit rating from an authorised credit rating agency.  
However, this gives rise to a unique set of frictions.  The efficacy of rating agencies relies 
on their access to reliable and independent financial information.  Inherent in public 
monitoring of a bond market is the ability of multiple participants to undertake 
independent and accurate credit analysis.  Yet the credit rating agency is paid by the bond 
issuer, risking a business pressure on the rating agency to generate a threshold credit 
rating for the issuer.   
Versus bank lending: an MBA acquires detailed knowledge of individual SNGs to rival that 
of a lending bank, as it builds membership.  Municipal bond issues are often substantially 
larger than loans, with longer maturities, lower interest rates and requiring less collateral 
(USAID, 2009; Danilowska, 2009).  If it operates within an efficient bond market, an MBA 
can lower costs for certain issuers by unbundling the services of a lending bank.  In terms 
of monitoring, bond markets rely upon public disclosure and analysis of municipal 
financial information, which compares with the lending banks’ in-house analysis.  Public 
monitoring and disclosure are consistent with greater transparency for all public financial 
institutions. 
 
MBAs’ bonds: joint and several guarantee and government moral obligation 
MBAs outside the US either enjoy an implicit government guarantee of their bond issues 
or they issue bonds with the joint and several guarantee of their members.  This 
guarantee means that each of two or more parties are liable on an obligation to deliver on 
a promise stated in a contract.  If a breach of contract takes place, liability arises to 
honour the contract for either a debt due, or damages, even if the creditor approaches just 
one provider of the guarantee (Revesz, 2002).  Literature on joint-liability lending covers 
screening, monitoring and enforcement of repayment (Ghatek and Guinnane, 1999), 
adverse selection (Ghatek, 1999) and risk matching (Ahlin, 2009) in microfinance, but 
there is little written within the municipal bond literature.  The joint and several 
guarantee creates a coinsurance design, through which SNGs with strong borrowing 
capacities subsidise weaker ones when jointly issuing a bond.  A weakness of this concept 
is when SNGs are reluctant to provide such a guarantee for their liabilities (Schnitzler, 
2017).  UK and French examples underline the difficulties in building new pooled credit 
markets with participating SNGs’ joint and several guarantee (see AFL and UKMBA 




With respect to government guarantees of pooled bond issuers, Hsueh and Kidwell 
(1988) study the effect of the moral obligation of the State on pooled credit markets 
relative to individual bonds, namely the Texas Permanent School Fund bond guarantee 
programme.  This is a stronger condition than the moral obligation of the State to MBB 
bond programmes and allowed school districts to achieve interest cost savings of 
between 40-98 basis points for single A up to Baa-rated issuers respectively, while AA-
rated issuers enjoyed no interest costs savings and AAA-rated issuers suffered a penalty 
yield of 18 basis points above that of other AAA-rated issuers. 
   
Bond characteristics – foreign currency bonds  
US and European SNGs rarely issue bonds in a foreign currency.  On the other hand, for 
the European MBAs, foreign currency bonds represent the majority of their bond 
issuance.  McBrady and Schill (2006) test the opportunistic motive for foreign currency 
borrowing by governments and agency issuers, who have cash flows exclusively in their 
respective local currencies (similar to MBAs and MBBs).  They conclude that covered and 
uncovered interest yield differentials across currencies are important in choosing the 
currency of denomination for international debt.  Chinn and Ito (2000) argue for  
larger-sized foreign currency issues if an issuer is based in a small currency market (e.g. 
the Nordic issuers) and smaller sized issues if the issuer is based in a large currency 
market (e.g. euro based issuers).  Black and Munro (2010) argue that non–government 
agencies within smaller markets issue swap-covered foreign currency bonds to arbitrage 
deviations from covered interest rate parity, to access foreign investors, and to issue 
larger or longer-maturity bonds.  The propensity to issue a bond offshore is related to 
bond characteristics, such as size and tenor, and bond market characteristics, such as 











By the 1990s, over 60 developing countries had established financial intermediaries, such 
as municipal development funds, to provide credit to SNGs and fund infrastructure 
investment, according to the OECD.  However, few of these organisations have evolved 
into market-oriented suppliers of credit, capable of mobilising private sector savings, or 
leading to private sector participation in the municipal credit market.  By contrast, in 
developed markets there has been a slow move towards public institutions, such as SNGs, 
raising their own funds in capital markets.  Decentralisation in many developed countries 
may shift the burden of funding investment programmes to SNGs.  Thus, the local 
authority credit market is an important source of funding, matching long-term financing 
to infrastructure investment programmes.   
This study examines the financial innovation of developed market SNGs to raise private 
funds.  It addresses clear gaps in the existing literature ― there is only one other paper on 
European municipal bond agencies (MBAs) relevant to Chapter 1; none on MBAs are 
relevant to Chapter 3; and the database for Chapter 2 is substantially more detailed than 
any in the current literature.  In particular, the thesis compares three important 
alternative means for raising long-term debt: 
i. Direct government-backed lending 
ii. Individual bond issues  
iii. Municipal credit-pooling agency backed bond issues 
Given a UK focus, Chapter 1 addresses which of these alternatives - (i) or (iii) - is best 
suited for SNGs, by examining the relative trade-offs.  What is the yield spread of pooled 
municipal debt over sovereign debt in the presence of either a joint and several guarantee 
of pool members or a sovereign guarantee of the issuer?  What are its determinants?   
To address these questions  the performance of European MBAs is reviewed.  This 
chapter addresses frictions in municipal lending.   
Chapter 2 examines which of the alternatives - (ii) or (iii) - is best suited for SNGs by 
examining the relative trade-offs in the primary market.  Is there an interest cost 
advantage to a municipality by participating in a pooled agency bond issue relative to 
issuing their own bond?  Are participants motivated by credit rating and issue size 
advantages?  I look at the US market to assess this question, given that both MBBs and 




Chapter 3 investigates a potential advantage of MBAs by examining, within (iii), the role 
for issuing domestic as opposed to foreign denominated bonds.  Municipal bond agencies 
are flexible in the currency of their bond issuance.  Are they reducing issue costs or simply 
chasing customer appetite?  Here the performance of their foreign currency bond 
issuance is considered, including discussion of covered interest parity (CIP) and the 
channels of its failure.  CIP is a no-arbitrage condition that is supported by minimal 
transaction costs, low political risk, low credit and counterparty risk, low liquidity risk 
and low measurement error.  Deviations from CIP contradict the operation of a 
frictionless foreign exchange market.  The breakdown of CIP allows MBAs to generate 
risk-free interest cost savings, relative to domestic bonds, when issuing bonds in foreign 
currency. 
Concluding remarks 
The following chapters will demonstrate that applying the funding model of a European 
MBA to the newly-formed UKMBA should allow it to generate interest cost savings for its 
borrowers, relative to borrowing direct from central government agencies, but that these 
savings are not conclusive; that the size of borrowing requirement and the credit 
worthiness of the borrower determine whether a municipality should participate in MBB 
bond issuing activity; and that European MBAs often, but not always, generate interest 
cost savings by issuing bonds in foreign currencies, relative to their respective domestic 
currency. 
Despite a long and successful history in parts of Europe and Japan, municipal credit-
pooling agencies do not have deep roots on a global basis.  There are relatively few 
developed countries where municipal bond agencies or municipal bond banks are active, 
which leads me to investigate the growth potential of this niche of public finance.  The two 
newest entrants to the cohort of MBAs are Agence France Locale and the UK Municipal 
Bond Agency.  Both have found early progress to be hard earned.  The former has issued a 
total of €3.0 billion of bonds in the five years since its launch, while the latter has yet to 
issue a bond.  Yet the credit-pooling agency concept has achieved good traction in the five 
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CHAPTER 1: DOMESTIC YIELD SPREADS 





A municipal bond agency (MBA) funds its lending activity by the issuance of bonds on a 
regular basis.  If it issues successfully, then it can generate interest cost savings for its 
participants, relative to borrowing from other channels.  What spread over its sovereign 
yield might a newly launched UKMBA expect to achieve with its bond issues over time?  
Based on a European peer group, I use a synthetic control methodology to estimate the 
spread of domestic currency denominated MBA bond yields compared to the respective 
government’s sovereign yield curve in secondary markets and determine that the UKMBA 
might expect to be competitive relative to a government-backed loans provider.  I identify 
the best linear estimation model of European MBA yield spreads.  Liquidity impacts the 
yield spread negatively, while duration, credit rating and coupon are significant and 
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The UK Municipal Bond Agency (UKMBA) is planning to issue bonds as a credit-pooling 
agency, in order to fund loans to English and Welsh local authorities.  To establish a 
foothold in long-term local authority funding, it must demonstrate meaningful interest 
cost savings to local authorities, relative to their existing methods of raising funds for 
long-term projects.  For example, a 10 basis point saving on current interest costs could 
represent up to £100 million per annum for British local authorities over the long run.  
Can it compete with the Public Works Loan Board (PWLB), the lender which represents 
almost 80% of local authority long-term financing?  Most local and unitary authorities in 
England, Wales and Scotland currently borrow direct from the PWLB to fund capital 
investment projects.  This agency of the UK Treasury draws funds from the National 
Loans Fund and lends money upon demand to local authorities.  For new loans, the PWLB 
forms a ‘Certainty Rate’, which applies equally to all local authorities for their long-term 
borrowing.  PWLB loans to local authorities were set at an annual interest rate premium 
of 80 basis points over the UK par gilt curve until October 2019, when it was increased to 
100 basis points.  It had £78.3 billion of fixed- and variable-rate loans outstanding to the 
sector at March 2019 and generated £2.9 billion of interest income in the 2018/19 
financial year.  Other local authority funding sources include private sector banks, with 
£18 billion of combined lending, while a small number of UK local authorities undertake 
their own bond issues, raising £4.3 billion in the above financial year (source: UK Ministry 
of Housing, Communities and Local Government).      
If a UK credit-pooling agency is to thrive, it must issue bonds at a competitive yield, which 
will fund long-term loans to local authorities more cheaply than if they were to borrow 
directly from government-backed agencies or banks.  This study investigates the spread 
over the local sovereign yield curve at which a UK credit-pooling agency can expect to 
issue fixed coupon, fixed term bonds in the presence of a joint and several guarantee of its 
members, in order to fund its lending activities to local authorities.  I look to the mature 
European MBAs for guidance and investigate domestic currency bonds, which represent 
an important part of their funding.  Of the six mature European MBAs’ outstanding bonds, 
33% were denominated in their respective domestic currencies at December 2016.   
I compare the yield spreads relative to respective sovereign curves of bonds issued by 
these MBAs over time from a representative sample.  Adopting a synthetic control 
methodology, a subsample of European MBA bond issues is used to statistically replicate 




in order to compare pricing of these issues.  The synthetic control group is created by 
matching on country and macro characteristics, given the difficulties in matching the 
bond issuer characteristics of a synthetic MBA with no history of bond issues.  This 
provides a cross-sectional comparison of average pricing across the issuance design, 
which estimates how a mature UK MBA would have fared in open secondary market 
conditions over the period.  The synthetic UK MBA’s bond yield spreads are then 
compared with those of a synthetic PWLB bond issuer (created to replicate its aggregate 
lending activity) to determine the competitiveness of a mature bond agency. 
I also observe how key determinants influence the bond yield spread to their respective 
sovereign yield curve, having first identified the best regression model to explain the yield 
spreads.  There is one just recent European paper (Schnitzler, 2017) of relevance to this 
work.  The majority of the literature covers the US municipal bond market; yet European 
and US municipal bonds have different features.  I address gaps in the existing literature, 
as I strive to offer policy guidance to the newly created UKMBA.  The literature review on 
pages 43-47 identifies a number of drivers of the pricing of municipal bond securities:  
1. The price that the respective sovereign borrower of an MBA pays to borrow 
money in the securities markets, i.e. the interest rate on government bonds. 
2. Liquidity of the securities: the bonds of large borrowers with many investors can 
be more easily traded in a secondary market than smaller issues. 
3. Duration: the greater the remaining life on a bond, the greater its yield divergence 
from the benchmark sovereign yield, in general. 
4. Credit risk: the amount of compensation required for risk of default. 
5. Coupon: I follow the tax clientele literature to identify whether the tax status of 
different investors affects the relationship between coupon and yield spread. 
Different regression models are compared to identify the impact of key determinants.  
While an OLS or GLS model achieves the highest R-squared in general, I test whether this 
is the best linear predictor.  The literature often employs the use of lagged dependent 
variables among regressors.  These may be correlated with error terms.  Thus, 
identification of coefficients might require the use of instrumental variation.  While 
liquidity and duration can be assigned at random and their effects on yield spread 
identified, they may themselves result from endogenous decisions of the market.   




Economic setting – municipal bank lending versus bonds 
This chapter compares direct government-backed lending to subnational governments 
(SNGs) and municipal credit-pooling agency-backed bond issues, by examining the 
relative trade-offs.  Government-backed lending is an important source of SNG long-term 
credit financing globally.  However, a trend of decentralisation is shifting the burden of 
funding investment programmes to SNGs, including the issue of bonds for long-term 
finance.  Among bond issuers, the MBAs function as intermediaries between SNGs and 
capital markets in their respective countries.  They are organised either as government 
agencies or co-operative entities and provide access to long-term finance to their 
participants.  They issue bonds either with a government guarantee or the joint and 
several guarantee of their members.  The six oldest European MBAs maintain strong 
balance sheets and have never defaulted on a bond issue.  Thus, they all command credit 
ratings in-line with their respective sovereign issuers.   
Why issue bonds rather than borrow from government or banks?  Peterson (2003) 
highlights that municipal lending banks bundle their services to SNGs, which means that 
they do not price them to correspond with their incremental costs.  Typically, such a bank 
lends to all SNGs at the same interest rate with no differentiation of credit quality from 
one SNG to another and a failure to price services that correspond with their incremental 
costs.  The UK’s PWLB is one example.  A local authority, lacking experience in financial 
markets, may find the bundled services and pricing of a municipal lending bank more 
attractive than a large and better credit-rated local authority, which may have more 
sources of credit available.  However, the nature of many of these loans is that they 
consist of small amounts, reflecting the size and requirements of their recipients, which 
can lead to relatively high transaction costs.   
The relationship banking skills of a municipal lending bank are important.  Providing 
loans to fund investment projects, its relationship banking service includes the 
structuring of SNG budgets, investment programmes and financial analysis for SNGs that 
lack credit market experience.  As long as municipal lending banks enjoy preferential 
access to low-rate long-term savings, they can provide low-cost, long-term loans to SNGs 
to finance local infrastructure investment.  In the case of Crédit Local de France, this was 
provided by La Poste’s savings plans for small savers; in Italy, the public bank, Cassa 
Depositi e Prestiti, is 83% owned by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and raises 
much of its funding through postal savings; in the UK, the PWLB draws its funding from 




have lost their exclusive access to sources of low-cost, long-term savings, obliging them to 
compete for funds with the broad market.  Post the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the 
higher capital requirements of Basel III regulation have limted their ability to supply 
credit, relative to previous years.  Banks’ margins and balance sheets are more restricted 
by tighter capital requirements that enforce increases in bank liquidity and decreases in 
bank leverage.  This impacts municipal and other lending for commercial banks, with a 
resultant impact on the price of credit.   
At less than US$1,500 billion globally, SNG lending is a relatively small part of total bank 
lending activity (OECD/UCLG, 2016), so many banks subsume this into their broader 
commercial banking activity, possibly eroding the special relationships that support 
lending to this community.  Without a well-established specialised municipal lending 
bank as a partner, an SNG must seek loans through the standard commercial banking 
network, which might not be so well attuned to the detailed requirements of its related 
investment programme.  Schnitzler (2017) finds evidence in Sweden that commercial 
banks charge higher credit spreads to smaller, more indebted SNGs than larger SNGs. 
 
Municipal bond agencies  
An MBA indirectly leverages on its country’s borrowing capacity and to be effective, 
national institutions must be supportive.  This includes a highly credit-rated central 
government; a legal framework that allows interventions if an SNG falls into financial 
hardship; and prudent borrowing by subnational governments.  An MBA builds a detailed 
knowledge of individual SNGs to rival that of a lending bank.  If it operates within an 
efficient bond market, it can lower costs for certain issuers by unbundling the services of 
a lending bank.  In terms of monitoring, bond markets rely upon public disclosure and 
analysis of municipal financial information, contrasting with the lending banks’ in-house 
analysis.  This is consistent with greater transparency for all public financial institutions.   
In a world where high quality sovereign bonds command low real and nominal yields, the 
high credit ratings and relatively low risk of MBA bonds are attractive to investors, given 
that they typically trade in secondary markets at a yield premium to their respective 
sovereign bond yield curves.  Attaining a threshold credit rating from an authorised credit 
rating agency gives rise to a unique set of frictions.  The efficacy of rating agencies relies 
on their access to reliable and independent financial information.  Inherent in public 
monitoring of a bond market is the ability of multiple participants to undertake 




issuer, which might create a business pressure on the agency to generate a threshold 
credit rating for the issuer.   
In the Introduction to the thesis, I define how each of the mature European municipal 
bond agencies enjoy either an implicit government guarantee of their bond issues or they 
issue bonds with the joint and several guarantee of their members.  This enables an 
MBA's risk to be equated with that of its guarantor or liable institution by the credit rating 
agencies.  KommuneKredit, Kommuninvest, MuniFin and AFL bonds are subject to the 
joint and several guarantee by their respective members, whereby each shareholder 
guarantees the entirety of the relevant agency's liabilities.  A joint and several guarantee 
creates a coinsurance design through which SNGs with strong borrowing capacities 
subsidise weaker ones when jointly issuing a bond.  The MBA business model is 
challenged, if SNGs are reluctant to provide a joint guarantee for their liabilities, unless an 
equivalent guarantee can be installed, such as the implicit support of the government or 
government ownership.  In effect, BNG and KBN are controlled by their respective central 
governments, given their respective ownership.  NWB, is partly owned by the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands and its status as a government-related entity allows an implicit 
government guarantee of liabilities.  While no formal government guarantees exist for 
these three agencies, their respective roles in the Dutch and Norwegian public sectors 
imply a high probability of government support if needed.  For example, in the case of 
NWB, Standard & Poor’s states in its annual assessment that ‘We base our ratings…solely 
on…an almost certain likelihood of timely and sufficient extraordinary government 
support in the event of financial distress.’ 
To give a background, the individual European MBAs are briefly described.  The first 
subnational government bond funding agency was created in Denmark in 1898.  A 
Norwegian agency followed in 1926 and agencies were founded in Sweden in 1986 and 
Finland in 1990.  The Netherlands is home to the two largest agencies (BNG Bank – 
founded in 1914; and NWB Bank – founded in 1954), as measured by balance sheet.  All 
these MBAs hold credit ratings in-line with their respective sovereign.  Agence France 
Locale was created in December 2013 and is owned by French local authorities.  Its long-
term Moody’s credit rating of Aa3 compares with a French sovereign rating of Aa2.  














Benchmark currency EUR/USD EUR/USD EUR/USD 
Ownership 100% SNGs 17% central government, 
81% water boards,  
2% provinces 
50% central government, 
50% SNGs 
Loan guarantee Joint & several 




Purpose Danish public sector 
lending only 
Dutch public sector and 
water board lending 
Dutch public sector 
lending only 







Benchmark currency EUR/USD SEK/USD EUR/USD 
Ownership 100% central 
government 
100% SNGs 30.66% Keva, 16% central 
government, 53.34% SNGs 
Loan guarantee Government owned, 
Letter of Support 
Joint & several guarantee 
by members 
Jointly guaranteed by 
SNGs 
Purpose Norwegian public sector 
lending only 
Swedish public sector 
lending only 
Finnish public sector 
lending only 
Profit motive Profit maximising Non-profit Profit maximising 
Source: MBA data 
Each of the European MBAs act on behalf of SNGs at two levels in their respective 
countries (municipal/water authority and regional), as defined in the Introduction: 
Table 3: The Tiers of Subnational Government in the Countries of Interest 
  1st Level 2nd Level Number of MBA members 
Denmark 98 municipalities 5 regions all munis and regions 
Finland 311 municipalities 19 regions all munis and regions 
France 36,697 municipalities 101 departments 292 shareholders 
Netherlands 383  municipalities 12 provinces 
public sector: local and 
water authorities, housing 
and healthcare institutions 
Norway 422  municipalities 18 regions all munis and regions 
Sweden 290 municipalities 21 counties 277 munis + 11 counties 
Source: MBAs 
Non-interest costs of the agencies 
While I compare interest costs between MBAs’ bonds and other forms of capital fund 
raising, MBAs do incur other costs, which may be attributable to participating SNGs.  The 
annual non-interest administration costs of a European MBA are 7-10 basis points of 
assets under supervision (source: MBAs’ annual accounts).  These are financed by MBA 
revenues that include interest received from lending to local authorities by the agency.  
Thus, they are not a direct cost of a bond issue.  On the other hand, the one-off transaction 
costs of primary bond issuance include syndication, placement, credit rating, legal, 
printing and other fees.  These approximate to 5-10 basis points of the principal and are 




The paper is divided as follows: Section 2 summarises relevant literature.  Section 3 
compares the bond issues of a synthetic UK MBA and a synthetic PWLB.  Section 4 
discusses the yield spread data and important variables and defines the best linear 
regression model.  Section 5 presents regression results on an unbalanced panel of yield 

















Table 4: Literature Highlights Determinants of European MBA Yield Spreads 
Paper Topic Main Results Comments 
LIQUIDITY  A number of studies estimate 
liquidity by the bid-offer spread of 
US municipal bonds or Länder 
bonds 
Data providers only 
publish mid prices for 
European muni bonds 





Yield spreads over benchmark 
bonds depend significantly on 
liquidity and credit quality 
Germany and Spain pay 






Uses a measure of price return 
relative to volume 
Study restricted to 
equities 
Wang, Wu & 
Zhang (2006) 
Liquidity, credit 
risk and tax 
Liquidity, default risk and taxes 
are all strongly significant factors 
on US muni yield spreads 
Estimate liquidity by 





Liquidity US municipal bond market 
liquidity increases with credit 
quality and falls with time-to-
maturity  
Municipal bond 
transaction costs are 
more than those of 
equity trades 
Lin, Liu, Wang 
& Wu (2009) 
Liquidity Much of yield spread between 
muni and taxable bonds driven by 
liquidity premium 
Liquidity premium is 
correlated to maturity, 
size, volume, coupon 
Ang, Bhansali 
& Xing (2010) 
Liquidity, credit 
risk and tax 
Liquidity is a more important 
driver of yield spread than tax 
Compared municipal 
bonds with Build 
America Bonds 
CREDIT RISK  Credit ratings recognised as a 
driver of yields in corporate and 
government bonds 
Credit risk drives yield 
spreads of European 
municipal bonds 
Capeci (1991) Credit risk   Effects of credit rating changes 
are large and significant 
Credit ratings changes 
impact yield spreads 
directly and indirectly 
Canuto & Liu 
(2013) 
Financial crisis 
and credit risk 
Subnational yield spreads rose by 
an average 46bps over two years 
through the credit crisis 
SNG yield spreads 
depend on credit risk, 
liquidity, risk appetite  
Cornaggia et al. 
(2015) 
Credit risk Upgrades in credit rating reduce 
credit spreads 
Argues to include credit 
ratings in regressions 
TAXATION AND COUPON Given tax exemption, much US 
literature identifies tax as a 
significant factor in yield spreads 
There is no European 
municipal bonds 
investor tax advantage  
Schaefer 
(1982) 
Tax clientele High coupon bonds are primarily 
held by low tax payers and low 
coupon levels by high tax payers. 
Tax clienteles: refer to 
percentage of total 
return from coupon 
income  
Ang, Bhansali 
& Xing (2014) 
Taxation The tax exemption on US 
municipal bonds lowers yields.  
Credit risk and illiquidity raises 
yield spreads 
The financial crisis 
reversed relationship of 
municipal bond and 
Treasury yields 
LAGGED DEPENDENT VARIABLE  Time persistence of bond yields:  
add lags of dependent variable  
Debate as to the best 
models, given OLS bias  




They use a GMM method of 
Arellano & Bond (1991) 
Optimal for a small 
number of time periods 




They propose 2SLS with cross-









The Nordic Model - Local Government, Global Competitiveness in Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden (jointly authored by Kommunekredit, MuniFin and Kommuninvest, 2012) states 
that subnational governments here have a broader portfolio of responsibilities than in 
most other countries and, thus, are responsible for a higher proportion of total taxation 
and government spending.  The Nordic MBAs have never experienced a default.  However, 
even after the creation of Kommuninvest, individual Swedish SNGs still experienced 
stress.  Von Hagen et al. (2000) show that by 1998, 87 of them had applied at least once 
for central government grants during respective financial crises, thus avoiding 
bankruptcy.   
There are no MBAs in Germany, Italy or Spain and the majority of European SNG 
literature covers regional bond issuers rather than those at the municipality level.  For 
example, Schuknecht et al. (2009) claim that German and Spanish SNG bonds pay 
liquidity-related interest rate premia relative to their respective sovereign bonds.  
However, large inter-governmental transfers have suppressed these premia and delinked 
bond prices from underlying fiscal risks, such as debt levels.  Furthermore, the public debt 
of German SNGs benefits from an implicit guarantee of the German States.  In Italy, Pinna 
(2014) claims that the bond yields of the regions are affected by an issuer’s specific 
economic factors.  By contrast, Italian cities’ and provinces’ default risks are related to 
that of the sovereign, due to the reliance of local authorities’ revenues on central 
government transfers.  Canuto and Liu (2013) quantify the effect of sub-sovereign credit 
ratings, liquidity and investor risk appetite on yield spreads across European SNGs in 22 
countries.  Schnitzler (2017) finds evidence of risk-sharing within the Swedish municipal 
bond market and net gains of improved credit across all borrowers.   
The majority of relevant literature covers the US municipal bond market, while this paper 
focuses on European municipal bond markets.  European and US municipal bonds have 
some different features.  For example, investing in many US municipal bonds is tax 
efficient for domestic retail investors, relative to other bond markets, but there is no 
explicit tax advantage to investors in investing in European municipal bonds.  
Nonetheless, key threads of the US literature are relevant and I draw upon this and other 







Determinant 1: Liquidity, investor transparency and trading costs  
Liquidity is widely recognised as an important driver of bond yield spreads.  The US 
municipal bond market is notoriously illiquid.  Harris and Piwowar (2006) find high 
dealer mark-ups and transaction costs and a lack of transparency.  The average municipal 
bond traded just 15 times in total over its life.  It is not until the 99.9th percentile of their 
sample that they find municipal bonds that trade up to six times per day.  They show that 
liquidity increases with credit quality and decreases with investment complexity, time to 
maturity and time since issue.  Wang et al. (2006) find that the effects of liquidity, default 
risk and personal taxes on the relative yields of municipal and treasury bonds are all 
strongly significant, when regressed on by US municipal bond yield spreads.  The liquidity 
premium explains 7-13% of yield spreads for AAA bonds and 8-20% for BBB bonds.   
Lin et al. (2009) find that a substantial portion of the yield spread between the relative 
yields on municipal and taxable bonds is attributable to the liquidity premium, which is 
highly correlated to maturity, size, age, coupon and bond volume. 
Ang et al. (2010) underline that liquidity is a more important component of the municipal 
yield spread than tax, by comparing with the Build America Bonds (BABs) programme of 
2009-10.  The latter bonds carried no tax exemptions.  Ang and Green (2013) show that a 
typical US municipal bond trades just twice a year and the liquidity and information effect 
on transaction costs is equivalent to 103 basis points of turnover.  Marlowe (2013) 
recognises the lack of liquidity in the US municipal bond market and claims that 10-20% 
of the municipal bond yield spread is attributable to liquidity risk.  He constructs an 
‘implied bond liquidity’ from the weighted average of observed liquidity in all portfolios 
that hold the bond, even if the bond does not actually trade.  Intuitively, it would be 
expected that a bond held by an active investor has greater potential liquidity than a bond 
held by a passive investor.   
So how should liquidity be measured?  Some German Länder bonds are exchange traded, 
which allows Heppke-Falk and Wolff (2008) to develop proxies of liquidity from bond 
prices’ bid-offer spreads.  But most European municipal bonds are traded over-the-
counter.  So there are no published exchange data on volumes traded or price spreads 
over time in my sample.  Data providers disclose period-end mid-price and yield-to-
maturity for each bond, which allows calculation of the total value of bond issuance 
outstanding.  This approach is supported by papers on US municipal bond banks (Kidwell 
and Rogowski, 1983; Reid, 1990) and municipal bonds (Namvar et al., 2015), which 




government bond markets, Chakravarty (1999) regresses realised bid-offer spreads on 
liquidity and finds that the spread falls with rising trading volume and rises with time to 
maturity and after-tax yield.  He inspects each bond with at least one buy and one sell 
transaction per day and defines the bid-offer spread as the difference in the average 
buying and selling prices.  Focusing on stock price returns, Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986) also use the bid-offer spread as an instrument of liquidity.  Amihud (2002) later 
developed average daily return relative to a stock’s daily dollar volume as a measure.  
This is interpreted as the daily stock price reaction to a dollar of trading volume.   
Determinant 2: Duration or time to maturity   
Duration is a measure of a bond price’s sensitivity to changes in interest rates and is an 
important indicator of interest rate risk.  It is defined as the weighted average term-to-
maturity of a bond's cash flows, where the weights are the present values of each cash 
flow as a percentage of the bond's price.  Although most research includes duration as  
a regressor of yield spreads, Namvar et al. (2015) also find that US municipal bond yields 
are positively correlated to the time-to-maturity of the bond, in addition to the credit 
default swap premia of the issuer and are negatively correlated to a bond insurance 
dummy.  I look at time-to-maturity as a regressor within the robustness checks.   
Determinant 3: Credit risk  
Liu and Thakor (1984) find that credit ratings have an independent effect on municipal 
bond yields, given the private information of the rating agencies.  Capeci (1991, 1994) 
investigates how an SNG’s credit rating affects its borrowing rate.  He concludes that 
credit markets impose discipline on the SNG’s fiscal behaviour and that the effects of 
changes in credit rating are statistically significant.  An upgrade from Baa to Aaa (Moody’s 
ratings) is associated with a reduction in the borrowing rate of approximately 1.5%.  Debt 
levels impact bond yields directly.  Ang et al. (2014) disaggregate the municipal bond 
yield spread into credit, liquidity and tax components.  They show that the tax exemption 
on US municipal bonds lowers yields on average, although credit risk and illiquidity relate 
positively to yield spreads.  After the 2008 financial crisis, a decomposed municipal yield 
spread over Treasuries comprised a tax component of -1.84%, a credit component of 






Determinant 4: Coupon and tax clientele 
I identify a significant effect of bond coupon on municipal bond yield spreads.  Schaefer 
(1982) demonstrates how bonds’ tax clienteles relate to the fraction of its total return 
from coupon income relative to capital gain and claims that personal tax rates influence 
pricing and portfolio decisions in the gilt market - higher rate tax payers may desire lower 
coupon bonds than lower rate tax payers.  Kim et al. (1993) show that the default risk in 
corporate bond coupons affects valuation and Elton et al. (2001) argue that the coupon is 
higher for lower-rated debt, so the tax burden is higher, which suggests a tax effect.  
Methodology: introducing lags of the dependent variable into the model 
Addressing the time persistence of yield spreads may require the inclusion of at least a 
one-period lagged dependent variable in regressions.  Wang et al. (2006) and Zipfel and 
Zimmer (2013) identify high time persistence in yield spreads.  A lagged dependent 
variable in the regressors implies that a classical OLS approach may not be the best 
method to solve the model, given estimation bias.  They use instrumental variables. 
Addressing the time persistence of yield spreads with respect to EMU sovereign bond 
yields, Afonso et al. (2015) include lagged dependent variables as regressors and propose 
a 2SLS solution with cross-sectional weights that accounts for cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity.  They also investigate Feasible Generalised Least Squares and achieve 
similar results to their 2SLS model, concluding that credit ratings and certain macro and 
fiscal fundamentals explain sovereign spreads. 
Barrios et al. (2009) investigate the impact of different investor risk appetite regimes on 
the time persistence of yield spreads.  They use a lagged dependent variable to correct for 
serial correlation.  A GMM estimator is used to solve the dynamic panel data model, as 
described by Arellano and Bond (1991), but this has limitations for a long time series.  
Nickell (1981) investigates the bias of the OLS estimator in dynamic panel models with 
fixed effects.  He finds asymptotic biases in first order autoregressive models that use 
panel data, when estimated by OLS.  The bias falls as a function of 1/T.  Judson and Owen 
(1989) compare different panel estimators for unbalanced samples of a range of 
macroeconomic datasets that include a lagged dependent variable among the regressors.  
They find that the OLS estimator with country dummies performs the best when the 
number of time periods, T, exceeds 30.  For T less than or equal to 20, they argue in favour 
of a GMM approach.  Beck and Katz (2004) argue that the Nickell bias is less than 2% 




COMPARING SYNTHETIC MBA AND SYNTHETIC PWLB BOND ISSUES 
European MBA bonds are traded in secondary markets by a number of investment banks 
and dealers on an Over-the-Counter (OTC) basis, where transaction volume is not 
reported publicly.  To access a representative sample of volumes traded requires data 
provision direct from the dealers that trade the bonds.  Therefore, my focus on the access 
to credit is on price.   
Deriving municipal bond spreads 
My objective is to estimate the yield spread relative to a UK sovereign curve that  
a synthetic UK municipal bond agency, with a credit rating in-line with its sovereign, 
might expect its bonds to trade at over time.  Firstly, I calculate the spreads of the yield-
to-maturity of a representative sample of European MBA bond yields, duration-matched 
to their respective government zero-coupon yield curves, and then I use a synthetic 
control methodology to match European results to the UK and estimate a UK yield spread.   
The yield-to-maturity over time of the sample of municipal bonds is observable.  
Estimating government bond yield curves requires more work: it is possible to identify 
the benchmark constituents of government yield curves over time, which provides the 
building blocks of a sovereign yield curve.  A zero-coupon yield curve provides a reference 
point to estimate the present value of money across different countries.  Using monthly 
benchmark data, I calculate zero-coupon government yield curves for Denmark, Finland, 
the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.  Different central banks adopt different 
methodologies across Europe.  To follow a common process for all jurisdictions, the 
Nelson-Siegel-Svensson method is adopted across all five markets.  This process is 
defined within the Appendix.  It can offer an improved fit to the data and a smoother 
shape relative to the Nelson–Siegel curve, which has fewer parameters.  On the other 
hand, the model can struggle with irregular yield curves. 
 
Selecting representative bonds 
The six European MBAs issued 859 fixed coupon, fixed maturity-date bonds between 
2010-15, which represents approximately 85% of all their issued bonds.  Of these,  
116 were domestic currency bonds.  The sample also includes bonds that may have been 
issued before 2010 and were outstanding during the period of review.  The sample 
includes an unbalanced panel of 70 bonds, issued by the MBAs, in secondary markets at 




inclusion in the sample is that bonds are actively traded and therefore have price 
variation over time.  The MBAs have issued several bonds as private placements, which 
subsequently scarcely trade in secondary markets.  These are excluded from 
consideration, so that the adopted sample represents over 52% of bonds with suitable 
liquidity.  The selected bonds exhibit monthly price movements almost all of the time and 
are subject to their respective issuing agency’s credit rating.   
Bond selection is representative of all the MBAs’ respective issuance programmes.  The 
majority of the PWLB’s loans in the UK are for terms of more than 10 years.  However, 
there are relatively few European MBA bonds in issue of that term or longer, which 
impacts inference for longer-dated synthetic UK MBA 6 bonds.  I select bonds with a broad 
cross-section of coupons and time-to-maturity, whose prices are directly observable over 
time.  Each of the six agencies has active bond issuance programmes.  BNG, NWB and 
MuniFin issue domestic currency denominated bonds in euros and the other MBAs issue 
domestic currency bonds, denominated in Swedish, Norwegian and Danish krone 
respectively.  I draw 16 bonds from BNG and NWB, 14 from Kommuninvest, 9 from 
Kommunekredit, 8 from KBN and 7 from MuniFin, which reflects the number of domestic 
currency bonds, issued by each agency over the period.  The 70 bonds generate 2,856 
observations over the period December 2009 – December 2015.  The mean size of bond 
issuance outstanding is €683m, the median is €350 m; the range is from less than €10 m 
up to €3,377m.      
Four bonds generate monthly data throughout the period.  The other bonds either mature 
before the end or are issued after the start of the period under review.  This defines an 
unbalanced data panel of each municipal bond yield to its respective zero-coupon 
government yield curve, matched by duration.  The distribution of yield spreads over the 
whole sample is not normal.  The mean yield spread over the respective sovereign yield 
curve over the full time period is 51 basis points, the median yield spread is 45 basis 
points and the standard deviation is 33 basis points.  The range is from -1 basis point to 
207 basis points and 8.7% of all observations are in excess of 100 basis points.  The mean 
yield spread of all bonds outstanding peaked at 104 basis points in December 2011 and 
declined thereafter.   
 
 
                                                          
6 Note the difference in syntax that I use throughout of UK MBA for a synthetic UK municipal bond 




Figure 4: Average Bond Yield Spread by Issuer and Month (basis points)  
Source: Calculated as the average of yield spreads observed each month; MUN is MuniFin, KKT is 
Kommunekredit, KMN is Kommuninvest; ALL is a simple average of all bonds outstanding each month 
Table 5 shows the average yield spreads and bond duration over 2010-15 by individual 
issuer.  On average, the Dutch and Danish issues are of longer duration than those of KBN, 
Kommuninvest and MuniFin: 
Table 5: Average Bond Duration and Yield Spread for Each Issuer  
Issuer Mean Yield Spread Standard Deviation Mean Duration 
BNG 42.4 24.8 7.27 years 
Kommunekredit 62.2 32.1 6.65 years 
NWB 39.9 23.9 6.50 years 
Kommuninvest 78.5 36.9 5.04 years 
MuniFin 31.4 31.5 4.15 years 









Using synthetic control to create a UK MBA yield spread 
I want to derive a synthetic UK MBA bond yield spread over time from the other European 
MBA spreads.  The UK Municipal Bond Agency is a less mature organisation than the six 
large European MBAs.  Before October 2019, the proposed operating model of the UKMBA 
followed the joint and several guarantee of bond issuance design.  Moody’s confirmed the 
credit rating of the UKMBA at Aa3 in its periodic review of April 2019.  This represents a 
one notch discount to the credit rating of the UK government.  To quote Moody’s 
rationale: ‘The credit profile of the UK Municipal Bond Agency reflects the strong credit 
quality of the local authority sector and the presence of structural enhancements to the 
pool.  The credit challenges are the start-up nature of the agency and the strong 
incumbent of the Public Works Loan Board, which provides competitive finance to the 
sector with easy access.’  The six mature European MBAs are all rated in-line with their 
respective sovereigns’ credit ratings.   
To compare yield spreads from existing European data, I consider a counterfactual that is 
based on a synthetic mature UK MBA being the established dominant provider of credit to 
UK local authorities, as is the case in the Netherlands and the Nordic countries.   
I assume that it would issue bonds on the joint and several guarantee of its member SNGs.  
In this case the synthetic UK MBA might command a credit rating in-line with its 
sovereign. 
Creating controls to approximate the UK municipal bond issuer 
Synthetic control methodology is often used to estimate treatment effects on an existing 
bond issuer.  Controls can be generated at country, macro-economic or issuer levels.  In 
this case, the UKMBA has not yet issued a bond, so there are no municipal bonds or issuer 
characteristics over time to match on, in order to estimate a yield spread.  This 
necessitates using country and economic variables in order to create the optimal 
weightings of the existing MBAs to estimate the yield spreads of a synthetic UK MBA over 
2010-15.   
I minimise the mean square prediction error of a set of predictors from the five relevant 
European countries to variables such as generic government bond yields and 
macroeconomic variables over the period 2000-15.  These include investment grade bond 
yields; change in real GDP; GDP per capita; unemployment; public debt as a percentage of 
GDP; financial debt as a percentage of GDP; government gross debt; government net 
lending; and inflation.  I match on government bond yields rather than investment grade 




1. A full time series is available on 10-year government bond yields for all countries from 
December 2000, (compared with December 2003 for investment grade yield spreads for 
all countries);  
2. Investment grade bond indices may not have the same attributes (e.g. credit ratings and 
duration) from one country to another, so matching may not be like-for-like.  
The variables that provide the optimum predictor balance for government bond yield 
over the observation period include bond yield; change in real GDP; inflation; 
unemployment; private debt as a percentage of GDP; and non-financial debt as  
a percentage of GDP.  Table 6 highlights the balance of the predictors of the UK variables: 




Bond yield 4.67% 4.50% 
GDP annual change 1.81% 1.52% 
Inflation 1.92% 1.91% 
Unemployment 5.45% 5.53% 
Private debt as a percent of GDP 224% 215% 
Non-financial debt as a percent of GDP 89% 97% 
Source: National accounts, Stata Synth; the columns compare actual variables of the UK from 2010 with those 
that the synthetic control method estimates          
Figure 5 shows that this is not a perfect approach – the difference between the synthetic 
and actual UK 10-year government bond yield ranges up to 90 basis points over time, 
which weakens the case for inference.  However, comparison over time of the UK 10-year 
government bond yield with a simple average of five European countries’ bond yields 
offers no greater insight – the range of difference here is up to 96 basis points.  I have 
found no other relevant bond-related time series than that highlighted above, which 














Figure 5: Difference Between the Synthetic and Actual UK 10-year Bond Yields 
Source: Bloomberg and IMF; the treated unit is the UK 10-year government bond yield, the synthetic control 
unit is an optimal blend of Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden 10-year bond yields 
The synthetic control methodology suggests weightings for the estimated UK government 
bond yield of 44.5% Denmark, 30.4% Finland and 25.1% Norway and minimises the 
contribution of data from the Netherlands and Sweden to zero respectively.  Applying 
these weightings to a synthetic UK MBA of structural similarity to the European peer 
group implies an expected  mean yield spread to the UK zero-coupon sovereign yield of its 
bonds of 52.3 basis points in secondary markets over all of 2010-15.  This is somewhat 
problematic for inference of longer-term synthetic UK MBA bonds, because Finland and 
Norway are home to the MBAs with the shortest duration bonds in the sample, on 
average.  Table 7 shows the variation over time of the estimated spread.   




Danish MBA yield 
spread (bps) 
Finnish MBA yield 
spread (bps) 
Norwegian MBA yield 
spread (bps) 
Estimated UK MBA 
yield spread (bps) 
30/09/2010 68.7 49.9 75.6 64.7 
30/09/2011 149.7 42.9 101.3 105.1 
30/09/2012 80.6 14.8 70.4 58.0 
30/09/2013 49.0 17.7 42.2 37.8 
30/09/2014 76.0 17.1 27.8 46.0 
30/09/2015 55.2 38.5 38.5 45.9 
Source: Calculated relative to a respective government zero-coupon yield curve; the UK yield spread is 
estimated as 44.5% of the Danish spread + 30.4% of the Finnish spread + 25.1% of the Norwegian spread 
Comparing synthetic bond issuance to PWLB lending 
Having estimated a spread over the UK government zero-coupon yield curve of the 
synthetic UK municipal bond agency bond issuer over time, I compare this to the activity 
of the PWLB, which is a government-owned agency.  According to its annual report, ‘The 




when it requires to fund its loans…. all loan repayments are paid over to the National 
Loans Fund.’  The National Loans Fund is administered by HM Treasury.  Most of its 
borrowing needs are met indirectly, through borrowing on its behalf by the Debt 
Management Office and National Savings and Investments.  In its annual accounts, the 
PWLB discloses the term and amount of its loans to local authorities at the aggregate 
level.  However, it does not provide details of its funding.   
To compare with the bond issuance of a synthetic UK MBA, a synthetic PWLB bond issuer 
is created and its required bond issuance simulated to duration-match the funding for 
PWLB lending.  The lending activity of the actual PWLB is typically longer in term than 
that of the other European MBAs.  It grants loans to UK local authorities with terms of up 
to 50 years and only 27.5% of its outstanding loan book had a term-to-maturity of less 
than 10 years at its March 2019 year-end.  By contrast, 84.4% of my sample of European 
MBA bond yield observations has a duration of less than 10 years and the longest 
observation is 20 years.  For the purposes of this exercise, I am approximating the bond 
issuance required to fund the annual incremental funding needs of the PWLB for loans of 
less than 20 years.  In practice, the new UKMBA will have to compete with the PWLB 
across a fuller range of lending terms. 
Table 8 summarises the actual PWLB’s aggregate loans outstanding to English and Welsh 
local authorities at various year-ends between March 2010 and 2016.  The reason that the 
published average interest rates are different from the rates at which it issues loans to 
local authorities at any time is that the majority of loans in each period are existing loans 
whose term-to-maturity is rolling down over time.  It is assumed that all existing loans are 
covered by synthetic bonds, which also roll down through time, in-line with the loans.  In 
order to estimate bonds to be issued and redeemed for each maturity range in each 
period, I calculate the change in the synthetic PWLB bond issuer’s net funding 
requirement from one year to the next (the period-end loans minus the period-start 
loans).  To allow for covered loans that roll into a given period from a longer term-to-
maturity period, I adjust by subtracting the assumed bonds that roll in with them.  
Conversely, to adjust for the bonds that roll out of a given period with loans to a shorter 
term-to-maturity period, I add back the assumed bonds that have rolled out.  For the 
maturity ‘1-2 years’ category, I assume that all loans at period-end will roll down into the 
maturity ‘up to 1 year’ category over the next 12 months; for the maturity ‘2-5 years’ 
category, I assume that one third of loans at period-end will roll down into the maturity 




‘10-15 years’ and maturity ‘15-20 years’ categories, I assume that one fifth of loans at 
period-end will roll down over the next 12 months. 
Table 8: Approximate Profile of PWLB Loans Outstanding of Less Than 20 Years 
Date 
Principal Maturing up to  
1 year (£ million) 
Mid-Point Maturity 
0.5 years Average Rate Average Duration 
31/03/2010 1,391 30/09/2010 5.78 0.50 
31/03/2011 1,414 30/09/2011 5.03 0.50 
31/03/2012 1,159 30/09/2012 3.95 0.50 
31/03/2013 1,283 30/09/2013 4.60 0.50 
31/03/2014 1,401 30/09/2014 5.31 0.50 
31/03/2015 1,372 30/09/2015 5.83 0.50 
31/03/2016 1,361 30/09/2016 4.73 0.50 
 Principal Maturing up to Mid-Point Maturity   
 
between 1 and 2 years 1.5 years Average Rate Average Duration 
31/03/2010 1,294 30/09/2011 5.36 1.46 
31/03/2011 1,177 30/09/2012 4.65 1.47 
31/03/2012 1,269 30/09/2013 4.62 1.47 
31/03/2013 1,418 30/09/2014 5.38 1.46 
31/03/2014 1,349 30/09/2015 5.88 1.46 
31/03/2015 1,330 30/09/2016 4.80 1.47 
31/03/2016 1,309 30/09/2017 5.31 1.46 
 Principal Maturing up to Mid-Point Maturity   
 
between 2 and 5 years 3.5 years Average Rate Average Duration 
31/03/2010 3,845 30/09/2013 5.94 3.21 
31/03/2011 4,476 30/09/2014 6.13 3.20 
31/03/2012 4,034 30/09/2015 5.47 3.23 
31/03/2013 3,939 30/09/2016 5.44 3.23 
31/03/2014 3,732 30/09/2017 5.07 3.25 
31/03/2015 3,903 30/09/2018 4.77 3.26 
31/03/2016 4,264 30/09/2019 4.30 3.29 
 Principal Maturing up to Mid-Point Maturity   
 
between 5 and 10 years 7.5 years Average Rate Average Duration 
31/03/2010 4,869 30/09/2017 6.75 6.01 
31/03/2011 5,575 30/09/2018 5.64 6.22 
31/03/2012 6,304 30/09/2019 4.70 6.41 
31/03/2013 6,813 30/09/2020 4.45 6.46 
31/03/2014 7,611 30/09/2021 4.34 6.48 
31/03/2015 7,813 30/09/2022 4.40 6.47 
31/03/2016 7,917 30/09/2023 4.37 6.48 
 Principal Maturing up to Mid-Point Maturity   
 
between 10 and 15 years 12.5 years Average Rate Average Duration 
31/03/2010 4,439 30/09/2022 6.75 8.64 
31/03/2011 4,447 30/09/2023 5.64 9.13 
31/03/2012 5,985 30/09/2024 4.70 9.59 
31/03/2013 7,037 30/09/2025 4.45 9.72 
31/03/2014 6,961 30/09/2026 4.34 9.78 
31/03/2015 6,817 30/09/2027 4.40 9.74 
31/03/2016 6,744 30/09/2028 4.37 9.76 
 Principal Maturing up to Mid-Point Maturity   
 
between 15 and 20 years 17.5 years Average Rate Average Duration 
31/03/2010 3,515 30/09/2027 5.65 11.34 
31/03/2011 3,545 30/09/2028 5.41 11.53 
31/03/2012 5,395 30/09/2029 4.37 12.41 
31/03/2013 5,838 30/09/2030 4.24 12.53 
31/03/2014 6,222 30/09/2031 4.26 12.51 
31/03/2015 6,472 30/09/2032 4.26 12.51 
31/03/2016 6,839 30/09/2033 4.21 12.55 




The above assumptions allow me to deduce changes in net funding from one year to the 
next within categories ‘1 to 2 years to maturity’ and longer.  Where the required funding 
is higher than at the previous year-end, I assume that the agency issues a bond half-way 
through the year to duration-match the change.  I assume that the synthetic PWLB 
functions at zero cost and therefore the synthetic PWLB bond issuer issues bonds on the 
same terms that the actual PWLB makes new loans (i.e. 100 bps over the UK sovereign 
par yield curve pre-November 2012; 80 bps over the UK par yield curve post-November 
2012).  The PWLB publishes historical loan rates and gilt yields on its website, which 
allows me to calculate the yield-to-maturity and duration of the required bond issues.  
This implies a bond issuance profile, as outlined below: 






 Term to 
Match 
 Duration 
to Match  
Yield of PWLB 
Bond to Issue 
Implied Duration of 
PWLB Bond to Issue 
Difference in 
Duration 
30/09/2010 900 3.5 3.20 2.12 3.39 0.19 
30/09/2010 800 7.5 6.22 3.52 6.66 0.44 
30/09/2010 200 12.5 9.13 4.37 9.76 0.63 
30/09/2011 1,000 7.5 6.41 2.88 6.80 0.39 
30/09/2011 1,700 12.5 9.59 3.75 10.09 0.50 
30/09/2011 1,700 17.5 12.41 4.22 12.55 0.14 
30/09/2012 100 1.5 1.46 0.97 1.49 0.03 
30/09/2012 600 7.5 6.46 2.03 6.99 0.54 
30/09/2012 1,200 12.5 9.72 2.93 10.56 0.84 
30/09/2012 400 17.5 12.53 3.55 13.18 0.65 
30/09/2013 50 1.5 1.46 1.03 1.49 0.03 
30/09/2013 750 7.5 6.48 2.88 6.80 0.32 
30/09/2013 200 12.5 9.78 3.76 10.09 0.31 
30/09/2013 400 17.5 12.51 4.10 12.66 0.15 
30/09/2014 100 1.5 1.47 1.35 1.49 0.02 
30/09/2014 300 7.5 6.47 2.82 6.81 0.34 
30/09/2014 500 17.5 12.51 3.60 13.13 0.62 
30/09/2015 100 3.5 3.29 1.52 3.42 0.13 
30/09/2015 300 7.5 6.48 2.15 6.97 0.49 
30/09/2015 800 17.5 12.55 3.02 13.72 1.17 
Source: PWLB, calculated; “duration to match” is the duration of the principal outstanding in a particular term 
range; “difference in duration” measures the difference between the duration of principal outstanding and the 
implied duration of a bond to be issued to match the principal outstanding, i.e. it is column 6 minus column 4 
To compare column 5 in Table 9 with the bond issuance of a synthetic UK municipal bond 
agency, I estimate the yield spread to a UK sovereign zero-coupon yield curve at which  
a synthetic UK MBA would issue bonds.  The yield spread over time of the synthetic UK 
MBA is calculated by the synthetic control method, defined above.  In Table 10, I compare 
the yield-to-maturity of bonds that duration-match the bond issuance of the synthetic 
PWLB with that of the estimated bond issuance of the synthetic UK MBA.  The final 











Term to Match Yield of PWLB 
Bond to Be Issued 
Synthetic UK MBA 
Bond Yield 
Difference (bps) 
30/09/2010 900 3.5 2.12 1.90 0.22 
30/09/2010 800 7.5 3.52 3.01 0.51 
30/09/2010 200 12.5 4.37 3.69 0.68 
30/09/2011 1,000 7.5 2.88 2.89 0.01 
30/09/2011 1,700 12.5 3.75 3.55 0.20 
30/09/2011 1,700 17.5 4.22 3.92 0.30 
30/09/2012 100 1.5 0.97 0.76 0.21 
30/09/2012 600 7.5 2.03 1.69 0.34 
30/09/2012 1,200 12.5 2.93 2.36 0.57 
30/09/2012 400 17.5 3.55 2.75 0.80 
30/09/2013 50 1.5 1.03 0.96 0.07 
30/09/2013 750 7.5 2.88 2.39 0.49 
30/09/2013 200 12.5 3.76 3.03 0.73 
30/09/2013 400 17.5 4.10 3.42 0.68 
30/09/2014 100 1.5 1.35 1.29 0.06 
30/09/2014 300 7.5 2.82 2.52 0.30 
30/09/2014 500 17.5 3.60 3.18 0.42 
30/09/2015 100 3.5 1.52 1.34 0.18 
30/09/2015 300 7.5 2.15 1.92 0.23 
30/09/2015 800 17.5 3.02 2.53 0.49 
Source: Calculated; column 6 is column 4 minus column 5; a positive value in the last column suggests that the 
synthetic UK MBA can issue bonds at a lower yield than a synthetic PWLB issuer 
Table 10 suggests that bond issues of the synthetic UK MBA generate interest cost savings 
relative to bond issues of a synthetic PWLB over time, even after the Certainty Rate was 
cut in November 2012.  There is no time when the difference in bond yields is greatest. 
A number of factors undermine inference for UK MBA yield spreads.  Firstly, when 
estimating the yield spread of a synthetic UK MBA over time by a synthetic control 
methodology, the error between the weighted bond yields of the existing MBAs’ sovereign 
issuers and the actual UK government bond yield over time is large relative to the findings 
of Table 10 (see Figure 5). 
Secondly, the derived UK synthetic control weightings include Finland and Norway, which 
are home to the shortest duration bonds, on average.  A challenge for the UKMBA is that 
over £40 billion of the £55.9 billion of PWLB loans outstanding to English and Welsh local 
authorities are of more than 10 years’ term at March 2019.  By contrast, the existing 
European MBAs have issued a limited number of bonds of long duration.  
Thirdly, Moody’s has given the real UKMBA a lower credit rating than those of the mature 
European MBAs.  If the UKMBA were to consistently trade in the medium-term at a one 
notch discount to the UK sovereign rating, then some of the yield advantage of this bond 




THE REGRESSION MODEL   
I now quantify the effect of key regressors on European MBA yield spreads.  By comparing 
the observed yield of a municipal bond to its respective estimated sovereign zero-coupon 
yield of the same duration, I generate a ‘municipal bond yield spread’ to form the 
dependent variable.  Monthly time series for a sample of representative municipal bonds 
provide sufficient trading activity and hence price and yield-to-maturity variation.  The 
literature identifies liquidity, time to maturity/duration and credit risk as drivers of US 
municipal bond pricing.  Following the European literature, I add coupon to the set of 
regressors.  Certain clienteles of bond investors may be more sensitive to income than 
capital gains requirements, so I look at income and capital gains tax regimes across the 
relevant European countries on pages 69-70.  In creating an instrument for liquidity, I am 
mindful of the limitations of reporting the secondary market activity of European 
municipal bonds.  There is no exchange-published trading volume data available for 
European municipal bond trades.  Publicly available market information is limited to 
price, issue outstanding and yield-to-maturity in this OTC market.  Following Kidwell and 
Rogowski (1983) and Reid (1990), my instrument for liquidity is the value of municipal 
bond outstanding in a common currency.  Monthly prices in euros are used.   
The issued units of the six issuers’ bonds are almost constant over time-until-maturity, 
subject to minor redemptions and tap issues.  The exception is Kommuninvest’s domestic 
benchmark bonds, which must have a minimum SEK 3 billion of outstanding issuance 
with a maximum bond size of SEK 25 billion.  Following a primary issue of a benchmark 
bond, Kommuninvest issues taps in smaller volumes on an ongoing basis, until a bond has 
one year remaining to maturity.  Within the robustness checks, I also look at monthly 
changes in value outstanding, price returns and variance of price returns over time as 
instruments, which follows the US literature. 
Standard & Poor’s grants all European municipal bonds in my study either AAA or AA+ 
credit ratings.  These vary within issuer over time.  I represent credit ratings by dummy 
variables: AA+ is the omitted regressor.  The credit ratings of each of the MBAs have 
remained in-line with their respective sovereign throughout the period of the sample and 
changes always coincide with those of the MBA’s respective sovereign agency.  Hence 
their variation over time arises directly from Standard & Poor’s revisions of sovereign 





The linear regression model 
I define Yijt , the dependent variable, as the municipal bond yield spread over its 
respective duration-matched sovereign bond yield in secondary markets.   
It varies from issuer to issuer (i), bond to bond (j) and over time (t).   
I estimate Yijt by way of linear regression in a model:  
Yijt  = α + Xijt  β  + Zijt  γ +  ϵijt  ;  ϵijt   ̴  IID (0, σϵ²) 
Xijt  is a vector of regressors, including liquidity, duration, coupon and credit rating;  
Zijt  is a vector of control variables.   
 
Given the time persistence of bond yields and spreads, I also investigate linear regression 
models that include one or more lags of the dependent variable among the regressors.  
For example, I show a model with one lag of the dependent variable as a regressor: 
Yijt  = α + Yijt-1 ρ + Xijt  β  + Zijt  γ +  ϵijt  ;  ϵitj   ̴  IID (0, σϵ²) 






If OLS regression achieves the highest R-squared and minimises prediction errors, then 
Gauss-Markov assumptions imply that it is the best linear predictor model.  However, 
introducing lags of the dependent variable into the regression model can induce 
endogeneity.  Thus, an instrumental variables approach might prove superior, 
instrumenting the explanatory variables by lagged values, or one can use GLS as an 
alternative method to address the possible bias of an OLS regression.   
In Table 11, I estimate the model, defined on page 59, by OLS regression.  Following the 
literature, municipal bond yield spreads are described as a function of liquidity, duration, 
coupon and the credit rating of the issuer, which vary across bond issuers and issues and 
over time.  I am also interested in cross-section and time fixed effects.    
Table 11: OLS Regressions of Municipal Bond Yield Spread as the Dependent Variable 
Estimator (1) (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
Constant 0.0455  0.0926  0.2000 * 0.3609 ***  0.0035  0.0248  0.0400  0.1417 * 
 
(0.1162) (0.1298) (0.0813) (0.0883) (0.0177) (0.0413) (0.0215) (0.0529) 
Liquidity 
(per €bn) 
-0.0854 ** -0.0891 * -0.0896 *** -0.0855 *** -0.0155 ** -0.0161 * -0.0192 ** -0.0244 ** 
 
(0.0332) (0.0399) (0.0160) (0.0153) (0.0060) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0082) 
Duration 0.0196 * 0.0173 * 0.0246 * 0.0221 ** 0.0034 * 0.0035 * 0.0050 ** 0.0064 ** 
 
(0.0085) (0.0075) (0.0096) (0.0085) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0025) 
Coupon 0.0692 *** 0.0619 ** 0.0432 ** 0.0240 * 0.0102 ** 0.0102 * 0.0083 ** 0.0068 * 
 (0.0131) (0.0179) (0.0122) (0.0107) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0031) (0.0028) 
Credit rating 0.2604 ** 0.1833 * 0.1731 *** -0.0912 * 0.0284 * 0.0304 ** 0.0223 -0.0188 
 
(0.0769) (0.0857) (0.0253) (0.0537) (0.0133) (0.0126) (0.0148) (0.0128) 
Yield spread 
with one lag 
    0.8638 *** 0.8475 *** 0.8258 *** 0.7452 *** 
 
    (0.0493) (0.0536) (0.0564) (0.0681) 
Time fixed 
effects 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Issuer fixed 
effects 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
2856 2856 2856 2856 2786 2786 2786 2786 
Number of 
bonds 
70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Number of 
time periods 
73 73 73 73 72 72 72 72 
R-squared 0.320 0.496 0.462 0.702 0.833 0.862 0.837 0.869 
Source: Calculated; cluster robust standard errors; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All four contemporaneous parameters of Model 1 are significant.  The bond yield spread 
depends negatively upon liquidity – the more liquid the bond, the tighter the yield spread.  
The bond yield spread depends positively upon duration, coupon and a bond credit rating 
― higher rated bonds imply higher yield spreads, except in the model with time and issuer 




Introducing fixed effects to Model 1 improves the R-squared of regressions.  The Wald test 
rejects the null hypothesis that the period coefficients are jointly equal to zero, implying 
that the time fixed effects model is appropriate.  All regressors remain significant at least 
at the 10% level in the time fixed effects and issuer fixed effects models.   
The best R-squared of 0.702 is achieved by the model that includes both issuer and time 
fixed effects.  Although there is some loss of significance of both coupon and credit rating, 
the significance of liquidity and duration improves relative to the base model.  The sign of 
the credit rating regressor turns negative.  The time fixed effects model concludes that the 
effect of liquidity on the yield spread is similar to the base model in size and sign, but the 
respective impacts of the other regressors are lower.  Within the issuer fixed effects 
model, the effect of duration is somewhat greater than in other models.  The effects of 
coupon and credit rating fall.   
All models without lag regressors suggest that yield spreads fall by just under 9 basis 
points per €1 billion increase in outstanding issuance.  While these numbers are 
statistically significant, from an economic point of view, this is not a large movement.  
Recall that the median bond size of the sample is €350 million, so a €100 million shift 
either side of this makes less than one basis point of difference to the bond’s yield spread. 
A one-year increase in duration adds between 1.7 and 2.5 basis points to the yield spread, 
depending upon which model is used without lag regressors.  With 72.5% of the UK 
competitor PWLB’s loan book being more than 10 years in term, this should be an 
important planning consideration for a UK MBA.  However, only 15.6% of the bonds in the 
sample are of a duration longer than 10 years, thus affecting inference.   
Contemporaneous regressors do not correlate with the error terms within Model 1: the 
correlation coefficients between liquidity and the error terms, duration and the error 
terms, credit rating dummy and the error terms, and coupon and the error terms are each 
0.000.  There is modest covariance among the contemporaneous regressors, summarised 
in Table 12.  The highest correlation is -0.231 between liquidity and duration. 
Table 12: Correlation Matrix of the Contemporaneous Variables 
Correlation Yield Spread Coupon Duration Credit Rating Liquidity 
Yield Spread 1 0.314 0.284 0.379 -0.320 
Coupon  1 0.216 0.109 -0.099 
Duration   1 -0.088 -0.231 
Credit rating    1 -0.174 





Adding lags of the dependent variable as regressors 
The specification of the OLS model is checked by comparing with models that include lags 
of the dependent variable as regressors.  Yield spreads exhibit persistence over time and 
the residuals are highly correlated with each other, suggesting a possible misspecification 
of the regression model.  The low Durbin-Watson statistic can be an indicator of 
autocorrelation of the residuals in Model 1.  Figure 6, shows correlations of the residuals 
of the regression with the same residuals lagged by one period, and up to ten periods.   














I address possible autocorrelation by adding one or more lags of the dependent variable 
to the list of contemporaneous regressors.   
Table 13: How Many Lags of the Dependent Variable to Use? 
Estimator (1) (2) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
Constant 0.0455  0.0035  0.0009  0.0019  0.0374  0.1168 * 
 
(0.1162) (0.0177) (0.0150) (0.0369) (0.0187) (0.0485) 
Liquidity 
(per €bn) 
-0.0854 ** -0.0155 ** -0.0143 ** -0.0138 ** -0.0173 ** -0.0210 ** 
 
(0.0332) (0.0060) (0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0059) (0.0070) 
Duration 0.0196 * 0.0034 * 0.0031 * 0.0033 ** 0.0044 ** 0.0058 ** 
 
(0.0085) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0023) 
Coupon 0.0692 *** 0.0102 ** 0.0083 *** 0.0081 ** 0.0074 ** 0.0060 ** 
 (0.0131) (0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0022) 
Credit rating 0.2604 ** 0.0284 * 0.0182  0.0244 * 0.0132 -0.0147 
 
(0.0769) (0.0133) (0.0108) (0.0104) (0.0114) (0.0101) 
Yield spread 
with one lag 
 0.8638 *** 0.6607 *** 0.6413 *** 0.6423 *** 0.5976 *** 
  (0.0493) (0.0537) (0.0425) (0.0566) (0.0497) 
Yield spread 
with two lags 
  0.2338 *** 0.2404 *** 0.2192 *** 0.1952 *** 
 
  (0.0287) (0.0366) (0.0270) (0.0377) 
Time fixed 
effects 
No No No Yes No Yes 
Issuer fixed 
effects 
No No No No Yes Yes 
number of 
observations 
2856 2786 2717 2717 2717 2717 
number of 
bonds 
70 70 69 69 69 69 
number of 
time periods 
73 72 71 71 71 71 
R-squared 0.320 0.833 0.842 0.870 0.843 0.875 
Source: Calculated; cluster robust standard errors; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
OLS regression results of a one lag model without fixed effects are represented by Model 2 
in Table 13.  An Augmented Dickey Fuller test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root, 
with a t-statistic of -8.33 and an associated one-sided p-value of 0.00.  The R-squared is 
improved relative to Model 1.  This comes at the cost of reduced coefficients of all the 
original contemporaneous regressors, although each remains significant at least at the 
10% level and their signs remain the same between Model 1 and Model 2.  The size of 
each of the coefficients of coupon, liquidity, duration and credit rating is reduced by at 
least 74% relative to Model 1, while the coefficient of the lagged variable is highly 
significant.  Figure 7 shows that adding a one-period lagged observation of the dependent 
variable to the existing regressors reduces, but does not entirely eliminate the residuals’ 





Figure 7: Correlation of Residuals with One Lag Added to the Regressors 
Source: Calculated 
Table 13 also shows results of OLS regression models that include two lags of the 
dependent variable (Model 3).  As Figure 8 shows, the serial correlation of the regression 
residuals is effectively eliminated in a model that includes two lags of the dependent 
variable as an additional regressor.  While there is a small improvement in the R-squareds 
of the models with two lags of the dependent variable as regressors, credit rating loses 
significance as a regressor in three of the four models.  Only liquidity and coupon remain 
significant at least at the 5% level in all two-lag models, with and without fixed effects.   






In summary, there is a trade-off in models with lags of the dependent variable as  
a regressor between reduced risk of bias in the estimator against lower or lost 
significance of regressors of interest.  The addition of fixed effects improves the  
R-squareds of the regressions in both the one-lag and two-lag models.  However, inclusion 
of issuer fixed effects in these models leads to loss of significance of the credit rating 
regressor.  All contemporaneous variables are significant at least at the 10% level in time 
fixed effects models.   
Distribution of residuals  
Jarque-Barra test statistics reject the null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals of 
Model 2.  Figure 9 shows negative skewness and kurtosis of the residuals.      
Figure 9: Distribution of the Residuals within Model 2 Estimation  
Source: Calculated; the x-axis shows the ranges of the 2,786 observations; the y-axis measures frequency of 
observations 
Tests for heteroscedasticity are generally invalidated when there is serial correlation 
across the residuals, as is the case in Model 1.  Instead, I look at heteroscedasticity in  
a model that includes one lag of the dependent variable.  A Breusch-Pagan test rejects the 
null hypothesis of constant variance of the residuals.  I also discuss on page 67 panel 
regressions that are undertaken by Generalised Least Squares to allow for 






Model bias   
While the regressors of interest within Model 1 are all significant, the R-squared of this 
model is modest and the error terms exhibit heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  
Introducing time-lags of the dependent variable (bond yield spread) into the model’s 
explanatory variables creates a dynamic panel data model.  The model’s R-squared 
improves and the lagged dependent variable regressors are more significant within the 
model than the contemporaneous variables.  However, the lags of the dependent variable 
in Model 2 correlate with the error term with a coefficient of 0.27.  Therefore, OLS 
estimators may be inconsistent, which raises the possibility of bias.   
The argument in favour of using OLS in dynamic panel data models rests on the size of  
T (time) and the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, ρ.  Nickell (1981) studies 
standard models for the first-order autoregressive case and finds that bias in dynamic 
models with fixed effects falls as a function of 1/T.   
Nickell shows that ‘for reasonably large values’ of T, the following approximation holds: 
 
My panel data contain 73 time periods and in Model 2 without fixed effects ρ = 0.86, 
which implies the upper bound of the absolute bias is 0.026. 
On the other hand, Beck and Katz (2004) conclude that the Nickell bias has already fallen 
as low as 0.02 when T = 20. 
Clustering of standard errors 
Clustering of errors can lead to overstating the significance of results.  Following Cameron 
and Miller (2015), I use cluster robust standard errors in the main regression analysis, 
clustering about the MBA issuers by month.  Cluster robust standard errors are greater 
than heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors, so the significance of the regressors of 
interest is lower than estimations that use other standard errors.  Looking at individual 
issuers, the greatest absolute average residuals of Model 2 are found within observations 
for MuniFin (mean -3.39 basis points) and Kommuninvest (mean 2.77 basis points).  But 
Model 2 generates the best regression fit to the overall panel data, not to sub-samples of 
the individual issuers.  I would expect the average errors of the fitted data to be higher for 















Mean -0.0047 -0.0095 -0.0339 0.0055 0.0132 0.0277 0.0000 
Median -0.0071 -0.0103 -0.0446 -0.0179 0.0140 0.0161 -0.0078 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0835 0.1006 0.2771 0.1384 0.2164 0.0922 0.1338 
Skewness 0.9471 0.8532 0.7572 2.1635 -0.5154 0.6036 0.7307 




OLS models compare well to GLS and Instrumental Variables  
None of the four contemporaneous variables correlate with the error term within the 
main OLS regressions.  Nonetheless, I set up a Two Stage Least Squares estimation model 
to investigate consistent estimates of the dependent variable.  I instrument the 
explanatory variables by the same variables with a one period lag.  The 2SLS results are 
represented as Model 4 within Table 15, which I compare to the OLS model that includes 
one lag of the dependent variable.  The R-squared of the 2SLS model is similar to that of 
the OLS model.   
Table 15: Regressions with Instrumental Variables and GLS 
Estimator OLS 2SLS 
2SLS with Time 
Fixed Effects 
GLS with Cross-
Section Weights  
GLS with Time 
Weights  
 
(2) (4) (4) (5) (5) 
Constant 0.0035  -0.0016  0.0005  0.0014  0.0076  
 
(0.0107) (0.0112) (0.0206) (0.0111) (0.0067) 
Liquidity 
(per €bn) 
-0.0155 *** -0.0104 *** -0.0094 * -0.0116 *** -0.0119 *** 
 
(0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0054) (0.0036) (0.0025) 
Duration 0.0034 *** 0.0024 *** 0.0023  0.0019 ** 0.0028 *** 
 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0007) 
Coupon 0.0102 *** 0.0053  0.0051  0.0077 *** 0.0038 * 
 
(0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0020) (0.0023) 
Credit rating 0.0284 *** 0.0145 ** 0.0147  0.0130  0.0083 **  
 
(0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0130) (0.0102) (0.0035) 
Yield spread 
with one lag 
0.8638 *** 0.9281 *** 0.9251 *** 0.9133 *** 0.9070 *** 
 (0.0167) (0.0181) (0.0300) (0.0177) (0.0099) 
Number of 
observations 
2786 2716 2716 2772 2772 
Number of 
bonds 
70 69 69 70 70 
Number of 
time periods 
72 71 71 72 72 
R-squared 0.833 0.831 0.860 0.926 0.922 




In order to underline the loss of significance of regressors as I move from Model 2 to 
Model 4, I present both models with White-Huber heteroscedasticity-consistent standard 
errors, which differs from the cluster-robust standard errors presentation of results in 
Tables 11 and 13.  Coupon loses significance in the 2SLS model.  Liquidity and duration 
remain significant at the 1% level, although their respective coefficients are somewhat 
smaller than those represented within the OLS model.  Only liquidity remains significant 
within the 2SLS model with period fixed effects, that is at the 10% level.  The coefficients 
of the lag of the dependent variable in 2SLS models are higher than those of OLS.   
For further robustness in the presence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity of the 
residuals in the OLS model, I construct Generalised Least Squares (GLS) estimates, which I 
include within Table 15 as Model 5.  The R-squareds are higher than those achieved with 
an OLS approach, but there is some loss of significance of regressors.  The coefficients of 
all the contemporaneous variables are much lower than those within the OLS models, 
while the coefficients of the lag of the dependent variable are higher than those of OLS. 
The choice between an OLS and instrumental variables approach to modelling this panel 
is a trade-off between bias in the least squares estimator and a loss of significance of the 
contemporaneous variables in the 2SLS model.  Following Beck and Katz (2004), I adopt 
the OLS model with fixed effects, including one lag of the dependent variable as a 




Does investor tax status drive the significance of coupon? 
Coupon is a significant regressor in all of the OLS models, although it loses significance in 
the 2SLS models.  In all OLS models the coefficient is positive, suggesting that yield spread 
rises as coupon increases.  The literature offers some guidance:  Schaefer (1982) shows a 
relationship between bonds’ tax clienteles by the percentage of a bond’s total return that 
arises in the form of coupon income relative to capital gain (for example, higher tax 
investors buy lower coupon bonds and low tax payers buy higher coupon bonds).  Elton 
et al. (2001) argue that because coupon is higher for lower-rated debt, then the tax 
burden is higher, which suggests a tax effect.   
I compare the highest tax rates of investment income and capital gains across the 
different jurisdictions of the bond agencies, to investigate whether the tax status of 
different investors affects the relationship between coupon and yield spread.  Table 16 
highlights the approximate share of investors in all municipal bond types, domestic and 
foreign currency.  While central banks are not motivated by tax, it is possible that other 
investor types are.  In addition to private individuals, many asset management funds are 
pooled funds with individual unit holders, which may prioritise income or capital growth.   
Table 16: Share of Investment by Different Investor Types 
 Central Banks Asset Managers Individuals Banks Other 
BNG 34% 22% 1% 22% 21% * 
KBN n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Kommunekredit n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Kommuninvest 60% 6% 6%  26% 2% ** 
MuniFin 29% 10% 37% 19% 5% 
NWB 15% 25% 4% 42% 14% *** 
Source: municipal bond agencies 2016 annual reports; * 9% official institutions, 9% insurers, 2% pension 
funds, 1% corporates; ** other is corporates; *** other divides between insurance/pension funds 
I look at the taxation of investment income and capital gains of individuals rather than 
companies, because capital gain is often seen as part of the normal operations of a 
company and therefore subject to tax at the same marginal rate as investment income.  
Investment income tax may be levied at a flat rate (as in Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden) or a progressive rate (for example, Denmark, Finland).  In Denmark, share 
dividends and capital gains are taxed from 36.5% up to 42%, depending on income level, 
while other types of investment income (such as bond interest) are taxed within the 
ordinary personal tax scheme.  In Finland, investment income tax rises from 30% to a top 




Table 17: Top Domestic Rate of Investment Income Tax 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Denmark 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 
Finland 30.0% 28.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 34.0% 
Netherlands 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 
Norway 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 27.0% 25.0% 
Sweden     30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 
United Kingdom 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 45.0% 45.0% 45.0% 
Source: Deloitte, Grant Thornton, KPMG, pwc, Expatax, Trading Economics, HMRC 
Contrasting Table 17 with the marginal rate of capital gains tax for each country in  
Table 18, it is apparent that the rate of investment income tax is closely aligned with the 
rate of capital gains tax across the Nordic countries (the rates are the same, although 
some tax bands may vary).  Thus, the high tax-rate private investor should be indifferent 
between investment income and capital gain.  However, the story is different in the 
Netherlands, where capital gains are generally exempt from tax.  In that case capital gain 
is considered to be income from ‘other activities’ or ‘business income’ and is taxed 
accordingly.  The UK also levies capital gains tax at a different (lower) rate to investment 
income tax. 
Table 18: Top Domestic Rate of Capital Gains Tax 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Denmark 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 
Finland 30.0% 28.0% 32.0% 32.0% 32.0% 34.0% 
Netherlands 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Norway 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 27.0% 25.0% 
Sweden     30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 30.0% 
United Kingdom 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 28.0% 











To investigate the coupon effect, I interact coupon with the country regressors and check 
for significance within the resulting regressions.  I use a dummy (NL) for the Netherlands, 
as I am testing for the country effect.  The results in Table 19 show that the coupon effect 
is strongest in Norway and Sweden and weakest in Finland and the Netherlands.  In 
Model 2, the coupon x issuer dummy loses significance either partially or completely 
relative to coupon in Model 1 in all countries.  In Model 4, in which yield spread is 
regressed on just coupon, only coupon x Finland and coupon x Netherlands lose 
significance relative to coupon in Model 3.  In Model 6, which regresses yield spread on 
coupon and a lagged dependent variable, all coupon x country dummy regressors 
lose/reduce significance relative to Model 5 coupon.   
Table 19: OLS Regressions with Coupon Interacting with Country Dummies 
Estimator  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant 0.0035  0.0213   0.1920 ** 0.2560 ** 0.0110  0.0227  
 
(0.0177) (0.0126) (0.0684) (0.0900) (0.0131) (0.0186) 
Liquidity 
(per €bn) 
-0.0155 ** -0.0172 **     
 
(0.0060) (0.0060)     
Duration 0.0034 * 0.0057 **     
 
(0.0015) (0.0022)     
Credit rating 0.0284 * 0.0246      
 
(0.0133) (0.0141)     
Coupon 0.0102 **  0.1038 ***   0.0119 **  
 
(0.0040)  (0.0215)  (0.0044)  
Coupon x  
DEN dummy 
 0.0125   0.1245 ***  0.0189 * 
  (0.0068)  (0.0305)  (0.0083) 
Coupon x  
FIN dummy 
 -0.0096 *   0.0167   0.0027 
  (0.0044)   (0.0330)  (0.0052) 
Coupon x  
NL dummy  
 0.0039  0.0552 *  0.0088  
  (0.0058)  (0.0273)  (0.0053) 
Coupon x  
NOR dummy 
 0.0130 *  0.1068 ***  0.0148 * 
  (0.0052)  (0.0265)  (0.0070) 
Coupon x  
SWE dummy 
 0.0196 *  0.1512 ***  0.0194 * 
  (0.0084)  (0.0242)  (0.0089) 
Yield spread  
with one lag 
0.8638 *** 0.8244 ***   0.8986 *** 0.8756 *** 
 (0.0493) (0.0597)   (0.0437) (0.0517) 
Number of 
observations 
2786 2786 2856 2856 2786 2786 
Number of bonds 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Number of time 
periods 
72 72 73 73 72 72 
R-squared 0.833 0.837 0.099 0.274 0.829 0.831 




Can Euro Area issuers issue more cheaply than non-Euro Area issuers? 
The sample includes issuers from four different currencies.  Three are based within the 
Euro Area (MuniFin, BNG and NWB) and the domestic currencies of the others are Danish 
krone, Norwegian krone and Swedish krone.  In order to investigate whether there is  
a currency advantage for issuers from a particular currency bloc, I look at the issuer fixed 
effects dummies of Model 2 with issuer fixed effects from Table 11.  One of the issuer 
parameters is excluded, in order to avoid collinearity between the control variables. The 
results of Table 20 underline the impact of issuer effects.  The horizontal axis highlights 
the dummy variable that is excluded and the vertical axis shows the resulting coefficients 
of the other dummy variables.  When one of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish dummy 
variables are excluded, the coefficients of the Finnish and Dutch dummies are always 
negative.  The yield spread depends negatively on the Euro Area dummies.  This suggests 
that the Euro Area issuers are able to issue more cheaply than the non-Euro Area issuers. 
Table 20: Parameter Coefficients of the Issuer Fixed Effects Dummies of Model 2   
 DEN FIN NLB NLN NOR SWE 
DEN 
 
0.0565 0.0265 0.0302 0.0024 -0.0260 
FIN -0.0565 
 
-0.0300 -0.0263 -0.0541 -0.0825 
NLB -0.0265 0.0300  0.0037 -0.0240 -0.0525 
NLN -0.0302 0.0263 -0.0037  -0.0277 -0.0562 
NOR -0.0024 0.0541 0.0240 0.0277 
 
-0.0285 
SWE 0.0260 0.0825 0.0525 0.0562 0.0285 
 
 
Source: Calculated, key DEN – Denmark, FIN – Finland, NLB – Netherlands (BNG), NLN – Netherlands (NWB),  
NOR – Norway, SWE - Sweden 
While Table 5 shows that the three Euro Area municipal bond issuers command lower 
yield spreads than the other three issuers, we should not consider issuer effects in 











Robustness checks  
Table 21 includes results of models with different control regressors.  Model 2 of Table 13 
is used as the base model, which includes a one-period lag of the dependent variable and 
no fixed effects. 
1. Price returns and variance of price returns as a proxy for liquidity 
In the literature review, price returns are discussed as a proxy of liquidity.  I observe 
prices at monthly intervals for issued municipal bonds and construct price returns as an 
instrument for the liquidity regressor.  This is included in Model 7 in Table 21.  This 
regressor is not significant and the model’s overall results are similar to those of Model 2.  
Thus, Model 2 offers a clearer economic interpretation of yield spread as a function of 
outstanding issuance than Model 7’s yield spread as a function of price return.  I also 
study variance of price returns (not reported).  I find that this regressor is significant at 
the 10% level and the R-squared of this model is slightly reduced relative to Model 2.  The 
coefficients of the other variables are otherwise similar to those of Model 2.   
2. Change in issuance outstanding as an instrument for liquidity 
I investigate the month-to-month change in the euro value of issuance outstanding as an 
alternative measure to the actual euro value outstanding (results not reported).  In terms 
of fit, the resulting regression is similar to Model 2, with an R-squared of 0.833.  However, 
the change in issuance outstanding coefficient is not significant.  There are large monthly 
changes in some of the Swedish data, relative to other bond time series.  All other 
regressors are similar to those in Model 2. 
3. Proximity to a benchmark sovereign bond 
Kommuninvest, BNG, NWB and MuniFin support benchmark municipal bond programmes 
in their respective domestic currencies.  In general, the bond issuance of European 
municipal bond issuers is pitched close to existing benchmark bonds of their respective 
sovereign issuers.  For example, of the 2,856 domestic bond observations in my sample, 
the time-to-maturity of 67.3% of them are within six months of the closest sovereign 
benchmark bond.  I add the absolute of distance in years from the closest sovereign 
benchmark bond to the list of contemporaneous regressors, to understand the effect of a 
bond’s proximity to a sovereign benchmark bond on its yield spread to the sovereign 
curve.  Within the regression without lags of the dependent variable (not reported in 
Table 21), the regressor is significant at the 10% level.  But this coefficient is negative.  




‘absolute of distance’ variable loses significance.  Many MBAs maintain their own 
benchmark bonds in domestic currency. 
4. Time-to-Maturity 
I include bond duration ahead of time-to-maturity in my models, given the improved 
results gained.  Had I followed Namvar et al. (2015) and used time-to-maturity instead of 
duration in Model 1 of Table 11, this would have kept all regressors significant at least at 
the 10% level (results not reported).  However, the R-squared of the regression fell to 
0.266.  Including time-to-maturity in Model 2, which includes a lag of the dependent 
variable as a regressor, generates very similar results to those shown in OLS(2) in Table 
21.  All parameters remain significant at least at the 10% level.  
5. Risk appetite  
Changing market risk appetite regimes may influence what an investor is willing to pay 
for an asset, all else being equal.  Barrios et al. (2009) investigate the impact of different 
investor risk appetite regimes on the time persistence of yield spreads.  They introduce  
a global markets risk factor into their model, which they proxy by log (VIX), where the  
VIX index represents the CBOE Volatility Index, a measure of the implied volatility of  
S&P 500 index options.  Following Barrios et al., I include the VIX index as an instrument 
within Model 9 in Table 21.  Comparing the results with Model 2 shows coefficients of the 
contemporaneous regressors are similar in general.  I also test the VDAX index and the 
implied volatilities of the S&P 500 and Euro STOXX 50 indices as instruments and 
generate similar results (not reported).  The VIX index correlates with the residuals of the 
OLS regression with a coefficient of 0.409.  I find similar results by measuring correlations 
of the residuals with other proxies for investor risk appetite, such as the VDAX index and 
3-month implied volatility of equity indices, such as the DAX 30.  Time fixed effects 
capture the influence of aggregate time trends, so risk appetite controls may not be 
necessary in models with time fixed effects.  Indeed, the correlation between the VIX 
index monthly time series and the time fixed effects from a time fixed effects model is a 








Table 21: Robustness Checks  
Estimator OLS  
OLS with 
price return  
 OLS with proximity 
to benchmark bond 
OLS with risk 
appetite  
 
(2) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 0.0035  -0.0149 0.0028 -0.0531 * 
 
(0.0177) (0.0083) (0.0178) (0.0238) 
Liquidity 
(per €bn) 
-0.0155 ** - -0.0167 ** -0.0171 * 
 
(0.0060)  (0.0064) (0.0073) 
Duration 0.0034 * 0.0043 ** 0.0042  0.0033 * 
 
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0015) 
Coupon 0.0102 ** 0.0089 ** 0.0105 * 0.0101 * 
 (0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0045) (0.0043) 
Credit rating 0.0284 * 0.0267 * 0.0295 * 0.0234  
 
(0.0133) (0.0130) (0.0142) (0.0136) 
VIX index - - - 0.0040 *** 
    (0.0003) 
Price return - -0.0161  - - 
  (0.0123)   
Proximity to  
benchmark bond 
- - -0.0065 - 
   (0.0065)  
One lag of yield spread  0.8638 *** 0.8839 *** 0.8612 *** 0.8488 *** 
 
(0.0493) (0.0433) (0.0511) (0.0507) 
Number of observations 2786 2786 2786 2786 
Number of bonds 70 69 70 70 
Number of time periods 72 72 72 72 
R-squared 0.833 0.837 0.833 0.837 









This chapter provides the first analysis of the secondary market performance of the bond 
issuance of all the six major European MBAs.  I demonstrate that there is an interest cost 
saving case for a new UK municipal bond agency.  However, history shows that MBAs 
have only proved successful in a small number of developed countries.  Their excellent 
long-term records of avoiding credit distress and default are reflected in strong credit 
ratings and competitive loan pricing for their member SNGs.  But this business model is 
not universally adopted.  
The UKMBA must compete against a strong incumbent loans company, which is 100% 
owned by central government and is the dominant force in the UK market for local 
authority long-term funding.  Subject to the limitations of synthetic control methodology 
in this investigation, the results suggest that the bond issues of a synthetic UK MBA can 
generate interest cost savings relative to a synthetic PWLB bond issuer.  That said, the 
actual PWLB does not rely upon a bond issuing model for funding and any local authority 
borrower can draw funds from it at a predetermined spread over the UK par gilt curve on 
demand.  Recent evidence shows that PWLB loan pricing is responsive to competitive 
threats, including from the UKMBA (see the Summary and Contribution of the Thesis).  
This implies that the UKMBA has a high hurdle to clear in order to establish a sustainable 
business. 
In terms of planning bond issuance, European MBA bond yield spreads depend negatively 
on liquidity and positively on duration.  I show that the yield spread rises by 0.64 basis 
points per year of duration in models with lag regressors and fixed effects.  This is 
economically significant for an MBA bond issuer that plans bond issuance with a term in 
excess of 10 years, which is where much of current lending to English and Welsh local 
authorities is focused.  A caveat to this result is that there are limited European MBA bond 
data of longer duration to guide policy, due to a lack of suitable, observable bonds.  Only 
15.6% of the observations in the regression sample have a duration of more than 10 







Estimating a yield curve by the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson method 
The EFFAS-European Bond Commission published ‘Overview of Methodology for 
Definition of Risk Free Zero-coupon Yield Curve and Spreads in the Eurozone’ (June 
2006) and the Monetary and Economic Department of the Bank of International 
Settlements published ‘Zero-coupon Yield Curves: Technical Documentation’ (October 
2005).  These highlight that the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson method is one of a number of 
methods used by central banks and private sector institutions to estimate a yield curve 
from bond data.  The former paper also discusses parametric models and spline-based 
models to estimate zero-coupon yield curves and describes the different processes used 
by 13 central banks across developed markets.  The BIS Paper contains a detailed 
definition of the Nelson-Siegel method (1987) and the Svensson extension (1994).  The 
extended Nelson–Siegel-Svensson model can offer an improved curve fit to the data and 
smoother shape over the Nelson–Siegel curve, which has fewer parameters.  On the other 
hand, the model can struggle with irregular yield curves. 
The yield of a zero-coupon bond of n years’ maturity is the true n-year interest rate.   
A zero-coupon yield curve estimates the term structure of interest rates and provides  
a common reference point to estimate the present value of money.  Model parameters are 
determined by minimisation of the squared deviations of theoretical yields from observed 
yields to give the result in Figure 10.   
τ represents time-to-maturity.  For longer maturities, the spot and forward rates 
asymptotically converge to β₀, which will be positive.  β₁ is the slope of the curve.  The 
parameters β₂ and τ₁ define the first hump in the curve – the magnitude of the hump is 
determined by the absolute value of β₂; its direction is determined by the sign of β₂  
(a negative derives a u-shape, a positive derives a hump or inverse u-shape);   
τ₁ determines the position of the hump.   
The Svensson extension to a Nelson-Siegel curve adds the extra parameters, β₃ and τ₂, 






Figure 10: The Nelson-Siegel-Svensson Curve Fitting Formula      
 
Source: Nelson, Siegel and Svensson; Key: y(τ) is yield to maturity; τ is time; the vectors β₀, β₁, β₂, β₃, τ₁ and τ₂ 
are the parameters to be estimated, with (β₀, τ₁ and τ₂) > 0; β₀ is the long-term yield; β₁ is the slope of the 
curve; β₂ is the curvature; β₃ is the secondary slope; τ₁ and τ₂ represent time decay 
Figure 11 shows an example of a zero-coupon government yield curve, as derived by the 
Nelson-Siegel-Svensson process.  It sits alongside the coupon-paying par yield curve.  In 
this example there are 15 benchmark bonds, but this number might vary from month to 
month. Most government yield curves are generated from between 8 and 15 government 
benchmark bonds.   
Figure 11: A Representative US Treasury Bond Yield Curve (January 2015) 
Source:  Bloomberg, Nelson, Siegel and Svensson; x-axis is time (years), y-axis is yield-to-maturity 
Key: red dots – current bond yields of the yield curve constituent bonds; black line – the fitted par curve;  
blue line – the fitted zero-coupon curve  
The upward sloping zero-coupon yield curve is normally above the par yield curve.  A few 
yield curves are sparsely populated by benchmark bonds at the longer maturity end of the 
spectrum, which can lead to a small number of fitted yield curves turning sharply 
downwards or diverging to high yields at the longer end.  Given that MBAs use foreign 
exchange swaps to hedge short-dated bonds that are issued with less than one year’s life,  
I do not use municipal bonds curves for less than one year duration in this analysis. 
I acknowledge the advice of Professor Lars Svensson of Stockholm University and Seppo 
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CHAPTER 2: THE VALUE OF PARTICIPATION 





What determines whether a municipality issues its own bonds or participates in a mutual 
credit-pooling agency’s issuing activity?  The US offers most scope for comparisons.  The 
US municipal bond market includes individual municipalities and credit-pooling agencies, 
known as municipal bond banks (MBBs).  Nine of the ten MBBs enjoy an implicit 
guarantee from their respective State and over time they have all built a reserve within 
their respective balance sheets that acts as a buffer against individual municipality 
financial stress.  I show that an individual municipality’s credit rating and required bond 
participation size affect its probability of joining MBB bond issuance.  Furthermore, using 
propensity score matching, it is shown that participation in an MBB bond issue has a 
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Ang and Green (2013) argue that municipal bond issuers pay billions of dollars each year 
in unnecessary fees and interest expenses.  Municipal bond markets are illiquid, with a 
lack of pricing transparency, and they operate inefficiently, raising costs for issuers.  They 
propose the establishment of CommonMuni, an independent advisory firm to reduce 
borrowing costs for municipalities 7 and raise returns for investors.  While this stops 
short of arguing the case for credit-pooling agencies, the recognition that bond pricing by 
individual US municipalities is inefficient in the largest municipal bond market in the 
world motivates my examination of the advantage of MBBs as a method of funding long-
term municipality debt. 
I address which of individual bond issues and credit-pooling agency bond issues is best 
suited for which municipalities.  My research objective is twofold: to identify the factors 
driving a municipality’s participation in a credit-pooling agency’s bond issuance and to 
identify the interest cost advantage of a credit-pooling agency bond issuer to a 
municipality, relative to issuing its own bond.  The first investigation is undertaken 
through probit regression of municipal bond bank bond participation on a participant’s 
credit rating and bond participation size.  The second investigation involves linear 
regressions and propensity score matching for treatment effects on a bond’s yield spread 
from MBB bond participation.   
The US market is used as the basis to assess these questions.  The European municipal 
bond agencies (which are similar to MBBs) are so dominant in their respective countries 
that there are few individual domestic municipality bond issuers in these markets to 
compare them with.  On the other hand, a US municipality can raise capital by individually 
issuing general obligation or revenue bonds.  Alternatively, it can join a group of 
municipalities that participate in the bond issuance of a credit-pooling agency.  MBBs and 
Municipal Finance Authorities issue bonds collectively on behalf of participating 
municipalities.   
I compare the primary issuance of MBB bonds with those of individual municipalities, 
focusing on the five US States with the longest-standing MBBs, where I identify cross-
sections of MBB and individual municipality bond issues.  I include every municipal bond 
issued within these States over 2012-16.  Much of the literature on pooled bond issuers is 
based on surveys and small data sets (Katzman, 1980; Kidwell and Rogowski, 1983; 
                                                          
7 I refer to municipalities in this chapter, which are the most local tier of SNG in the US.  These are 




Gilbert and Pike, 1998).  However, Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) data 
now allow creation of a multi-State data set, based on a detailed analysis of primary bond 
issues.  A probit regression analysis allows me to identify key drivers of the decision of a 
municipality whether to issue its own bond or participate in the activity of an MBB. 
I then calculate municipal bond to hypothetical MBB-curve yield spreads (defined on  
page 100) and select the best linear estimation model, which allows me to quantify the 
effect on yield spread of participation in an MBB bond issue plus control variables.  OLS 
regressions give very significant results, but there may be a risk that the average causal 
effect of participating in the bond issues of an MBB is masked within the observed 
difference by a selection bias.  I address this by using a propensity score matching method 
to refine the sample, using probit regressions on the key variable of interest.   
To assess the other drivers of yield spreads, I refer to Kidwell and Rogowski (1983), Reid 
(1990) and Simonsen et al. (2001).  They identify bond liquidity, duration, credit risk, the 
bond’s tax exemption and underwriting agreement as drivers of municipal bond pricing.  
Larger bond issue sizes reduce underwriter costs per dollar of funds raised and increase 
the marketability of the bonds.  Credit risks to investors are reduced by the pooling of 
beneficiaries, the standardisation of information available and a State's moral obligation 
to back the pooled bonds.   
This paper creates a much larger and more detailed sample of bond and bond participant 
data from multiple sources compared to the small survey-based samples in the existing 
literature.  This gives a more accurate input to my empirical work.  This is also the first 
paper to use propensity score matching to refine the MBB participation samples.  
The US Municipal Bond Bank Market 
Many US municipalities, counties and States raise capital by issuing bonds, with a 
combined annual issuance of approximately US$390 billion (source: MSRB).  To service 
smaller municipalities, some States have developed credit-pooling institutions that are 
similar to the European municipal bond agencies.  There are ten Municipal Bond Banks 
and Municipal Finance Authorities across the USA.  This is a small niche of the overall 
market, representing 0.5% of all US municipal bonds outstanding by value.  Over 2012-16 
their combined bond issuance averaged approximately US$800 million per annum.   
The MBBs offer economies of scale, bond issuing expertise and strong balance sheets to 
participating municipalities.  They use the proceeds of pooled bond issues to lend money 




The provision of funds is accomplished by the direct purchase from such municipalities of 
their bonds, notes or evidence of debt payable from taxes, charges for services or 
assessments.  With the exception of the Indiana Bond Bank, which is structured as a 
quasi-government agency, the credit strength of the MBBs rests upon: 
1) over-issuing pooled bonds by up to 10%, relative to the aggregate demand of 
municipalities, which is added to the MBB’s balance sheet and invested in US Treasuries;  
2) an implicit guarantee — normally a moral obligation — by their respective State to 
back all bonds in their pools in the event of default by a local issuer.   
Table 22: List of US Municipal Bond Banks and Their Respective Launch Dates 
Name of Municipal Bond Bank Authority Date of Creation Bonds outstanding over 
one year($billion) 
Vermont Municipal  Bond Bank   1969 0.53 
Maine Municipal  Bond Bank   1971 1.44 
Alaska Municipal Bond  Bank Authority   1975 1.03 
North Dakota Public  Finance Authority   1975 0.43 
New Hampshire Municipal  Bond Bank  1977 0.85 
Virginia Resources Authority   1984 3.43 
Indiana Bond Bank   1984 0.70 
New Mexico Finance  Authority (NMFA)  1992 1.17 
Idaho Bond Bank  Authority  2001 0.27 
Michigan Finance Authority   2010 7.22 
Source: MBB report & accounts; data at December 2016 or June 2017, depending upon authorities’ respective 
year-ends; outstanding Indiana Bond Bank bonds and notes may not exceed $1 billion in aggregate by law 
The reserve funds act as a line of defence in case an individual municipality defaults on its 
dues to the MBB.  In addition, the implicit support of the State can take several forms.  For 
example, in addition to a moral obligation, income from the State of New Mexico’s 
‘Governmental Gross Receipt Tax’ is directed to the NMFA as a credit enhancement of its 
bonds.  The Idaho Bond Bank Authority states that ‘The Bond Bank is able to pledge 
certain State funds as additional security for its bonds, further reducing interest costs.’   
Municipal Bond Bank credit ratings 
Moody’s normal practice is to value the State obligation in isolation with a one-to-two 
notch discount relative to an MBB’s respective State’s credit rating.  Other factors, 
including the MBB’s balance sheet reserve fund, the MBB’s long-term experience and good 
reputation may also contribute to the level of credit rating.  In a discussion of a bond 
series issue by the New Hampshire Municipal Bond Bank on 9th May 2018, Moody’s states 
‘…for pool program structures that include a moral obligation pledge of their respective 




repayment deficiency, we will compare the credit quality of the moral obligation pledge to 
the underlying pool program rating and apply the higher of the two.’   
The credit experience of MBBs is excellent: none has ever reported a default.  By contrast, 
US individual municipality bond default rates averaged 0.18% per annum across all 
issuers over 2007-16.  Several MBBs purchase bond insurance though credit insurers, the 
cost of which is absorbed within the cost of bond issuance.  Insurance premia vary from 
10 basis points for AA-rated issues to more for lower rated bonds (reference Standard & 
Poor’s ratings).  Some MBBs have even built stronger or equal credit ratings relative to 
their respective State over time, as shown in Table 23:  
Table 23: Credit Ratings of Municipal Bond Banks versus Their Respective States 
Municipal Bond Bank Authority Moody’s credit rating Respective State credit rating 
Vermont Municipal  Bond Bank Aa1 Aaa 
Maine Municipal  Bond Bank    Aa2 Aa2 
Alaska Municipal Bond  Bank Authority  A1 * Aa3 
North Dakota Public Finance Authority   Aaa Aa1 
New Hampshire Municipal Bond Bank  Aa2 Aa1 
Virginia Resources Authority   Aa2 Aaa 
Indiana Bond Bank AA+ ** Aaa 
New Mexico Finance Authority   Aa1 Aa1 
Idaho Bond Bank Authority   Aa1 Aa1 
Michigan Finance Authority   Aa2 Aa1 
Source: MSRB; data at December 2016; * Alaska Municipal Bond Bank Authority’s lowest credit rating during 
2012-16 was Aa3; ** this is the rating accorded by Standard & Poor’s on the bond 
Economic setting   
I address which of primary market individual municipality bond issues or municipal 
credit-pooling agency-backed bond issues is best suited for municipalities by examining 
the relative trade-offs.  A number of frictions raise the cost of issuing and trading 
individual bonds within the municipal bond market.   
Individual municipal bond markets are illiquid – costs to issuers and investors 
The tax exemptions on most US municipal bonds make them attractive to individuals.  As 
a result, households held 66% of outstanding municipal bonds in 2018 directly or 
indirectly (i.e. through mutual funds), according to the Federal Reserve’s flow of funds 
data.  However, judged by the frequency of trading, most municipal bond markets are 
illiquid.  The average municipal bond trades only twice per year (Ang et al., 2010).  The 
direct costs of illiquidity to issuers include the fees paid to the bond underwriter and any 




investors.  Trading costs for retail investors are over double those of institutions or 
dealers, which represent a large proportion of the first year’s yield in transaction costs.   
There are also indirect costs, such as the price concessions that must be made to an 
investor, who believes the bond may be difficult to sell in the future.  In a liquid financial 
market, investors can buy and sell bonds at short notice and the price paid is relatively 
insensitive to the amount they wish to trade.  However, in an illiquid market investors 
bear the risk that an unexpected need to sell their holdings might result in losses beyond 
those driven by fundamentals.  Investors, concerned about their ability to sell efficiently 
in the future, will pay the issuer less for a bond today. 
Individual municipal bond markets are opaque  
Municipal bonds are not traded on centralised exchanges, but rather on over-the-counter 
(OTC) broker-dealer markets.  On an exchange, quotations are publicly posted, and all 
trades are reported through a central clearing house.  This reduces the cost of comparison 
shopping and search costs.  By contrast, OTC prices are not available in a central location 
and comparison shopping involves a costly search.  However, the MSRB now mandates 
that broker-dealers record their trades centrally and make these records available to the 
public.  An investor can now see if the price she paid is out of line with prices paid by 
other investors from other recent trades.  Nevertheless, the opacity of the OTC market 
places retail investors at a disadvantage relative to institutional investors and broker-
dealers.   
Information asymmetry in individual municipal bond markets  
Municipal bond prices respond slowly to changes in market information, interest rate 
movements or macroeconomic announcements and adjustment in municipal bond prices 
can take days.  Investors pay less for investments that carry non-transparent risks.  The 
absence of timely financial information about a borrower adds adverse selection risk.  In 
this case, investors must be concerned not just about the risk of the underlying credit, but 
also that the seller has private information.  Thus, an investor may demand more 
advantageous prices to overcome these risks, further raising costs to the bond issuer.   
The US municipal bond issuers are a large and diverse group, comprising over 50,000 
entities.  This heterogeneity limits information flow, because of fixed costs of gathering 
information, and inhibits liquidity by reducing the probability of a coincidence of needs 
between buyer and seller at any time.  Municipal bond investors lack access to uniform 




less transparency than their corporate counterparts, and compliance requirements vary 
by State.  Financial reports from municipalities are released with lags after the close of 
their fiscal years and are rarely available in a format that can be easily compared across 
municipalities and time.  The lack of a central source of information on the financial 
situation of individual issuers, the costs of attached derivatives, fees in debt issues and net 
issuing costs make it difficult for individual investors to make well-informed investment 
decisions.  Furthermore, when municipalities negotiate with financial intermediaries to 
issue debt, they often have less expertise and relatively few resources to guide their 
decision-making.  This is detrimental not only to investors, but also to the municipalities.  
According to Ang and Green (2013), access to information in municipal bond markets and 
liquidity in trading involve externalities and other forms of market failure, namely:  
• Standardisation and dissemination of financial information are public goods, which 
facilitates comparisons across different bonds, issued by different entities.  It is more 
efficient that each issuer reports to a central information depository, accessible to all 
investors, than for each investor to approach each issuer with information requests. 
• Finding information is costly.  Investors face search and information acquisition costs 
that increase with added complexity and non-standardisation of securities.   
• Opacity and complexity in certain financial instruments that bonds are wrapped into 
may reduce market competition and make it more difficult for investors and issuers to 
evaluate fees and other forms of compensation being earned by financial intermediaries.  
More standard municipal bond types are more liquid.   
• Market liquidity is increasing in the number of market participants.  The ease with 
which an investor can find a counterparty to trade with at mutually beneficial terms 
depends on how many people come to trade at a given time.    
Pros and cons of the credit-pooling of Municipal Bond Banks   
Municipal bond banks (MBBs) address a number of these issues, in particular for smaller 
municipalities.  The credit rating spread between the State and the stand-alone 
municipality plays an important role in whether a municipal bond bank can help  
a municipality reduce its borrowing costs.  Smaller communities with poorer credit 
ratings benefit the most, when issuing debt through MBBs (Katzman, 1980; Cole and 
Millar, 1982; Kidwell and Rogowski, 1983).  Furthermore, Butler (2008) argues that in 
many cases municipal bonds only attract interest from local investors.  Thus, distance is a 




may have difficulties in obtaining funding from institutions that provide access to capital 
markets.    
Because of the heterogeneous nature of various municipalities (for example, in terms of 
size and credit rating), MBBs offer different benefits to their participants and some 
municipalities benefit more than others from bond bank participation.  While a large bond 
issuer can generate savings in the market from open tender, there is a niche for the credit-
pooling financing agent to fulfil for smaller and less experienced municipalities.  Many 
individual municipality bond issues are small, which leads to relatively high transaction 
costs, such as legal, distribution, printing, advertising and bond underwriting costs.  Bond 
underwriters charge direct fees and generate gains (a cost to investors and issuers) from 
reselling these bonds to investors.  On the other hand, the municipal bond bank offers 
economies of scale, bond issuing expertise and relatively strong balance sheets, bolstered 
by reserve funds.  This is attractive to a municipality that may lack the financial 
knowledge, size or credit rating to issue bonds on an irregular basis.   
However, a large municipality may command a higher credit rating than that of an MBB.  
Seeing little benefit from joining the bond issuance of a municipal bond bank, it may 
choose to issue its own debt.  It might have concerns about implicitly reducing its own 
debt capacity and believe that debt issued in its own name is sufficiently liquid, will 
improve investor name recognition and assist in developing its own credit history.  
Furthermore, joining the bond issuance programmes of an MBB means a relative lack of 
flexibility in timing.  Most MBBs issue series of bonds two-to-four times per year and the 
issue process is time consuming, as the MBB invites participations and screens 
applications.  By contrast, individual municipalities are able to issue at a time of their 
choosing in normal market conditions, notwithstanding the transaction costs and their 
relative credit ratings.  
 
 
The paper is divided as follows: Section 2 summarises relevant literature.  Section 3 
defines the probit regression model, including collection of yield spread data and 
important variables.  Section 4 presents descriptive statistics, a linear regression of the 
municipality’s MBB participation choice and a propensity score matching method to 







Much of the literature that covers the control regressors in this chapter is discussed on 
pages 43-47 in Chapter 1 and is not repeated here, where the focus is rather on literature 
that is directly related to North American municipal bond banks. 
Most US MBBs benefit from the implicit guarantee or moral obligation of their respective 
State.  Hsueh and Kidwell (1988) look at the effect of a State bond guarantee via the Texas 
Permanent School Fund bond guarantee programme, which is a stronger condition than 
the moral obligation of the State to MBBs’ programmes.  School districts achieved interest 
cost savings between 40-98 basis points for single A to Baa rated issuers respectively, due 
to the bond guarantee programme, although AA-rated issuers enjoyed no interest cost 
savings and AAA-rated issuers paid a yield of 18 basis points above that of non-school 
AAA-rated issuers.   
Gilbert and Pike (1998) study Canadian subnational government debt, where municipal 
finance agency (MFA) loans are directly guaranteed by provincial governments.  Their 
sample of 122 responses within Ontario shows that pooled financing through an MFA 
generates cost savings in aggregate, resulting from reduced costs of capital and lower 
administration costs.  Using the hypothetical MBB yield curve approach, also adopted in 
this thesis, they conclude that an MFA generates interest cost savings for municipalities in 
inverse proportion to credit rating and population - small municipalities benefit more 
than large municipalities.   
Cole and Millar (1982) find a cross-subsidisation effect: MBBs generate cost savings for 
small, higher-risk issuers and the magnitudes of these cost savings increase with the State 
bond bank's reputation.  On the other hand, larger, higher-credit-quality issuers face 
higher costs if they market their bonds through a bond bank than if they take them 
directly to market.  They establish that issuers’ interest costs are influenced by 
characteristics, such as bond issue size, credit rating and issue type.  Interest savings arise 
from MBB participation in Maine on a sample of 282 bond issues, but municipalities with 
credit ratings above A and large issue size should investigate other borrowing methods. 
Kidwell and Rogowski (1983) investigate savings from participation in bond banks, 
focusing upon 651 long-term serial bond issues in Maine and Vermont.  They conclude 
that small, low-rated municipalities derive the greatest benefit from participation in MBB 
issues.  Benefits range up to 154 basis points.  Municipalities with a credit rating of Aaa, 




identify bond issue size and sale-type (negotiated or competitive underwriting 
arrangement) as significant regressors of interest costs.   
Reid (1990) claims that the bond bank benefits from increased issue size (lower 
underwriting costs and greater bond marketability) and reduction of risk to investors.  
However, municipal bond banks offer no benefit to large, well-known individual 
municipality bond issuers.  He estimates that negotiated underwriting offerings sell at a 
premium to competitive underwriting offerings.  Simonsen et al. (2001) study issue size 
and sale type with data from municipal bond issues in Oregon, where there is no MBB.  
They conclude that smaller municipalities pay a higher yield-to-maturity and competitive 
underwritten sales generate lower yields than negotiated underwritten sales.   
Katzman (1980) investigates the log-odds of participation in a bond bank through a logit 
regression and concludes that individual municipalities benefit from the credit rating and 
bond issue size of the MBB across a pooled sample of 162 bond issues.  Looking at new 
bond issue re-offer yields, he compares the costs to municipalities that participate in the 
Maine and Vermont Municipal Bond Banks with those they would have incurred, had they 
issued independently, and finds that interest cost savings accrue only for those 
municipalities rated at least one grade below the MBB's rating.  These savings increase as 






PROBIT REGRESSIONS ON PARTICIPATION IN MBB BOND ISSUES  
I begin my analysis by identifying whether an individual municipality’s credit rating and 
the size of its funding requirement are significant regressors of the decision to participate 
in an MBB bond issue.  Following the lead of Katzman (1980), I estimate a probit 
regression of participation in an MBB bond series issue over 2012-16, by regressing on 
the credit rating and participation size of an individual municipality, firstly across the full 
sample of five States, with the longest-standing MBBs, and then by individual State.     
 The regression takes the form: 
Prob (BONDit = 1) = α + Xit  β  + Zit  γ +  ϵit  ;  ϵit   ̴  IID (0, σϵ²) 
BONDit, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if municipality i  participates in an MBB 
bond issue and equals zero otherwise at time t. 
Xit represents the credit rating of the municipality.   
Zit represents the required participation size of the municipality.   
Regression data  
Early studies in the literature collected data by survey.  My samples are larger and the 
participants in a MBB bond issue can be identified by both credit rating and size of 
participation in the pooled bond issue.  As an example, the Maine Municipal Bond Bank 
represented 29 municipalities and governmental units with a series of ten bond issues of 
maturities between one and ten years on 25th October 2012.  The Maine Municipal Bond 
Bank is rated by Moody’s at Aa2, while 24 participating municipalities are not rated and 
the other five are rated at Aa1, Aa2, A1, A2 and Baa1 respectively.     
If a municipality or MBB wishes to issue bonds, it will decide upon a series of issues of 
different terms.  All individual bond issues are grouped into their respective series.  In my 
sample, the 5,726 individual municipality bonds can be grouped as 654 bond series.   
By contrast, the 893 MBB bond issues represent 65 bond series.  Different municipalities 







Therefore, I am comparing 654 + 447 = 1,101 decisions of individual municipalities to 
participate in bond series.  The credit rating of each participating municipality in an MBB 
bond issue can be identified from the Moody’s database, together with the amount of the 
bond issue which is attributable to each municipality (either individually or within the 
MBB programme) from MSRB data.   
Of the municipalities that participated in an MBB bond series issue, 81.2% held no credit 
rating from Moody’s.  This does not necessarily mean that they are of poor credit quality.  
They may decide that they do not need to acquire a credit rating, if they are to participate 
in an MBB bond series issue.   
In general, individual municipality bonds are issued by higher-rated municipalities:  
68.4% of the bond series issued by individual municipalities carried a Moody’s rating of 
Aa3 or higher.  However, at the other extreme, some non-rated municipalities did issue 
their own bonds: 4.5% of individual municipality bonds are issued by non-rated 
municipalities. 
Throughout the analysis, I assume that a municipality pre-determines a set demand of 
funding before it decides to issue its own bond or apply to participate in an MBB bond 
issuance.  Municipalities with a smaller demand for bonds use MBBs: on the 447 
occasions that municipalities participated in an MBB bond series issue, 70.6% required 
less than US$2m, 17.4% required between US$2m and US$5m, and just 12.0% of bond 
participants in MBBs required in excess of US$5m.  On the other hand, of the 654 bond 
series that were issued by individual municipalities only 26.4% were less than US$2m, 
22.5% were between US$2m and US$5m, and 51.1% more than US$5m.   
Regression results 
Table 24 presents probit regressions across five States.  While the results confirm the 
conclusions of the literature, interpretation requires some care.  For example, ‘Not Rated’ 
is a significant and positive regressor.  A participant in an MBB bond series may 
determine that a credit rating is not necessary, regardless of their credit quality.  Thus, 
there may not be a clear causal relationship between MBB bond issue participation and 
the credit quality of a municipality.  Nonetheless, the regressors of participating in an 
MBB bond series issue are negative and significant for all credit ratings of Baa1 and above 
in Model 1 below.  Among the categorical variables, I exclude the low credit-rated 





Table 24: Probit Regressions of MBB Bond Issues — Credit Rating & Participation Size 
Estimator Credit ratings (1) Size of participation (2) Mixed (3) 
Aa1 -1.691 ***  -1.303 *** 
 (0.208)  (0.238) 
Aa2 -0.872 ***   -0.439 ** 
 (0.104)  (0.156) 
Aa3 -1.288 ***  -0.918 *** 
 (0.124)  (0.168) 
A1 -1.239 ***   -0.832 *** 
 (0.208)  (0.238) 
A2 -0.748 ***  -0.348  
 (0.209)  (0.243) 
Baa1 -1.111 ***  -0.774 * 
 (0.408)  (0.440) 
Baa2 0.180    0.723 
 (0.477)  (0.482) 
Not Rated 0.949 ***  1.259 *** 
 
(0.071)  (0.154) 
Size < $1m  0.450 *** -0.178  
 
 (0.077) (0.162) 
$1m < Size <$2m  0.164 * -0.159  
 
 (0.089) (0.162) 
$2m < Size <$5m  -0.394 *** -0.440 *** 
 
 (0.086) (0.163) 
$5m < Size <$10m  -0.790 *** -0.739 *** 
 
 (0.121) (0.191) 
$10m < Size <$20m  -1.360 *** -1.254 *** 
 
 (0.152) (0.226)  
Number of observations 1,101 1,101 1,101 
Dependent variable = 0 654 654 654 
Dependent variable = 1 447 447 447 
Log likelihood -459.3 -665.8 -433.3  
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; constant term 
suppressed; if the dependent variable = 1, the bond is an MBB bond, if the dependent variable = 0, the bond is 
not an MBB bond; credit ratings AAA and A3 are excluded, as they perfectly predict binary response failure; 
credit rating Ba1 excluded; size > $20m excluded   
In Model 2, municipalities with bond issue requirements of less than USS$2m have 
positive and significant regressors, while the regressors of those with larger requirements 
are all negative and significant.  These results suggest that municipalities with high credit 
ratings and larger funding requirements are less likely to participate in MBB bond issues.  
Among the categorical variables, I exclude the largest category of participation size, which 
is over US$20m. 
I also run the regressions with State fixed effects (not reported).  These do not change the 
signs of the regressors, although in a number of cases, their significance is reduced.  For 
example, the regressors of A1, A2 and Baa1 lose significance in Model 1 with State fixed 
effects and the US$5-10m size regressor loses significance in Model 2 with State fixed 
effects.  Some 245 individual municipalities issue bonds in addition to the five MBBs.  I do 






Tables 25 and 26 show the marginal effects of the probit regressions.  The former 
indicates that as the credit rating of the individual municipality improves above Baa2, it is 
less likely to use the services of an MBB.  The latter shows that as the size of the individual 
municipality’s participation requirement decreases below US$2m, it is more likely to use 
the services of an MBB.   
Table 25: Marginal Effects of Probit Regressions — Credit Rating  
Estimator Marginal effect 
Aa1 -0.390 *** 
 (0.046) 
Aa2 -0.201 *** 
 (0.022) 
Aa3 -0.297 ***  
 (0.025) 
A1 -0.286 *** 
 (0.046) 
A2 -0.173 *** 
 (0.048) 
Baa1 -0.256 *** 
 (0.093) 
Baa2 0.042  
 (0.090) 
Not Rated 0.219 *** 
 (0.013) 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 26: Marginal Effects of Probit Regressions — Size of Bond Participation  
Estimator Marginal effect 
Size < $1m 0.146 *** 
 (0.024) 
$1m < Size <$2m 0.053 * 
 (0.029) 
$2m < Size <$5m -0.128 ***  
 (0.027) 
$5m < Size <$10m -0.256 *** 
 (0.037) 
$10m < Size <$20m -0.441 *** 
 (0.045) 
Size > $20m -0.294 *** 
 (0.042) 










I repeat the probit models with month fixed effects included, which allows for seasonal 
factors.  Results are similar to those of Table 24, albeit with reduction or loss of 
significance in a number of regressors. 
Table 27: Probit Regressions of MBB Bond Issues with Month Fixed Effects  
Estimator Credit ratings (1) Size of participation (2) Mixed (3) 
Aa1 -0.941 ***  -0.704 ** 
 (0.279)  (0.300) 
Aa2 -0.223    0.034 
 (0.219)  (0.242) 
Aa3 -0.587 **  -0.380  
 (0.233)  (0.253) 
A1 -0.578 *   -0.343 
 (0.299)  (0.315) 
A2 0.011  0.197  
 (0.296)  (0.314) 
Baa1 -0.201   -0.042  
 (0.410)  (0.486) 
Baa2 0.817    1.182 ** 
 (0.548)  (0.539) 
Not Rated 1.642 ***  1.795 *** 
 
(0.210)  (0.241) 
Size < $1m  0.893 *** -0.186  
 
 (0.145) (0.183) 
$1m < Size <$2m  0.638 *** -0.062  
 
 (0.152) (0.186) 
$2m < Size <$5m  0.075  -0.350 * 
 
 (0.150) (0.183) 
$5m < Size <$10m  -0.290  -0.624 *** 
 
 (0.179) (0.217) 
$10m < Size <$20m  -0.882 *** -1.204 *** 
 
 (0.198) (0.247)  
Number of observations 1,101 1,101 1,101 
Dependent variable = 0 654 654 654 
Dependent variable = 1 447 447 447 
Log likelihood -393.1 -552.0 -373.6  
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; constant term 
suppressed; if the dependent variable = 1, the bond is an MBB bond, if the dependent variable = 0, the bond is 
not an MBB bond; credit ratings AAA and A3 are excluded, as they perfectly predict binary response failure; 











I include linear regression models in Table 28.  Most regressors are significant.  The lower 
and non-rated credit rating and the smallest size of participation estimators command the 
largest positive regression coefficients.  These are relative to the omitted categories of 
credit rating Ba1 and participation size > US$20m respectively. 
Table 28: Linear Regressions of MBB Bond Issues - Credit Rating & Participation Size 
Estimator Credit ratings (1) Size of participation (2) Mixed (3) 
constant 0.001 0.183 *** -0.009 
 (0.309) (0.036) (0.300) 
Aa1 0.045   -0.087 *** 
 (0.033)  (0.025) 
Aa2 0.192 ***   0.212 *** 
 (0.025)  (0.031) 
Aa3 0.099 ***  0.103 *** 
 (0.025)  (0.0251) 
A1 0.108 **  0.123 *** 
 (0.043)  (0.040) 
A2 0.227 ***  0.227 *** 
 (0.052)  (0.065) 
Baa1 0.133   0.146 * 
 (0.090)  (0.086) 
Baa2 0.571 ***  0.588 *** 
 (0.131)  (0.195) 
Not Rated 0.829 ***  0.784 *** 
 
(0.017)  (0.025) 
Size < $1m  0.491 *** 0.082 * 
 
 (0.046) (0.043) 
$1m < Size <$2m  0.382 *** 0.091 ** 
 
 (0.050) (0.043) 
$2m < Size <$5m  0.164 *** 0.006  
 
 (0.048) (0.037) 
$5m < Size <$10m  0.032  -0.053  
 
 (0.051) (0.039) 
$10m < Size <$20m  -0.096 ** -0.123 *** 
 
 (0.043) (0.037)  
Number of observations 1,101 1,101 1,101 
Dependent variable = 0 654 654 654 
Dependent variable = 1 447 447 447 
R-squared 0.505 0.193 0.523 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;   
if the dependent variable = 1, the bond is an MBB bond, if the dependent variable = 0, the bond is not an MBB 
bond; credit ratings AAA and A3 are excluded, as they perfectly predict binary response failure;  





Table 29 details regressions on credit ratings by individual State.  The omitted variable is 
Ba1 in Maine, North Dakota and Vermont or Baa2 in Alaska and New Hampshire.  Every 
significant credit rating regressor of A1 or higher records a negative regressor, while Not 
Rated is a significant and positive regressor in three States.  Higher rated municipalities 
tend not to use the services of an MBB anywhere, while non-rated municipalities tend to 
use the MBB in Alaska, Maine and Vermont. 
Table 29: Probit Regressions of MBB Bond Issues on Credit Rating by State 
Estimator Alaska Maine 
New 
Hampshire 
North Dakota Vermont 
Aa1 - -1.478 *** - -1.550 *** - 
 - (0.290) - (0.346) - 
Aa2 -0.736 ***  -0.197 -1.680 *** -1.991 *** -1.565 *** 
 (0.272) (0.158) (0.330)  (0.418) (0.487) 
Aa3 0.097 -1.282 *** -1.068 *** - -0.842 * 
 (0.348) (0.221) (0.293) - (0.452) 
A1 - -1.465 *** -0.349 -1.565 *** - 
 - (0.505) (0.386) (0.344) - 
A2 - 0.319  0.140 - - 
 - (0.451) (0.419) - - 
Baa1 - -0.431 - - - 
 - (0.749) - - - 
Baa2 - - - 0.431 0.431 
 - - - (0.749) (0.749) 
Not Rated 1.550 *** 1.601 *** - -0.798 *** 1.956 *** 
 (0.346) 
(0.346) 
(0.181) - (0.158) (0.244) 
Number of observations 98 330 198 313 162 
Dependent variable = 0 53 166 105 289 41 
Dependent variable = 1 45 164 93 24 121 
Log likelihood -48.6 -118.8 107.1 -33.7 -33.7 
Source: Calculated; key: robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; where a 
regressor is not quantified, it is because it is a perfect predictor of Mutual = 1 or 0; constant term suppressed; 












Table 30 summarises regressions on participation size by State.  The omitted variable is 
‘size > US$20m’.  All significant regressors of size of participation of less than US$2m, 
except in North Dakota, are positive and all significant regressors of size of participation 
in excess of US$5m are negative.  Municipalities with smaller funding requirements tend 
to use the services of an MBB, while those with larger funding requirements tend not to. 
Table 30: Probit Regressions of MBB Bond Issues on Size of Participation by State 
Estimator Alaska Maine 
New 
Hampshire 
North Dakota Vermont 
Size < $1m - 1.388 *** - -1.495 *** 1.856 *** 
 - (0.173) - (0.204) (0.310) 
$1m < Size <$2m 1.335 **  0.506 *** 0.785 *** -1.106 *** 1.712 *** 
 (0.530) (0.167) (0.231) (0.193) (0.461) 
$2m < Size <$5m 0.674 * -0.784 *** 0.366 * -1.763 *** 0.722 *** 
 (0.393) (0.181) (0.198) (0.261) (0.237) 
$5m < Size <$10m 0.000 -1.322 *** -0.566 ** -1.565 *** 0.000 
 (0.335) (0.266) (0.251) (0.344) (0.313) 
$10m < Size <$20m -0.589 * -1.803 ***  -1.668 *** -0.502  -0.722 ** 
 (0.315) (0.446) (0.331) (0.364) (0.335) 
Number of observations 98 330 198 313 162 
Dependent variable = 0 53 166 105 289 41 
Dependent variable = 1 45 164 93 24 121 
Log likelihood -57.1 -127.8 -93.6 -99.6 -58.1 
Source: Calculated; key: robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; where a 





THE BENEFIT OF MBB PARTICIPATION  
With regard to the second research question, the aim is to identify the interest cost 
advantage that a US credit-pooling agency offers to a participant in its bond issues.  
Following the approach of Gilbert and Pike (1998), the effect of participation in an MBB 
bond issue is estimated on a bond’s yield spread, relative to a duration-matched point on 
a hypothetical MBB bond yield curve.  It is possible to identify whether bond issues are 
those of individual municipalities or of MBBs.  Using an MBB participation dummy and 
control variables, I undertake linear regressions.   
The yield-to-maturity of an individual municipal bond or MBB bond is directly observable.  
To create the spread, I estimate a zero-coupon hypothetical MBB yield curve within each 
State for fixed coupon, fixed maturity bonds.  The median duration of all municipal bonds 
in my sample is 4.66 years, so I identify the closest live MBB bond to a five-year maturity 
as the reference bond for a particular State at a given time.  Using Bloomberg secondary 
market data, I also identify the 15 closest ‘observed comparables’ municipal bonds of 
different terms and coupons to this reference bond.  Bloomberg identifies these as part of 
its proprietorial curve building methodology, as recently traded and sufficiently liquid 
securities that most closely compare to a given reference bond.  Armed with the relevant 
secondary market data for these bonds, I use the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson curve-building 
methodology to generate zero-coupon MBB benchmark yield curves for each State (this is 
defined in the Appendix to Chapter 1).  
There is a risk that selection bias may affect the results, because the difference in the 
average outcome between participating in an MBB bond issue and issuing a bond 
individually may be caused by confounding variables that predict participation rather 
than the participation itself.  Thus, propensity score matching is also used to estimate the 
effect of participation in an MBB bond issue, which is then compared to the linear 
regression results.  This method accounts for the covariates that predict participation, and 
it reduces bias, due to confounding variables that could be found in a simple OLS estimate 
of the impact of MBB bond issue participation on yield spreads.  Propensity scores are 
predicted probabilities that are used to find close non-treated matches for the treated 
observations.  The methodology assigns observations into two groups: 
- a treated group (MBB bond participation) 





It estimates a probit model for the propensity of observations to be assigned into the 
treated group.  A propensity score is generated that is the conditional probability of 
receiving the treatment, given the pre-treatment characteristics of the bond/issuer.  This 
allows me to refine the sample used to estimate average treatment effects.  I can thus 
draw inference for treatment effects from a smaller group of treated and non-treated 
observations (MBB bond participation and individual bond issuers) of similar propensity 
scores, rather than from the full set of observations.   
My sample is based on observation of every municipal bond issued in five States over the 
period 2012-16.  I first run OLS regressions on the full sample and then study refined 
propensity score matching samples for treatment effects that use techniques, such as 
nearest neighbour matching or kernel matching.   
I construct the dependent variable, Yijt, as the yield spread at primary issue of the 
individual municipality or MBB bond, relative to the duration-matched hypothetical MBB 
bond yield for its respective State of issuer.  It varies from issuer to issuer (i), bond to 
bond (j) and over time (t).   
I estimate the zero-coupon hypothetical MBB yield curve for fixed coupon, fixed maturity 
MBB bonds, based on secondary market data (see Methodology on page 100 for 
definition).   
I estimate Yijt  by linear regression for the bond issues within each State in a model:  
Yijt  = α + Xijt  β  + Zijt  γ +  ϵijt  ;  ϵijt   ̴  IID (0, σϵ²) 
The main regressor of interest is Xijt, which is a dummy for participation in an MBB bond 
issue.   
Zijt is a vector of control variables that include bond duration, liquidity, coupon,  
a competitive underwriting dummy, bond tax status dummies and credit rating dummies. 
Issue size, price and yield-to-maturity data are sourced from Bloomberg.  The MSRB 
provides data for municipal bond banks, such as individual municipality participants, 
bond underwriting and tax status, which earlier papers had to access by survey.  Credit 







Katzman (1980), Kidwell and Rogowski (1983) and Reid (1990) use the logarithm of the 
value of the bond issued in USD millions as an instrument for liquidity at the time of 
primary issue.  For ease of economic interpretation, I use the value of the bond issued in 
USD millions, which can be calculated from MSRB data.   
Coupon 
As in Chapter 1, I show that bond coupon is often a significant regressor of yield spread.  
This may relate to tax considerations: Schaefer (1982) finds a relationship between 
different UK gilts’ tax clienteles through the percentage of a bond’s total return in the 
form of coupon income relative to capital gain.  Kim et al. (1993) show that a default risk 
in bond coupons affects valuation.  Elton et al. (2001) argue that because coupon is higher 
for lower-rated debt, then its tax burden is higher, suggesting a tax effect.      
Bond issue underwriting methods 
I investigate which method of bond underwriting generates lower interest costs for an 
issuer.  Kidwell and Rogowski (1983), Reid (1990) and Simonsen et al. (2001) include 
analyses of the effect of different types of underwriting on the interest costs of bond 
issuance.  Two methods of bond underwriting – competitive and negotiated – are used in 
approximately equal measure across my full sample: 
A competitive sale is a method in which underwriters submit bids for the purchase of  
a new issue of municipal bonds on a given date, either alone or as a syndicate.  The 
securities are awarded to the underwriting syndicate that presents the bid that 
represents the lowest interest cost to the seller.  Buyers will have applications filled on a 
first-come, first-served basis during the order period. 
In a negotiated sale municipal bonds are issued under an exclusive agreement with an 
underwriter or syndicate that is selected by the issuer.  This method tends to occur in 
larger, more complex issues.  Depending upon the rate of book-building (flow of orders), 
the underwriter can recommend to increase or reduce the interest rates on the new 







Tax structure of municipal bonds and tax dummies 
Investing in US municipal bonds is often tax efficient relative to other US bond markets 
for a tax-bearing investor.  Literature on the impact of the tax exemption on municipal 
bonds pricing includes Dammon and Green (1987), who find evidence of the tax 
advantage in the US municipal bond yield curve; Wang et al. (2006) control for the effects 
of default and liquidity risk and obtain implicit tax rates that are close to the statutory tax 
rates of high-income individuals and corporations; Ang et al. (2014) claim that the tax 
exemption component of municipal bonds has lowered yields by 1.84% since 2008.   
I investigate the effect of different tax categories on yield spreads.  Federal and State tax 
exempt or Federal bank qualified and State tax-exempt bonds represent over 85% of the 
sample.  Taxable municipal bonds also exist.  There is one bond in the sample, identified 
as ‘Federal taxable’, which serves as the excluded bond in the linear regressions.   
Eight other categories of Federal tax and State tax status are identified across the 
regression sample, as follows: 
Tax 1 – Federal and State tax exempt (57.62% of the sample) 
Tax 2 – Federal bank qualified/State tax exempt (27.63% of the sample) 
Tax 3 – Federal tax exempt (3.91% of the sample) 
Tax 4 – Federal bank qualified (0.20% of the sample) 
Tax 5 – Federal tax exempt/State taxable (0.12% of the sample) 
Tax 6 – Federal alternative minimum tax/State tax exempt (4.79% of the sample) 
Tax 7 – Federal taxable/State tax exempt (4.76% of the sample) 
Tax 8 – Federal taxable/State taxable (0.95% of the sample) 
State tax-exempt bonds include municipal issues that are exempt from State and often 
local taxes.  In this case, investors who reside in the State of issuance are not taxed on 
their interest earnings at the State level.  Thus, the effective yield they earn on the bond 
will actually be higher than the stated yield.   
Bank qualified describes a class of municipal securities that enjoy a tax-advantaged status 
when purchased by commercial banks.  Prior to the 1986 Tax Reform Act, commercial 
banks could take investment tax credits on funds invested in tax-exempt securities.  The 
1986 Act removed this benefit, except for securities designated as ‘bank qualified’.  Thus, 
demand by commercial banks for tax-exempt securities is almost entirely limited to bank-
qualified issues.  In order to meet the requirements for ‘bank qualification,’ municipal 




Alternative minimum tax is a supplemental income tax, imposed by the US Federal 
government in addition to baseline income tax for individuals, corporations, estates and 
trusts that have exemptions allowing for lower payments of standard income tax.  
Taxpayers with incomes above the exemption, whose regular Federal income tax is below 
a given amount, must pay the higher AMT amount. 
Taxable municipal bonds exist because the Federal or State government will not subsidise 
the financing of certain activities that it does not deem to provide a significant benefit to 
the public.  Investor-led housing, local sports facilities and refunding of an existing issue 
are examples of bond issues that are federally taxable.     
Linear regression data 
The sample for the linear regressions includes bonds issued by 250 entities, drawn from 
five States, including five Municipal Bond Banks.  6,619 fixed-coupon, fixed maturity-date 
bonds were issued across Alaska, Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota and Vermont   ̶ 
the States with the longest standing MBBs   ̶ from January 2012 to December 2016.  They 
represent every municipal bond issued in these States over the period.   
On average, MBB bonds are longer dated than municipal bonds, although their yield-to-
maturity is lower.   
Table 31: Summary Data of Municipal and MBB Bonds 
Moody’s Credit Rating MBBs Individual Municipalities 
Average duration 4.90 years 4.62 years 
Average yield-to-maturity 1.454% 1.495% 
Average yield spread to MBB curve 10.7 basis points 13.1 basis points 
Source: Calculated 
Bond issue size  
The average size of the bond issues of individual municipalities of US$1.253m compares 
with US$1.923m for the average of each bond issued by an MBB.  An issuer may issue up 
to 20 bonds in a series of different terms at one time.     
 Table 32: Issue Size of Municipal Bonds  
Issue Size Number of Bonds Issued By MBBs Number of Bonds Issued By Municipalities 
< $1 million 323 (36.2%) 3,936 (68.8%) 
$1-2 million 259 (29.0%) 945 (16.5%) 
$2-3 million 147 (16.4%) 500 (8.7%) 
> $3 million 164 (18.4%) 345 (6.0%) 






The average credit rating of an MBB bond is higher than that of an individual municipality 
bond.  232 bonds were issued with an Aaa credit rating, as determined by Moody’s.  These 
include the North Dakota Public Finance Authority, the Maine Municipal Bond Bank and 
six individual municipalities.  At the other extreme, 259 individual municipal bonds were 
unrated by the major credit ratings agencies.  Many municipalities do not seek credit 
ratings, given maintenance costs and the infrequency of their need for funds.   
Table 33: Ratings of Municipal and MBB Bonds 
Moody’s Credit Rating Number of Bonds Issued by 
MBBs 
Number of Bonds Issued by 
Municipalities Aaa 117 (13.1%) 115 (2.0%) 
Aa1 - 1,210 (21.1%) 
Aa2 636 (71.2%) 1,443 (25.2%) 
Aa3 120 (13.4%) 1,534 (26.8%) 
A1 - 500 (8.8%) 
A2 20 (2.3%) 261 (4.6%) 
A3 - 219 (3.8%) 
Baa1 - 144 (2.5%) 
Baa2 - 30 (0.5%) 
Ba1 - 10 (0.2%) 
Ba2 - 1 (-) 
Unrated - 259 (4.5%) 





Linear regression results 
OLS regressions of the yield spread relative to the hypothetical MBB yield curve for  
a sample of all bonds issued across the five States over 2012-16 are summarised in  
Table 34.  They suggest that participating in the bond issuance programme of an MBB 
generates interest cost savings for a municipality.  Issuing bonds through a Municipal 
Bond Bank saves between 6.2 and 8.1 basis points of yield spread relative to individual 
bond issuance, depending upon fixed effects.   
Controlling for State fixed effects makes little difference to the R-squared of the results, 
but the absolute size of the Municipal Bond Bank regressor is larger, at -7.9 basis points, 
than in the base model.  Adding time fixed effects implies an MBB dummy coefficient of  
-6.9 basis points.  The Wald test implies that the time fixed effects model is appropriate 
ahead of OLS Model 1. 
Most other regressors are significant.  Yield spreads rise by between 1.1 and 1.4 basis 
points per year of duration.  They fall by between 0.3 and 0.4 basis points per US$m 
increase in issue size in models without time fixed effects.  In economic terms, the 
liquidity regressors are small numbers, considering the average size of bond issue.  
Indeed, this regressor loses significance when time effects are added to the base model.  
Yield spread rises by between 3.7 and 4.4 basis points per 100 basis point change in 
coupon.  Competitive underwriting agreements save issuers between 24.5 and 27.3 basis 
points relative to negotiated underwriting agreements.  This is an interesting result, given 
that negotiated underwriting tends to happen on more complex issues. 
All tax category regressors are significant.  Tax categories 1, 2 3, 4 and 5 have the most 
favourable status at the Federal level and these significant regressors are the most 
negative relative to the omitted category, which is Federal taxable.  Credit rating 
regressors are significant in all models, with the exception of Baa2.  In general, higher 
credit-rated bond regressors are more negative relative to Ba2, the omitted category, than 
lower credit-rated bonds. 
I interact duration and liquidity with the State regressors and check for significance 
within the resulting regressions.  Interacting duration with State in Model 1, the Alaska 
and North Dakota regressors lose significance.  Interacting liquidity with State, the 
regressors for Alaska, New Hampshire and North Dakota lose significance.  These results 





Table 34: Regression of Yield Spread for Full Sample 
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 2.504 *** 2.465 *** 2.299 *** 2.231 *** 
 
(0.062) (0.066) (0.082) (0.085) 
Municipal Bond Bank 
issue dummy 
-0.062 ***  -0.079 *** -0.069 ** -0.081 *** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.031) 
Duration 0.014 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Liquidity ($mn) -0.004 ** -0.003 ** -0.004  -0.003  
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Coupon 0.037 *** 0.040 *** 0.042 *** 0.044 *** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Competitive u/w 
u/w dummy 
-0.273 *** -0.265 *** -0.255 *** -0.245 *** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Tax 1 -1.756 ***  -1.796 *** -1.853 *** -1.864 *** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.034) (0.035) 
Tax 2 -1.882 *** -1.912 *** -1.966 *** -1.968 ***  
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.034) (0.036) 
Tax 3 -1.214 *** -1.284 *** -1.366 *** -1.395 *** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.040) (0.040) 
Tax 4 -1.917 *** -1.883 *** -2.024 *** -1.975 *** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.037) (0.041) 
Tax 5 -1.108 *** -1.159 *** -1.216 *** -1.232 *** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.041) (0.042) 
Tax 6 -1.704 *** -1.612 *** -1.746 *** -1.645 *** 
 (0.060) (0.069) (0.064) (0.070) 
Tax 7 -1.968 *** -2.007 *** -1.915 *** -1.963 *** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.056) (0.056) 
Tax 8 -1.270 *** -1.317 *** -1.323 *** -1.345 *** 
 (0.055) (0.058) (0.052) (0.053) 
Aaa -0.722 *** -0.708 *** -0.819 *** -0.808 *** 
 (0.061) (0.062) (0.066) (0.067) 
Aa1 -0.750 *** -0.746 *** -0.871 *** -0.867 *** 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.063) (0.063) 
Aa2 -0.774 *** -0.792 *** -0.844 *** -0.856 *** 
 
(0.058) (0.059) (0.063) (0.063) 
Aa3 -0.705 *** -0.723 *** -0.808 *** -0.821 *** 
 
(0.058) (0.059) (0.062) (0.063) 
A1 -0.556 *** -0.567 *** -0.688 *** -0.691 *** 
 
(0.058) (0.059) (0.063) (0.064) 
A2 -0.466 *** -0.488 *** -0.573 *** -0.588 *** 
 
(0.061) (0.062) (0.064) (0.065) 
A3 -0.282 *** -0.363 *** -0.375 *** -0.440 *** 
 
(0.066) (0.067) (0.069) (0.069) 
Baa1 -0.289 *** -0.339 *** -0.339 *** -0.380 *** 
 
(0.083) (0.067) (0.071) (0.072) 
Baa2 -0.126  -0.165 ** -0.271 *** -0.294 *** 
 
(0.084) (0.077) (0.089) (0.081) 
No credit rating  -0.327 *** -0.345 *** -0.413 *** 0.429 *** 
 
(0.071) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) 
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Time fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 6,619 6,619 6,619 6,619 
R-squared 0.508 0.525 0.612 0.625 
Source: Calculated; key: robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
one observation of Ba2 credit rating omitted; one observation of Federal Taxable (the least favourable tax 




Cluster robust errors 
Following Cameron and Miller (2015), I also undertake the main regression analysis, 
including cluster robust standard errors, clustering about the States by month of bond 
issue (not reported).  This creates 225 clusters.  These errors are greater than 
heteroscedasticity-adjusted errors and the Mutual dummy loses significance in the base 
model without fixed effects.  In the other models it is significant at the 5% level.  The 
significance of duration falls to the 5% level in the models with State fixed effects and 
both time and State fixed effects.  The significance of issue size falls to 10% in the base 
model and the model with State fixed effects.  All other regressors, except Baa2, remain 
significant at the 1% level.   
Liquidity and credit rating regressors 
The liquidity and credit rating (‘Aaa’ to ‘No credit rating’) regressors within Table 34 are 
different from those in the regressions of Tables 24 to 30, but there is an overlap.  For 
example, each of the credit ratings of the 1,101 bond series observations in Table 24 are 
those of the individual municipality (which decides whether or not to participate in an 
MBB bond series).  On the other hand, each of the 6,619 observations of credit ratings in  
Table 34 represents the individual bond issued.  Of these, 893 are MBB bonds and 
therefore not those of the individual participating municipality.  Only 259 of the 6,619 
municipal bonds were unrated by the major credit rating agencies, whereas 81.2% of the 
municipalities that participated in an MBB bond series issue held no credit rating from 
Moody’s. 
Similarly, for liquidity from Tables 24 to 30, I look at either the size of participation in an 
individual municipality’s bond series or of its participation within MBB bond series, 
whereas in Table 34 liquidity reflects the size of the actual bond issued.  
Characteristics of the residuals  
None of the credit rating controls correlate with the residuals of any of the models within 
Table 34, which does not suggest bias.  However, I have also undertaken linear 
regressions that exclude all credit ratings regressors (not reported).  The Mutual 
regressor is much larger in all revised models.  For example, it rises to a highly significant  
-0.16 in Model 1, -0.17 in Model 2, -0.15 in Model 3 and -0.15 in Model 4.  These are also 
much larger figures than the treatment effects of the propensity score matching results, 





The correlations of the residuals of regression Model 4 in Table 34 against all regressors 
of interest are each zero.  A check for collinearity between regressors is presented in 
Table 35.  There is some correlation between contemporaneous regressors, in particular 
coupon and other regressors: 
Table 35: Pair-wise Correlations of the Contemporaneous Variables 
Correlation Yield Spread Mutual Competitive Duration Liquidity Coupon 
Yield Spread 1 -0.014 -0.457 0.101 0.137 0.154 
Mutual  1 -0.163 0.041 0.238 0.195 
Competitive   1 -0.045 -0.332 -0.147 
Duration    1 0.093 0.332 
Liquidity     1 0.424 
Coupon      1 
Source: Calculated; liquidity is represented by the log of the issue size 
An issuer might issue a series of up to 20 bonds of different terms on the same day.   
A Breusch-Pagan test rejects constant variance of the residuals, suggesting 
heteroscedasticity.  Jarque-Barra test statistics reject that the residuals of Model 4 are 
normally distributed.  The residuals have a median of -2 basis points and a standard 
deviation of 0.283.  Evidence of skew and kurtosis is seen in Figure 12.   

















Std. Dev.   0.283136
Skewness   0.697281





Source: Calculated; the x-axis numbers the ranges of the observations in percent;  









Effect of risk appetite regimes 
The effect of investor risk appetite regimes on bond yields is well researched, including 
work by Dungey et al. (2000), Codogno et al. (2003) and Pagano and Thadden (2004).  
However, time fixed effects also absorb changes in market conditions over time, which 
challenges the need to include a risk appetite regressor.  The VIX index of S&P 500 index 
volatility has a correlation of 0.188 with the time fixed effects of the second model.  
Adding the VIX index to the model without time effects in the five State sample makes 
little difference to the regressors of interest within either the base model (1) or the model 
with time fixed effects (3). 
Table 36: Regression of Yield Spread — VIX Index Added  
Estimator OLS Model 1 OLS Model 3 OLS 
Constant 2.504 *** 2.299 *** 2.439 *** 
 
(0.062) (0.082) (0.065) 
Municipal Bond Bank 
issue 
-0.062 ***  -0.069 ** -0.067 *** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Duration 0.014 *** 0.012 *** 0.013 *** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Liquidity ($mn) -0.004 ** -0.004  -0.004 ** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Coupon 0.037 *** 0.042 *** 0.039 *** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Competitive u/w dummy -0.273 *** -0.255 *** -0.270 *** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Risk Appetite (VIX Index) - - 0.006 *** 
   (0.001) 
State fixed effects No No No 
Time fixed effects No Yes No 
Tax controls Yes Yes Yes 
Credit rating controls Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 6,619 6,619 6,619 
R-squared 0.508 0.612 0.510 




Selection bias – propensity score matching 
To address possible selection bias within linear regressions, a propensity score matching 
method is adopted to match bond issues of individual municipalities with those of MBBs.  
Propensity score methods shift focus from the linear estimation of E [Yi ǀ Xi, di]  
to estimation of a propensity score: prob (Xi) = p (di = 1 ǀ Xi) ≡ E [di ǀ Xi],  
where di is a treatment dummy and Xi  an independent variable.   
I estimate a probit model for the propensity of observations to be assigned into the 
treated group (in this case MBB bond issues) and use Xi variables that may affect the 
likelihood of being assigned into the treated group. 
The propensity score is the conditional predicted probability of receiving treatment, given 
pre-treatment characteristics, Xi.  
Addressing the full data sample of all five States, as a first stage I estimate a propensity 
score by taking a probit regression of the Mutual (treatment) dummy.  These results 
allow an estimation of the treatment effect on the yield spread to be made.     
Table 37: Propensity Score Model (Probit Model) 
Dependent variable Mutual dummy Probit coefficients  
Duration -0.050 *** 
Issue size 0.233 *** 
Coupon 0.227 *** 
Competitive -0.482 *** 
Tax 1 3.747 *** 
Tax 3 2.400 *** 
Tax 5 3.447 *** 
Aaa 13.491 *** 
Aa2 11.753 *** 
Aa3 10.253 *** 
A2 10.204 *** 
Number of observations 6,619, log likelihood -1293.3, pseudo R-squared 0.506  
Source: Calculated; Tax 2, Tax 4, Tax 6, Tax 7, Tax 8, Aa1, A1, A3, Baa1, Baa2, Ba2 and Not Rated are omitted, 
as they are perfect predictors of Mutual; State and monthly fixed effects included; Vermont is excluded from 
State fixed effects; a number of months are excluded, due to collinearity; constant term suppressed 
The omitted credit rating variable is Ba1, which is a lower grade than the other credit 
ratings included.  The omitted tax variable is ‘Federal taxable’, which is the least attractive 
tax status.   Vermont is omitted from State fixed effects. 
The region of common support of propensity scores is between 0.0024 and 0.9839 and 




Table 38: Range of Percentiles of Observations 
Inferior of block of propensity score Mutual = 0 Mutual = 1 Total 
0 852 18 870 
0.1 449 62 511 
0.2 210 79 289 
0.3 168 117 285 
0.4 220 260 480 
0.6 83 156 239 
0.7 46 117 163 
0.8 26 84 110 
Total 2054 893 2947 
Source: Calculated 
Table 39 highlights the average treatment effect of an MBB bond issue from matching by 
different methods.  Each of the average treatment effects on the treated is estimated with 
time and State fixed effects included.    
Table 39: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (MBB bond issue) 
Estimation method Average Treatment Effect Standard error 
Linear regression with Mutual dummy -0.086 ** 0.014 
ATET nearest neighbour -0.083 *** 0.030 
ATET kernel matching -0.071 *** 0.018 
ATET stratification matching -0.076 ** 0.031 
Source: Calculated; the difference between the linear regression treatment effect and results from Table 34 is 
the omission of Tax 2, Tax 4, Tax 6, Tax 7, Tax 8, Aa1, A1, A3, Baa1, Baa2 and Not Rated regressors in the 
former, which are perfect predictors of Mutual 
All results of the effect of participation in an MBB bond issue are significant and lie in 
close proximity to the results suggested by the models in Table 34.  After matching 
treated and control bond issues, Table 39 claims that the average effect on participants of 
participation within an MBB bond issue programme is to reduce the yield spread by 
between 7.1 and 8.3 basis points across all five States.   
The control variables in Table 39 differ from those of Table 34: a number of the credit 
rating and tax status variables are omitted from the former, because they are perfect 
predictors of the Mutual dummy.  Hence the linear regression of Table 39 is not directly 





Individual State-by-State linear regression results 
A panel regression of the large sample fits data from five different States to one set of 
 β and γ coefficients.  By contrast, I show below that estimating the effect of  
a municipality’s participation in an MBB bond issue generates β and γ coefficients that 
differ widely from one State to another.  Tables 41 and 40 are constructed with and 
without time fixed effects respectively.   
The MBB dummy is negative and significant in four States in the base OLS model, whereas 
it is negative and significant in all States, according to time fixed effects models.  
Significant estimates of the benefit of participating in an MBB bond issue range from  
8.2 to 43.3 basis points by individual State and from 5.1 to 40.8 basis points in models 
that control for time fixed effects.  In each State, the Wald test implies that the time fixed 
effects model is appropriate, by rejecting the null hypothesis that the period coefficients 
are jointly equal to zero.  In every State, the R-squared of the respective regression with 
time fixed effects is higher than that of the regression for all five States combined. 
Benefits from participating in MBB bond issues are least compelling in Alaska: the MBB 
dummy coefficient is significant at the 5% level when I control for time fixed effects, 
although the regressor is not significant in the base model.  In the fixed effects model, 
participating in the bond issues of the Alaska Municipal Bond Bank saves 7.4 basis points 
relative to individual municipality bond issues.  Bonds issued by the Maine Municipal 
Bond Bank save between 8.2 (no fixed effects model) and 15.9 (time fixed effects model) 
for municipalities relative to bonds issued by individual municipalities.  New Hampshire 
Municipal Bond Bank involvement in new bond issues reduces yield spreads between  
5.1 and 9.1 basis points.  The MBB dummy within the North Dakota sample is collinear 
with the AAA credit rating dummy.  The effect of the MBB reduces yield spreads by 
between 40.8 and 43.3 basis points.  The MBB effect is significant and negative on yield 
spread in Vermont, ranging between 32.0 and 39.3 basis points.  This is the smallest 
sample of the five States. 
The North Dakota Public Finance Authority and Vermont Municipal Bond Bank generate 
the greatest interest cost savings of the five MBBs sampled, yet Table 22 shows that they 
have the lowest values of long-term bonds outstanding on their respective balance sheets 




Of the other regressors: 
1. Duration is significant at the 1% level in all States and affects yield spread 
positively in four States, except in North Dakota.  In the four States, the effect is 
between 1.8 and 3.5 basis points per year, which a bond issuer should consider as 
economically significant.  
2. Liquidity (as measured by size of bond issue) is only significant in North Dakota 
and Vermont, where it impacts yield spreads negatively.  Even here, the economic 
impact is low, given the small size of bond issues. 
3. Coupon is a positive and significant regressor in all States (between 1.5 and 11.4 
basis points per percent increase in coupon). 
4. Competitive underwriting arrangements generate savings of between 8.3 and 41.0 
basis points relative to negotiated underwriting for issuers in the four States that 
record both methods.  There are no negotiated arrangements in Vermont. 
5. In the base regressions, the higher quality credit ratings regressors that are 
significant are more negative than the lower credit ratings regressors, relative to 
Not Rated, in the four States where it is the omitted category. 
6. All tax regressors in the base models are significant in Alaska, Maine, New 
Hampshire and Vermont.  Fewer regressors are significant in the fixed effects 
models.  Tax 1 (Federal and State tax exempt) and Tax 2 (Federal bank 
qualified/State tax exempt) are the most attractive categories and represent 85% 
of the sample.  Their regressors are negative relative to Tax 8 (Federal and State 
taxable) in each State’s base model.  
In all models in Tables 40 and 41, the correlations of the residuals against the regressors 
of interest are zero in each State.  Furthermore, there is limited evidence of multi-
collinearity between the contemporaneous regressors across the States individually, with 
the exception of Maine.  
Regressions are run by individual State, without and with municipality fixed effects.  
There are 245 different municipalities and five MBBs across the five States (fixed effects 
results are not reported).  In general, this makes little difference to the regressors of main 






Table 40: Regression of Yield Spread by Individual State 
Estimator Alaska Maine New Hampshire North Dakota Vermont 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 0.521 *** 0.771 *** 0.233 *** 1.356 *** 2.187 *** 
 
(0.059) (0.125) (0.085) (0.117) (0.096) 
MBB issue dummy -0.007 -0.082 *** -0.091 *** -0.433 *** -0.393 *** 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.021) (0.082) (0.046) 
Duration 0.028 *** 0.018 *** 0.023 *** -0.019 *** 0.035 *** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
Liquidity ($mn) 0.001 0.001  0.002 -0.031 *** -0.052 *** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.019) 
Coupon 0.015 ** 0.021 *** 0.033 *** 0.069 *** 0.114 *** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.019) 
Competitive u/w -0.083 *** -0.204 *** -0.231 *** -0.410 *** - 
 (0.023) (0.014) (0.022) (0.025) - 
Tax 1 -0.131 *** -0.396 ***  -0.160 *** -0.634 *** -0.246 *** 
 (0.036) (0.078) (0.045) (0.087) (0.069) 
Tax 2 - -0.482 ***  -0.342 *** -0.739 *** - 
 - (0.077) (0.043) (0.088) - 
Tax 3 0.133 *** 0.163 ** 0.128 * -0.232 ** 0.348 *** 
 (0.048) (0.076) (0.073) (0.102) (0.074) 
Tax 4 -0.201 *** -0.306 *** - -0.063 - 
 (0.041) (0.098) - (0.107) - 
Tax 5 0.593 *** 0.141 * 0.568 *** 0.062 0.283 *** 
 (0.080) (0.083) (0.047) (0.143) (0.084) 
Tax 6 - -0.420 *** -  - - 
 - (0.075) - - - 
Tax 7 - -0.628 *** - - - 
 - (0.077) - - - 
Tax 8 - -  - - - 
 - - - - - 
Aaa -0.542 *** -0.519 *** - - - 
 (0.064) (0.104) - - - 
Aa1 -0.519 *** -0.359 *** -0.183 ** -0.501 *** - 
 (0.046) (0.103) (0.079) (0.077) - 
Aa2 -0.487 *** -0.414 *** -0.086  -0.611 *** -1.910 *** 
 (0.048) (0.102) (0.077) (0.083) (0.081) 
Aa3 -0.632 *** -0.381 *** -0.106  -0.436 *** -2.086 *** 
 
(0.052) (0.102) (0.077) (0.076) (0.070) 
A1 -0.300 *** -0.103  0.139 * -0.450 *** -2.120 *** 
 
(0.052) (0.103) (0.084) (0.075) (0.064) 
A2 0.144  -0.124  0.445 *** -0.412 *** -1.657 *** 
 
(0.106) (0.114) (0.103) (0.078) (0.076) 
A3 0.007 - 0.667 *** -0.152 * -1.814 *** 
 
(0.049) - (0.114) (0.086) (0.089) 
Baa1 - -0.069 0.382 *** 0.032 -1.804 *** 
 
- (0.110) (0.085) (0.111) (0.070) 
Baa2 0.217 *** - - -  -1.502 *** 
 
(0.071) - - - (0.089) 
No credit rating (NR) - - - -0.364 *** - 
 
- - - (0.080) - 
Number of readings 952 1,827 1,174 2,142 524 
R-squared 0.471 0.579 0.699 0.358 0.709 
Source: Calculated; key: robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Negotiated is the omitted underwriting dummy in all States; Tax 6 and NR omitted in Alaska; Tax 8 and NR 
omitted in Maine; Tax 6 and NR omitted in New Hampshire; Tax 8 and Aaa omitted in North Dakota (the only 
Aaa rated issuer in North Dakota is the MBB, the NDPFA); Tax 8 and NR omitted in Vermont; other omissions 





Table 41: Regression of Yield Spread by Individual State with Time Fixed Effects 
Estimator Alaska Maine New Hampshire North Dakota Vermont 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant -0.420 *** 1.301 *** -0.476 *** 1.069 *** 2.813 *** 
 
(0.112) (0.143) (0.084) (0.122) (0.187) 
MBB issue dummy -0.074 ** -0.159 *** -0.051 ** -0.408 *** -0.320 *** 
 (0.030) (0.029 ) (0.024) (0.105) (0.056) 
Duration 0.027 *** 0.015 *** 0.022 *** -0.023 *** 0.059 *** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Liquidity ($mn) -0.001  0.005 0.004 -0.042 *** 0.007 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.015) 
Coupon 0.029 *** 0.036 *** 0.053 *** 0.072 *** 0.037 *** 
 (0.007) (0.008 (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
Competitive u/w 0.030  -0.232 *** -0.298 *** -0.308 *** - 
 (0.042) (0.014) (0.020) (0.023) - 
Tax 1 0.096 -0.532 *** -0.072  -0.430 *** -0.458 *** 
 (0.260) (0.082) (0.061)  (0.065) (0.035) 
Tax 2 - -0.612 *** -0211  *** -0.585 *** - 
 - (0.081) (0.069) (0.065) - 
Tax 3 0.420 *** -0.012   0.112 -0.084 0.101 * 
 (0.259) (0.084) (0.072) (0.081) (0.059) 
Tax 4 -0.101 -0.464 *** - 0.139 - 
 (0.260) (0.102) - (0.117) - 
Tax 5 0.699 ** -0.022  0.600 *** 0.265 ** 0.040 
 (0.277) (0.088) (0.068) (0.133) (0.085) 
Tax 6 -  -0.279 *** - - - 
 - (0.097) - - - 
Tax 7 -  -0.664 ***  - - - 
 - (0.072) - - - 
Tax 8 - -  - - - 
 - - - - - 
Aaa - -0.677 *** - - - 
 - (0.089) - - - 
Aa1 0.350 *** -0.571 *** -0.189 ** -0.428 *** - 
 (0.105) (0.088) (0.081) (0.097) - 
Aa2 0.523 *** -0.525 *** -0.097  -0.379 *** -2.674 ** 
 (0.106) (0.086) (0.080) (0.100) (0.136) 
Aa3 0.387 *** -0.533 *** -0.062  -0.345 *** -2.691 *** 
 
(0.105) (0.085) (0.079) (0.095) (0.144) 
A1 0.567 *** -0.337*** 0.119  -0.317 *** -2.416 *** 
 
(0.101) (0.088) (0.091) (0.097) (0.179) 
A2 1.161 *** -0.309 *** 0.381 *** -0.283 *** -2.129 *** 
 
(0.150) (0.104) (0.090) (0.097) (0.159) 
A3 0.917 *** - 0.407 *** 0.014  -2.404 *** 
 
(0.107) - (0.099) (0.102) (0.122) 
Baa1 - -0.084 0.414 *** 0.153  -1.919 *** 
 
- (0.095) (0.087) (0.121) (0.076) 
Baa2 0.741 *** - - - -1.604 *** 
 
(0.120) - - - (0.128) 
No credit rating (NR)  - - - -0.199 *** - 
 
- - - (0.096) - 
Number of readings 952 1,827 1,174 2,142 524 
R-squared 0.669 0.705 0.849 0.633 0.908 
Source: Calculated; key: robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Negotiated is the omitted underwriting dummy in all States; Tax 6 and NR omitted in Alaska; Tax 8 and NR 
omitted in Maine; Tax 6 and NR omitted in New Hampshire; Tax 8 and Aaa omitted in North Dakota (the only 
Aaa rated issuer in North Dakota is the MBB, the NDPFA); Tax 8 and NR omitted in Vermont; other omissions 





Propensity score matching for individual States 
The propensity score matching methodology is repeated for each State individually.  All 
MBB bond issues are included in the average treatment effect calculations in Maine,  
New Hampshire and North Dakota, although the region of common support of propensity 
scores excludes some observations in Alaska and Vermont.  The latter States have the 
lowest number of overall observations.  The number of control variables in Vermont, in 
particular, is relatively low.  The full sample here is just 525 observations. 
Comparing this approach to the linear regressions above, it records similar Municipal 
Bond Bank treatment effects to the results with time fixed effects of Maine (the average 
effect of participation within an MBB bond issue programme is to reduce the yield spread 
by between 17.3 and 19.7 basis points), New Hampshire (between 3.9 and 6.0 basis 
points) and Vermont (between 38.0 and 42.4 basis points).  In North Dakota, the 
estimated treatment effect (between 15.1 and 20.4 basis points) is lower than that of the 
linear regression models.  In Alaska, this method fails to generate significant results, as is 
the case in the OLS regression without fixed effects.   
The ‘linear regression with Mutual dummy’ treatment effects in the following tables differ 
from the Mutual regressors in Table 41, because a number of the credit rating and tax 






Table 42: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (MBB bond issue) Alaska 
Estimation method Average Treatment Effect Standard error 
Linear regression with Mutual dummy -0.013 0.022 
ATET nearest neighbour -0.065  0.049 
ATET kernel matching -0.020 0.029 
ATET stratification matching -0.009  0.027 
number of MBB observations: nearest neighbour 144, kernel 144, stratification 144;  
number of control observations: nearest neighbour 52, kernel 95, stratification 95 
Source: Calculated; time fixed effects included  
Table 43: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (MBB bond issue) Maine 
Estimation method Average Treatment Effect Standard error 
Linear regression with Mutual dummy -0.070 ** 0.023 
ATET nearest neighbour -0.173 *** 0.041 
ATET kernel matching -0.184 *** 0.026 
ATET stratification matching -0.197 *** 0.029 
number of MBB observations: nearest neighbour 211, kernel 211, stratification 211;  
number of control observations: nearest neighbour 162, kernel 829, stratification 829 
Source: Calculated; time fixed effects included  
Table 44: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (MBB bond issue) New Hampshire 
Estimation method Average Treatment Effect Standard error 
Linear regression with Mutual dummy -0.058 *** 0.024 
ATET nearest neighbour -0.044 * 0.032 
ATET kernel matching -0.060 ** 0.024 
ATET stratification matching -0.039 * 0.025 
number of MBB observations: nearest neighbour 190, kernel 190, stratification 190;  
number of control observations: nearest neighbour 113, kernel 344, stratification 344 
Source: Calculated; time fixed effects included  
Table 45: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (MBB bond issue) North Dakota 
Estimation method Average Treatment Effect Standard error 
Linear regression with Mutual dummy -0.307 *** 0.054 
ATET nearest neighbour -0.204 *** 0.077 
ATET kernel matching -0.153 *** 0.054 
ATET stratification matching -0.151 *** 0.055 
number of MBB observations: nearest neighbour 107, kernel 107, stratification 107;  
number of control observations: nearest neighbour 75, kernel 1347, stratification 1347 
Source: Calculated; time fixed effects included  
Table 46: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (MBB bond issue) Vermont 
Estimation method Average Treatment Effect Standard error 
Linear regression with Mutual dummy -0.555 *** 0.050 
ATET nearest neighbour -0.424 *** 0.125 
ATET kernel matching -0.382 *** 0.119 
ATET stratification matching -0.380 ** 0.180 
number of MBB observations nearest neighbour 120, kernel 120, stratification 120,  
number of control observations: nearest neighbour 22, kernel 35, stratification 35 





My paper represents a modernisation of the literature in addressing the questions of what 
drives a municipality to participate in an MBB bond issue and what interest cost savings 
the credit-pooling agency offers its participants.  My key advantage is in creating a much 
larger and more detailed sample of bond and bond participant data from multiple 
sources, which give a more accurate input to my empirical work than the small survey-
based samples in the existing literature.  This is also the first paper to use propensity 
score matching to refine the samples.  
Participating in the bond issuance programme of an MBB has a significant and negative 
effect on the interest costs of municipal bonds across five different States.  Estimates of 
the MBB participation treatment effect vary by State from marginally beneficial to highly 
beneficial.  OLS regressions and propensity score matching methods give similar 
estimates of the treatment effect of a US municipality joining MBB bond issue 
programmes on interest expenses.   
With a combined US$20 billion of outstanding bonds issued, credit-pooling represents a 
small niche of the US municipal bonds market, whose greatest appeal is for smaller 
municipalities, whose credit is not rated or lower-rated.  Its own credit rating (or lack of) 
and the required bond participation size affect the decision of a US municipality whether 
or not to join MBB bond issuance programmes.   
The interest cost savings of MBB participation seem to be insufficient to convince larger 
and better credit-rated municipalities to commit to an MBB bond issue programme, when 
taking into account the greater flexibility for individual municipalities in timing bond 
issues than participating within a pool of bond issues two to four times per year.  Indeed, 
there are just 10 municipal bond banks across the United States of America and their 
annual bond issuance represents 0.2% of the total of the US municipal bond market.  Only 
two MBBs have been created this century, which suggests a limited appetite for this 
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CHAPTER 3: DOES FOREIGN CURRENCY 





Covered Interest Parity (CIP) has not held for many five-year currency pairs since at least 
2004.  European municipal bond agencies (MBAs) often diversify their bond issuance into 
foreign currencies on a covered interest rate basis: does this reduce the interest cost of 
their funding?  My data set over 2009-16 suggests that the cross-currency basis for MBAs 
is often in favour of issuing bonds in foreign currencies, such as the AUD and NZD.  The 
sample achieves average interest cost savings between 20.4 and 23.8 bps, relative to 
issuing bonds in their respective domestic currencies.  MBAs achieve interest cost savings 
67% of the time, suggesting there may also be other motivations to issue bonds in a 
foreign currency.  Estimations offer little evidence that MBAs are sensitive to deviations 
from CIP in timing the issue of foreign bonds, with the exception of the decision to issue in 
CHF.  This presents a puzzle as to why MBAs issue bonds in a currency where the 
deviation from CIP is often unfavourable and basis spreads, such as with AUD and NZD, 
are nearly always more attractive?   
 
 
Keywords: Municipal bond agency; covered interest parity; cross-currency basis swap; 
currency arbitrage 






Despite the majority of European MBA bond issuance being made in foreign currencies, 
this is the only paper to study their foreign currency denominated bond issuance and 
address the effectiveness of this funding strategy.  By hedging their currency exposure, 
MBAs can establish an interest cost advantage relative to issuing domestic denominated 
bonds.  Even though they have no operating exposure outside their domestic markets, 
they are active issuers in developed and emerging market currencies.  Does this reduce 
costs for stakeholders or are the agencies simply satisfying the appetite of bond buyers?  
Diversifying through different maturities, geographies and types of investors may 
optimise the cost of funding and refinancing risk over the business cycle.  I investigate the 
decision to issue hedged fixed-rate bonds in a foreign currency, and in particular the 
timing and choice of currency.   
Foreign currency bond issuance could require an issuer to take a currency risk.  For 
example, should the denomination currency appreciate over the life of a bond against the 
issuer’s home currency, then the effective coupon and the repayment amount would 
increase when translated back into home currency.  However, European MBAs do not 
assume currency risk in their foreign currency denominated bond issuance.  The agencies 
always issue on a covered interest rate basis, where their exposure to exchange rate risk 
on interest payments and capital repayment is hedged over the life of the bond via 
forward foreign exchange contracts or constant currency basis swaps.   
The existing literature identifies that the currency choice of bond issuers is driven by: 
1. Interest cost minimisation – arbitrage of the failure of CIP 
2. Broadening the investor base 
3. Market completeness – access to deeper, more mature markets; availability of 
interest rate/credit derivatives; information asymmetries 
4. Relative regulation – governance, disclosure requirements, taxes 
In choosing the currency of bond issuance, European MBAs often seek to exploit failures 
in CIP between their home currency and that of the bond’s denomination.  This allows 
them to issue a bond in a foreign currency more cheaply than had they chosen to issue a 
bond of the same duration in their own currency at the same time.  However, any of 
motivations 2 to 4 above could imply bond issuance in foreign currencies is undertaken, 




The Failure of Covered Interest Parity 
The breakdown of the covered interest parity condition allows a bond issuer in a foreign 
currency to benefit from a risk-free arbitrage profit.  CIP requires that the relationship 
between interest rates and the spot and forward currency values of two different 
currencies is in equilibrium: i.e. the interest rate differential between two currencies in 
cash money markets equals the difference between the forward and spot exchange rates.  
In equilibrium, the locked-in forward rate offsets the changes in value due to the different 
interest rates and one cannot generate an arbitrage profit by borrowing in one currency 
and investing in another over a given period.  By contrast, uncovered interest parity 
states that the interest rate differential between two currencies in cash money markets 
equals the expected change in exchange rates of the two currencies.  One cannot lock in 
the future spot rate today.  If the forward exchange rate is an unbiased predictor of the 
future spot rate, then covered and uncovered interest parity are the same.   
Let y$t, t+n and yt, t+n denote the n-year risk-free interest rates in US dollars and a given 
foreign currency respectively 
St is the spot exchange rate, expressed in units of foreign currency per US dollar and 
Ft,t+n is the n-year forward exchange rate, expressed in units of foreign currency per US 
dollar at time t.  CIP states that the following relationship should hold: 
(1 + y$t, t+n)n . Ft, t+n = (1 + yt, t+n)n . St 
Intuitively, one would expect that an investor, holding $1 today should own  
(1 + y$t, t+n)n US dollars in n years’ time by investing in US dollars.   
Alternatively, he can exchange his dollars into St units of a foreign currency and invest in 
that currency to receive (1 + yt, t+n)n . St units of the foreign currency in n years’ time.   
The investor buys a currency forward contract today, which will convert the foreign 
currency earned into (1 + yt, t+n)n . St  / Ft, t+n   US dollars.  
If both the domestic and foreign notes are risk-free, barring currency risk, and the 
forward contract has no counterparty risk and transaction costs, then the two 
investments are considered to be equivalent and should deliver identical returns.  Thus, 




A cross-currency basis swap involves the exchange of cash flows linked to floating 
interest rates that are referenced to interbank rates in two different currencies, plus the 
exchange of principal in the two currencies at the start and maturity of the swap.   
At longer maturities, the deviation from long-term CIP is defined by the spread on the  
cross-currency basis swap as xt, t+n , where: 
(1 + y$t, t+n)n . Ft, t+n  = (1 + yt, t+n + xt, t+n)n . St   
The measurement of xt, t+n is of interest in my work. 
The literature review identifies the channels of the breakdowns in covered interest parity 
since even before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).  I show that CIP has not held for many 
five-year currency pairs since at least 2004.  Failures of CIP provide potential risk-free 
savings to the issuing agencies’ funding programmes and are the motivation for my core 
research question, namely: do MBAs exploit lapses in covered interest parity, when 
issuing bonds in foreign currencies?   
I study the agencies’ decisions to issue bonds in foreign currency relative to their 
respective domestic currencies.  I focus on five foreign currencies of bond issuance and 
investigate how the difference between the hedged equivalent domestic rate of the 
foreign currency of issue and the hypothetical domestic interest rate of the respective 
issuer (the deviation from CIP) affects the decision to issue in a given foreign currency.   
I disaggregate the MBA’s issue decision into two steps: firstly, it decides whether to issue 
a bond; secondly, the choice of currency must be decided on.  I investigate both the joint 
issue and conditional issue decisions by undertaking univariate and multivariable probit 
regressions on the issue decision and I investigate how successful MBAs are in exploiting 
the failings of CIP in their choice and timing of foreign currency.  Through a multinomial 
probit regression, I investigate the choice between different currencies.   
The paper is divided as follows: Section 2 summarises relevant literature and the 
channels of CIP failure.  Section 3 demonstrates the failure of the Covered Interest Parity 
condition to hold across a number of currency pairs since 2004.  I calculate the MBAs’ 
total interest cost savings and include descriptive data.  Section 4 introduces the 
regression models and results of the timing of bond issuance in foreign currencies by the 
European MBAs.  Section 5 contains concluding remarks.  The descriptive background of 





Table 47: Summary of Existing Literature on Foreign Currency Debt Issuance 
Paper Topic Main Results Comments 
Popper (1993) CIP Long-term deviations slightly 
higher than short-term deviations 
I concentrate on five-
year swap spreads and 
note the failure of CIP 
since 2004 
Fletcher & Taylor 
(1994) 
CIP Transaction costs account for 
deviations from CIP in long-dated 
markets; CIP failures exist 
Transaction costs are 
priced into interest costs 
in this paper 
Baba & Packer 
(2008) 
CIP CIP has failed to hold since 2007. 
US dollar funding shortages hit 
liquidity in swap markets 
This matches my 
findings from 25 
currency pairs 
Sushko, Borio et al. 
(2018) 
CIP Reasons are FX hedging, 
counterparty risk and dollar 
funding access 
CIP failure is the starting 
point of my study 
Du, Tepper & 
Verdelhan (2016) 
CIP Deviations from CIP imply large, 
persistent and systematic arbitrage 
opportunities 
I identify covered swap-




CIP CIP puzzle stems from funding 
liquidity differences 
CIP failure is the starting 
point of my study 
Cenedese, Della 
Corte & Wang 
(2018) 
CIP Relationship of dealer balance 
sheets with CIP violations 
Central banks trade 
against currency 
mispricing 





Strong and consistent evidence that 
differences in covered and 
uncovered rates across currencies 
influence firms’ foreign currency 
bonds composition  
They focus on firms, who 
may have assets and 
income in foreign 
currency 





Deviations from covered interest 
parity drive choice of currency by 
sovereign and agency issuers 
Their focus is close to 
mine, given that I study 







Cost minimisation, broader 
investor base, complete markets 
They introduce 
motivation drivers other 
than swap spreads 
Habib & Joy (2008) Motivation for 
foreign currency 
funding 
Choice of issuance currency is 
sensitive to deviations from 
uncovered interest parity 
MBAs do not issue bonds 
on an uncovered basis 




funding in Asia 
Deviations from covered interest 
parity are actively arbitraged by 
residents of minor currency areas 
I study European issuers.  
They use a probit 
regression for offshore 
versus onshore 




Debt issues in domestic and 
international markets have 
different characteristics 
I study domestic and 
foreign currency fixed 
coupon, fixed maturity-
date bonds 
Hale & Spiegel 
(2012) 
Impact of EMU on 
issuance 
A significant rise in euro-
denominated issuance by non-
financial firms 
Euro is a benchmark 
currency for five of the 
six agencies 





Use of probit models finds 
increased depth of markets 
influence choice of Asian issuers 







Smaller economies have smaller 
domestic currency bond markets 
and more foreign currency bonds 
New Zealand dollar, for 
example, is an active 




Investigating interest rate differentials between the borrowing rates in different 
countries, I focus on the covered interest parity literature and, in particular, the 
opportunistic motive to arbitrage the failure of CIP.  The European municipal bond 
market is lightly researched.  Furthermore, given little issuance of US municipal bonds in 
currencies outside the US dollar, there is limited published literature from that country on 
international municipal bond issues.  However, a volume of literature on CIP discusses 
how price differences across markets are actively arbitraged by corporate, sovereign and 
agency borrowers.  Many corporates have assets or operating cash flows in countries 
outside of their domicile, in contrast to the MBAs.   
The channels of failure of Covered Interest Parity  
Deviations from CIP have existed for several years.  Popper (1993) constructed long-term 
arbitrage conditions using currency swaps.  She found that long-term financial capital is 
as mobile as short-term capital and that mean absolute deviations from swap-covered 
parity are on average about 10 basis points higher among long-term assets than short-
term assets.  Fletcher and Taylor (1994) found deviations averaging 12-33 basis points in 
long-dated currency pairs, which they ascribe to transaction costs.  While McBrady 
(2003) claimed that covered interest parity held for short-term interest rates, he 
suggested that this was not the case for long-term interest rates. 
Large cross-currency bases appeared during the Global Financial Crisis, implying a 
deviation from CIP, as interbank markets were impaired and arbitrage capital became 
limited.  Baba and Packer (2008) claim that while foreign exchange and related 
derivatives markets are very liquid, the GFC created dollar funding shortages from 2007 
for non-US financial institutions, which created shortages of liquidity in swap markets, 
giving rise to swap market deviations from covered interest parity.  Conditions for 
covered interest parity include minimal transaction costs, a lack of political risk, low 
credit/counterparty risk, low liquidity risk and low measurement error.  A number of 
these assumptions were challenged during the 2007-08 crisis.  The cross-currency basis 
spreads are a function of perceived relative risk of markets, availability of funding, 
transaction costs, measurement error and credit or counterparty risk.  Baba et al. (2009) 
show that during the GFC, CIP deviations were driven by banks’ counterparty risks and 
wholesale US dollar funding constraints.  Bottazi et al. (2012) argue that CIP deviations 





The literature shows evidence of the persistent breakdown of the CIP condition since the 
GFC, even when global foreign exchange markets returned to normal operation.  Iida et al. 
(2016) claim that interest rate differentials replaced measures of banks’ credit 
worthiness as drivers of CIP deviations.  Cenedese et al. (2018) look at end-users of FX 
swap markets and identify that the leverage ratio of major bank dealers, driven by Basel 
III requirements, is related to wider CIP deviations.  For longer duration FX contracts, the 
widening of the basis is associated with regulatory capital ratios.   
Du et al. (2016) investigate CIP arbitrage opportunities in the Libor markets post the GFC, 
using bonds and repo contracts issued by KfW and other high quality multi-currency 
issuers.  They identify the failure of the CIP condition and observe that deviations 
increase at quarter-ends, correlate with other fixed income arbitrage spreads and are 
correlated with nominal interest rate levels in both cross-section and time series analysis.  
They show Libor bases with an average annualised absolute value of 27 basis points at a 
five-year time horizon over their 2010-16 sample.  By comparison, the average term of 
my sample is 5.0 years and I cover the period 2009-16.  Du et al. show that the CIP 
condition is systematically and persistently violated among G10 currencies, leading to 
significant arbitrage opportunities in currency markets since the GFC.  They attribute this 
to costly financial intermediation (bank capital requirements and regulations) and 
imbalances in funding supply and investment demand across currencies, which may point 
to why the failure of CIP is not arbitraged away.   
Rime et al. (2017) focus on three-month arbitrage opportunities and argue that the 
failure of CIP results from funding liquidity differences, reflected in the marginal funding 
rates of the main arbitrageurs.  With severe funding liquidity differences, it becomes 
impossible for FX swap intermediaries to quote prices, such that CIP holds across the full 
rate spectrum.  Despite the prevalence of deviations from covered interest parity, they 
show that arbitrage profits can only be generated by the largest banks, who are present in 
funding markets in multiple currencies, face constant funding/liquidity needs and can 
enjoy risk-less arbitrage opportunities.  They identify persistent arbitrage opportunities 
as an equilibrium outcome from market segmentation. 
Sushko et al. (2018) identify the persistence of a cross-currency basis since 2007.  Short-
term CIP deviations are driven by money market frictions, such as availability of funding, 
market liquidity and leverage regulation.  This is due to concerns about counterparty risk 
and constrained bank access to wholesale dollar funding, resulting in shifts in demand for 




regulation now demands that banks’ leverage ratios are at least 3%, restricting their 
ability to arbitrage CIP.  As global banks face significantly higher risk-weighted capital 
requirements, they can only trade much smaller CIP arbitrage volumes relative to their 
respective equity than before the GFC.  The US Volcker Rule also limits banks’ proprietary 
trading activities, including exchange rate forward and swap contracts, thus reducing 
liquidity.  Reforms of the opaque and segmented over-the-counter derivatives market 
have set higher capital and minimum margin requirements for cross-currency swaps.  
Thus, other non-regulated arbitrageurs, such as hedge funds, are finding funding tighter 
from their prime brokers post the GFC, as they seek leverage.   
They find that imbalances in the supply and demand for FX hedging move forward 
exchange rates out of line with CIP, because financial institutions charge a premium for 
provisioning of collateral risks associated with exposures to the over-the-counter FX 
derivatives necessary to support FX hedges.  This drives longer term deviations, even in a 
period of low volatility in markets, and the level of CIP deviations relates to aggregate FX 
hedging imbalances, due to balance sheet costs on the supply side of FX hedges.  They 
derive a market clearing FX forward rate that shows the channel by which demand for FX 
hedges affects the pricing of cross-currency basis swaps and prevents CIP from holding. 
The motivation for foreign bond issuance – deviations from interest rate parity  
It is important to differentiate between bonds issued by companies and those by 
governments and non-corporate agencies that might not have natural foreign currency 
cash flows or assets.  In the case of the former, Allayannis and Ofek (2001) find that firms 
issue foreign currency denominated debt as a natural currency hedge against foreign cash 
flows that arise from foreign operations or income derived in foreign currency.  The 
corporate finance literature also introduces trade-off theory, in which issuers increase 
total debt relative to equity in order to create cost advantages.  This can arise from tax 
treatment (Newberry and Dhaliwal, 2000), clientele effects (Kim and Stulz, 1988) and 
interest rate differentials (Graham and Harvey, 2001; McBrady and Schill, 2006; Munro 
and Wooldridge, 2011).   
McBrady and Schill (2006) test an opportunistic motive and arbitrage strategies for 
foreign currency borrowing.  They look at the foreign currency bond issuance of 
governments and agency issuers, who have cash flows exclusively in their respective local 
currencies.  They conclude that covered and uncovered interest yields across currencies 
are important to these borrowers in choosing the currency of denomination for 




borrowing at 4-18 basis points.  These issuers systematically increase the share of bonds 
in a given currency after periods of relative appreciation.  The issue currency of the 
average bond offering in their sample then depreciates by 149 basis points in the year 
after issuance – ‘a happy circumstance for an uncovered issuer’. 
McBrady et al. (2007) find strong evidence that corporates change the currency 
composition of their international bond issues to exploit differences in borrowing costs 
across currencies.  By picking the currency with the lowest covered yield (the bond yield 
spread minus currency swaps), an issuer achieves the lowest ‘all-in swapped’ borrowing 
costs.  Currency shares increase when covered interest yields fall relative to other 
currencies.  They estimate the gains to opportunistic covered yield borrowing are 
between 2-10 basis points.  By contrast, they find little evidence that firms exploit 
differences in uncovered interest costs.  Thus, currency risk aversion is more important 
than potential gains from cross-currency differences in nominal yields and anticipated 
depreciation rates.   
Munro and Wooldridge (2011) study Asian corporate bond markets and focus on the 
motivation for swap-covered borrowing in a foreign currency between either risk 
management or comparative advantage.  They find that the characteristics of foreign 
currency bonds issued by residents and local currency bonds issued by non-residents are 
different.  The great proportion of foreign currency debt is swapped back into local 
currency directly by borrowers as a cost-effective means of raising local currency funding.  
Issuers systematically respond to estimated deviations from covered interest parity.  
Imperfections causing these opportunities include transaction costs, agency and 




Other motives for foreign currency choice 
Chinn and Ito (2000) refer to broader market depth, maturity and institutions in certain 
bond markets, arguing for larger-sized foreign issues if an issuer is based in a small 
currency market (e.g. the Nordic issuers) and smaller sized issues if the issuer is based in 
a large currency market (e.g. euro based issuers).  They focus on instruments, including 
market size and bond market turnover as measures of relative market choice.  Siegfried et 
al. (2007) investigate the motives for bond issuance in foreign currency and determinants 
of the choice of currency of non-financial corporations in advanced economies.  They use 
a conditional logit model to investigate the log odds that a firm chooses to issue in 
domestic or foreign currency and then, in the case of a foreign currency choice, a nested 
logit model to identify which particular foreign currency is chosen.  They find that cost 
minimisation, hedging motives, the desire to establish a broader investor base and market 
regulation influence the choice of currency.  An issuer seeks particular markets for longer 
duration bond issuance.   
Black and Munro (2010) argue that residents of smaller markets issue swap-covered 
foreign currency bonds to arbitrage price differentials, to access foreign investors, and to 
issue larger or longer-maturity bonds.  They find that deviations from CIP parity are 
actively arbitraged; and issuers benefit from the liquidity and diversification of larger 
‘more complete’ offshore markets.  They use a probit model and discover that the 
propensity to issue a bond offshore is related to price arbitrage, certain bond 
characteristics (e.g. size and tenor), bond market characteristics (e.g. liquidity) and 
macroeconomic variables.  Mizen et al. (2012) look at corporate bond markets in Asia and 
include size of the foreign investor base and development of the local derivatives markets 
as instruments.  They find that the choice between the onshore and offshore market is 
driven by the increased depth of the offshore market.  The authors’ use of probit models 
to evaluate issuance decisions and the choice between onshore and offshore issuance 
provides guidance to my work.  Hale and Spiegel (2012) use a multinomial logit 
specification to analyse the impact of the launch of the EMU on the currency 
denomination of private bond issuance over 1990-2006.  They discover a significant rise 
in euro-denominated issuance and a decline in international dollar-denominated issuance 





MBAs DIVERSIFY THEIR SOURCES OF ISSUANCE  
Deviations from long-term covered interest parity can be large and time persistent.  If CIP 
fails, the MBAs can lock in forward rates today to their advantage, when borrowing in a 
foreign currency.  A bond issuer might use foreign exchange swaps for shorter-dated 
issuance, although it is normal for multi-leg interest rate and cross-currency basis swaps 
to be used for maturities of more than one year.   
While European agencies budget a funding level to match their lending programmes, 
there is often a difference between the timing of funding and lending.  Thus, when they 
swap the cash flows of a multi-leg swap from a foreign currency into local currency, they 
often allow the cash flows to accrue at a floating interest rate in their domestic currency.  
This addresses the interest rate risk from timing differences between the cash inflows 
from the bond issue receipts and outflows of the funds being loaned to member SNGs.  For 
the purposes of my analysis, I include the third leg interest rate swap from floating- to 
fixed-rate in local currency, because I want to calculate the actual local currency 
equivalent fixed rate achieved relative to a hypothetical fixed rate of the same duration. 
Figure 13: Schematic of a Cross-currency Basis Swap from euro to SEK 
Source: Author 
A cross-currency basis swap spread at the time of bond issue protects the issuer from 
future changes in floating interest rates and currency movements on redemption and is 
embedded in the hedge.  As an example, Figure 13 demonstrates the cash flows for  
a Swedish agency that issues a euro denominated fixed coupon bond.  The proceeds of the 
bond issue accrue to the agency in euros at a fixed rate of interest.  The agency now swaps 
those cash flows into a euro floating rate (the first leg of the multi-leg swap) in order to 




euros to Swedish krone.  The agency may then decide to leave the cash flows in  
SEK-denominated floating rate or to undertake a third leg swap from SEK floating to fixed 
rate.  This third leg defines the effective local currency fixed interest rate to the agency.  
By comparing this rate to what the agency might pay to issue an equivalent duration 
Swedish krone bond, I can calculate the cost saving that accrues from issuing in a foreign 
currency relative to issuing in domestic currency.  If the CIP condition applies, the 
difference should be zero.       
I illustrate this with a live example in Table 48.  Swedish MBA, Kommuninvest, has issued 
a collateralised 7-year 2% coupon fixed rate, fixed maturity-date bond in euros on 4th 
October 2011.  The exchange rate on the curve date (normally two working days before 
the swap valuation date) was SEK 9.2025 = €1.  The issuing agency wants to secure this 
exchange rate over the life of its bond, thus eliminating exchange rate risk from future 
coupon payments and maturity repayment obligations.  I assume a €10,000,000 notional 
value for the purposes of the example.  The third column shows the annual coupon 
payments (in euros) on their respective annual due dates.  The interest payments and 
maturity notional are discounted back to a present date value, using the euro OIS curve.  
Column 5 sums the resulting present value of the future cash flows to €10,729,679. 
The first swap is a fixed- to floating-rate interest rate swap in euros (receiving to pay).  
Floating-rate payments are calculated quarterly.  Taking the curve date for the swap at 
30th September 2011, column 6 uses the euro versus 3-month Euribor swap curve.  
Matching the present day value of the fixed- and floating-rate cash flows gives  
a -9.4 basis point interest rate swap spread on a 2% fixed-rate.  This implies the floating 
rate interest payments of column 8, which are discounted back to the present day by the 
euro OIS curve.  The resulting stream of present day value floating rate coupons and 
maturity amount are in column 10, totalling €10,729,679.  
The cross-currency swap (paying to receive) exchanges the euro floating-rate cash flows 
into SEK floating rate cash flows, using the SEK versus euro basis curve.  The adjustment 
for the cross-currency basis swap spread is +33.2 basis points.  The resulting floating rate 
is shown in column 11.  The SEK floating rate interest payments are calculated in column 
12 and are discounted back to present values by using the SEK OIS curve.  The resulting 
SEK cash flows have a present value of SEK 98,878,912, which is equivalent to 






To calculate the effective SEK fixed rate of interest on the bond, I must swap the SEK 
floating rate cash flows into fixed rate cash flows (receiving to pay).  This is the reverse of 
the first swap, albeit this time in Swedish krone.  I use the SEK versus 3-month STIBOR 
swap curve and discount to present values with the SEK OIS curve.  The swap spread used 
is the +33.2 basis points that is generated from the cross-currency swap above.  Solving 
for this backs out an effective annual SEK fixed-rate coupon of 2.713%.  As a cross check, 
it can be seen from columns 19 and 20 that the discounted fixed coupon rates translate 
from euros to Swedish krone at a constant rate of SEK 9.2025 = €1, which is the same 
exchange rate as at the start of the swap contract.  
The example of Table 48 shows that by issuing a euro-denominated 2% 7-year fixed 
coupon bond in September 2011 the Swedish agency has locked in an effective fixed 
coupon of 2.713% in its domestic currency.  Is this a good interest rate relative to what 
the agency might have been able to issue at in krone on the same terms on the same day?  
The Kommuninvest 2% 7-year bond has a duration of 6.5 years in krone.  The OLS 
regression model of Chapter 1 estimates that on the curve date of the swap the MBA’s 
yield spread over the Swedish sovereign yield curve was 85.1 basis points.  The Swedish 
zero-coupon sovereign curve on 30th September 2011 has a yield-to-maturity of 1.602% 
for this duration.  Adding the yield spread to this implies that Kommuninvest might have 
issued a bond in krone at a fixed coupon of 2.453% at this time.  Thus, the agency has 
issued the bond in euros 26 basis points above the equivalent fixed rate that it might have 
issued at in its domestic currency – a relatively expensive bond issue.   
This raises a number of questions: 
 Do the agencies seek more favourable swap rates to optimise the timing of their 
foreign currency bond issuance? 
 How often do the agencies save interest costs when issuing in foreign currency? 
 Are there currencies that are more favourable to issue in? 





Table 48: Cross-currency Basis Swap Example of a Live Bond Issue  
Kommuninvest 2% 7-year euro fixed coupon bond issue, issued in October 2011 
Discounted Cashflows RECEIVE EUR fixed Discount rate EUR fixed PAY EUR floating discount rate EUR floating RECEIVE SEK floating discount rate SEK floating PAY SEK fixed discount rate SEK fixed
launch 04/10/2011 Leg 1 Leg 1 Leg 1 Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 2 Leg 2 Leg 2 Leg 2 Leg 3 Leg 3 Leg 3 Leg 3 Leg 3 in euros Leg 4 implied Leg 4 Leg 4 Leg 4 Leg 4 euros
EUR discounted euro vs 3m EURIBOR Swap adjusted discounted SEK vs 3m STIBOR discounted discounted SEK discounted discounted
04/10/2011 Fixed coupon 10,000,000-       swap rate 10,000,000     swap rate 92,025,115-    Fixed coupon 92,025,115      
04/01/2012 1.586% 1.492% 37,301-              0.9982 37,235-               2.908% 669,029          0.9949 665,585         72,326             
04/04/2012 1.219% 1.124% 28,110-              0.9970 28,024-               2.321% 534,057          0.9906 529,063         57,491             
04/07/2012 1.135% 1.041% 26,026-              0.9959 25,920-               2.139% 492,195          0.9872 485,871         52,798             
04/10/2012 2.000% 200,000             0.9950 198,997         1.125% 1.031% 25,767-              0.9950 25,638-               2.108% 485,002          0.9837 477,095         51,844             2.714% 2,497,239-         0.9837           2,456,529-       266,941-          
04/01/2013 1.126% 1.032% 25,795-              0.9935 25,628-               2.108% 484,953          0.9797 475,101         51,627             
04/04/2013 1.148% 1.053% 26,334-              0.9920 26,124-               2.093% 481,424          0.9758 469,768         51,048             
04/07/2013 1.217% 1.122% 28,056-              0.9906 27,793-               2.165% 497,984          0.9719 483,981         52,592             
04/10/2013 2.000% 200,000             0.9891 197,817         1.315% 1.220% 30,505-              0.9891 30,172-               2.242% 515,842          0.9680 499,315         54,259             2.714% 2,497,239-         0.9680           2,417,232-       262,671-          
06/01/2014 1.460% 1.365% 34,129-              0.9872 33,694-               2.375% 546,432          0.9639 526,733         57,238             
04/04/2014 1.542% 1.448% 36,200-              0.9854 35,672-               2.226% 512,169          0.9603 491,837         53,446             
04/07/2014 1.656% 1.562% 39,042-              0.9835 38,398-               2.403% 552,951          0.9565 528,907         57,474             
06/10/2014 2.011% 201,111             0.9814 197,375         1.775% 1.681% 42,026-              0.9814 41,245-               2.562% 589,406          0.9526 561,491         61,015             2.729% 2,511,113-         0.9526           2,392,186-       259,949-          
05/01/2015 2.055% 1.961% 49,027-              0.9793 48,011-               2.603% 598,819          0.9489 568,229         61,747             
07/04/2015 2.180% 2.086% 52,138-              0.9770 50,938-               2.902% 667,750          0.9452 631,144         68,584             
06/07/2015 2.233% 2.138% 53,461-              0.9749 52,120-               2.910% 669,566          0.9416 630,431         68,506             
04/10/2015 1.994% 199,444             0.9728 194,015         2.354% 2.259% 56,487-              0.9728 54,949-               3.013% 693,150          0.9379 650,115         70,645             2.706% 2,490,302-         0.9379           2,335,689-       253,810-          
04/01/2016 2.459% 2.365% 59,113-              0.9701 57,344-               2.847% 654,968          0.9343 611,939         66,497             
04/04/2016 2.554% 2.460% 61,491-              0.9673 59,478-               2.890% 664,908          0.9307 618,843         67,247             
04/07/2016 2.647% 2.553% 63,823-              0.9644 61,548-               2.932% 674,637          0.9272 625,500         67,971             
04/10/2016 1.994% 199,444             0.9613 191,731         2.768% 2.674% 66,847-              0.9613 64,262-               3.007% 691,747          0.9236 638,896         69,426             2.706% 2,490,302-         0.9236           2,300,038-       249,936-          
04/01/2017 2.764% 2.669% 66,730-              0.9584 63,956-               3.078% 708,207          0.9201 651,592         70,806             
04/04/2017 2.784% 2.690% 67,246-              0.9555 64,254-               3.053% 702,307          0.9166 643,749         69,954             
04/07/2017 2.892% 2.797% 69,934-              0.9525 66,612-               3.127% 719,505          0.9132 657,033         71,397             
04/10/2017 2.000% 200,000             0.9494 189,876         3.000% 2.906% 72,641-              0.9494 68,964-               3.203% 736,788          0.9097 670,265         72,835             2.714% 2,497,239-         0.9097           2,271,768-       246,864-          
04/01/2018 2.887% 2.793% 69,816-              0.9464 66,073-               3.137% 721,802          0.9063 654,153         71,084             
04/04/2018 2.886% 2.791% 69,787-              0.9434 65,839-               3.100% 713,178          0.9029 643,959         69,976             
04/07/2018 2.976% 2.881% 72,033-              0.9404 67,738-               3.165% 728,104          0.8996 654,999         71,176             
04/10/2018 10,200,000        0.9372 9,559,868      10,074,291-      0.9372 9,442,048-         92,758,081     0.8962 83,133,317   9,033,764       2.712% 2,496,013-         0.8962           2,236,927-       243,078-          
92,020,233-      0.8962           82,468,533-    8,961,525-       
PV 10,729,679   PV 10,729,679-       PV 98,878,912   10,744,775     2.713% PV 98,878,903-    10,744,774-     




How many bonds do European MBAs issue in foreign currency? 
Throughout this paper, I concentrate on foreign, single-currency denominated, fixed 
coupon, fixed maturity-date bonds.  Fixed income bonds represent approximately 85% of 
all bond issuance of the six largest European MBAs.  The balance includes bonds with 
floating-rate coupon, callable/puttable redemption features or equity structured payoffs 
within their maturity profile, and bonds with multi-currency features to the coupon or 
maturity profile of foreign currency bonds.  The latter are popular via Uridashi bond 
issues with Japanese investors, who seek higher nominal coupons than they are able to 
derive in yen-denominated bonds.  The bond buyer might be currency hedged, but the 
issuer is always fully hedged.  Furthermore, the practice of the MBA issuers is always to 
collateralise their bond issues.   
The six major MBAs had total bonds outstanding worth €271.9 billion at the end of 2016.  
With live Medium Term Note programmes worth a combined €250 billion, they are active 
issuers of foreign currency bonds.  I estimate that foreign-currency denominated bonds 
account for 67.3% of all their bonds outstanding by value at the end of 2016.  Respective 
report & accounts summarise the outstanding total bond issuance by currency of NWB, 
Kommuninvest, MuniFin and Kommunekredit at the end of 2016.  Neither BNG nor KBN 
publish detailed currency analysis of their bonds outstanding.  However, they do provide 
a breakdown of their gross issuance year-by-year.  Proxying their percentage of bonds 
outstanding by the percentage of bonds issued in 2016, I estimate an approximate 
geographical split of bonds outstanding below: 
Table 49: Bonds Outstanding by Currency Denomination at End 2016 
€ billion 6 MBAs estimated 4 MBAs ex BNG & KBN actual Share of 6 MBAs estimated 
EUR 74.2 29.9 27.3% 
USD 121.8 57.9 44.8% 
JPY 11.5 7.8 4.3% 
CHF 10.4 6.6 3.9% 
AUD 6.6 5.4 2.4% 
GBP 14.8 8.9 5.5% 
Other 32.6 23.5 12.0% 
Total 271.9 140.0 100.00% 
Source: MBA report & accounts 
The euro-based MBAs account for a combined €65.6 billion of the estimated euro-
denominated bonds outstanding, which is thus domestic currency issuance.  USD is by far 




Between 2009 and 2016, the six agencies issued 1,435 fixed-coupon, fixed maturity-date 
bonds in 24 different currencies.  Many of the 597 issues denominated in BRL, IDR, INR, 
MXN, TRY and ZAR are Uridashi bonds, which are small in size.  These dual-currency 
bonds may pay income or a redemption amount, denominated in a third high-yielding 
currency.  I exclude these bonds from my analysis, due to multi-currency features or lack 
of cross-currency basis swap data.   











AUD - 157 BRL - 203 
CHF - 68 CAD - 13 
DKK 10 - CLP - 7 
EUR 110 23 CNY - 1 
GBP - 28 EGP - 1 
JPY - 48 HKD - 31 
NOK 19 39 IDR - 55 
NZD - 72 INR - 70 
SEK 25 15 MXN - 30 
USD - 166 NGN - 1 
   PLN - 2 
   RON - 2 
   TRY - 107 
   ZAR - 132 




Source: Bloomberg; key – BRL Brazilian real; CAD Canadian dollar; CLP Chilean peso; CNY Chinese yuan;  
EGP Egyptian pound; IDR Indonesian rupiah; INR Indian rupee; MXN Mexican peso; NGN Nigerian naira;  
PLN Polish zloty; RON Romanian leu; TRY Turkish lira; ZAR South African rand 
All of the currencies in the left hand columns of Table 50 are single-currency bonds.  Four 
of these currencies lack sufficient observations for my regression analysis.  I also exclude 
many JPY-denominated bonds, as they have pay-offs that are linked to equity structures 
(e.g. if a reference company X’s stock price follows a certain path, the bond redemption 
pay-off is Y, otherwise the pay-off is Z).  I concentrate upon the following major currencies 










Table 51: Fixed Coupon/Fixed Maturity Bonds, 2009-16, Selected Currencies  
Currency Number Issuer Number 
AUD 157 BNG 161 
CHF 68 KBN 113 
HOME 164 Kommunekredit 55 
JPY 9 Kommuninvest 98 
NZD 72 MuniFin 117 
USD 166 NWB 92 
Sub total 636  636 
 
Source: Bloomberg     
Foreign currency fixed coupon, fixed maturity bond issuance represents 472 bonds in five 
currencies in my sample.  In general, foreign currency bond issues are smaller than 
domestic currency issues.  The average size of a foreign currency bond issue is €366m 
and the median size is €121m, with 46 issues valued in excess of €1 billion.  This 
compares with the average size of a domestic currency bond of €739m over the period.   
Do the MBAs save money by issuing in foreign currencies? 
The six MBAs issued 1,271 foreign currency fixed coupon, fixed maturity-date bonds over 
2009-16 in 23 different currencies.  I restrict the descriptive sample to single-currency 
bond issues in those currencies that publish interest rate swap and cross-currency basis 
swap data.  I also exclude bonds with equity-linked redemption payoffs.  I sample 270 
bonds, which is approximately 35% of the available field.   
I calculate the equivalent domestic currency coupon, duration and yield-to-maturity of  
a foreign currency bond at issue by the process defined on pages 133-135.  To compare 
this to the yield-to-maturity of a hypothetical bond, issued in the domestic currency on 
the same day of issue, I use the regression results from Chapter 1 to calculate a yield 
spread for each bond to the local sovereign yield curve.  By definition, there are no price 
data for a bond one month before it is issued, so I do not include lags of the dependent 
variable in the estimation.  Furthermore, the regressions of Chapter 1 are based on a 
2010-15 sample, so there are no time fixed effects coefficients for 2009 or 2016.   
I therefore use its regression Model 1 with issuer fixed effects.   
Referring to the domestic sovereign zero-coupon yield curve on the relevant curve date,  
I take the fitted yield of the equivalent duration to the foreign currency bond issue and 
add the issuer’s calculated yield spread from the regression model.  I then calculate  
a spread from the equivalent local currency yield-to-maturity of the foreign currency 




This yield spread indicates whether the foreign currency bond issued by the MBA was 
more or less expensive in terms of interest cost than a local currency bond issued on the 
same terms on the same day would have been.  I repeat the exercise undertaken for the 
Kommuninvest 2% 7-year euro-denominated bond.  Figure 14 summarises the interest 
cost range of the foreign currency bond issues compared with the interest cost, had they 
been issued in their respective domestic currency: 
Figure 14: Bond Issues’ YTM Relative to Domestic Currency Equivalent Yields 
Source: Bloomberg, calculated.  The x-axis represents a bond number; bonds are organised in order of relative 
interest cost cheapness to their domestic currency equivalent.  A minus value shows that the bond is issued 
expensively to an equivalent domestic currency bond, a positive value shows that it is issued cheaply to an 
equivalent domestic currency bond 
Some 181 foreign currency bonds (67.0%) are issued more cheaply than their duration-
matched domestic equivalent yield-to-maturity, whereas 89 bonds (33.0%) are more 
expensive.  On average a foreign currency bond is issued between 20.4 and 23.8 basis 
points cheaper than the domestic currency equivalent.  The range depends on whether I 
take the foreign currency bond duration or the domestic currency equivalent bond 
duration as the reference point on the domestic sovereign yield curve.  The median 
covered interest cost differential is between 14.3 and 15.6 basis points lower.  In general, 
the AUD and NZD appear most often as cheap currencies in which to issue.  Of the smaller 
currencies, when the agencies issued single-currency bonds denominated in IDR, MXN, 
TRY and ZAR, they always issued cheaply to their respective domestic equivalent yields.   
Bid-offer spreads in the swaps market 
In order to cross check the accuracy of my calculations, I construct a reverse direction 
trade, in which I assume a bond is issued in the local currency at the implied equivalent 




in the actual currency of issue.  As well as eliminating errors from the 270 calculations, 
this has the by-product of extracting the bid-offer spreads that are priced within the 
markets.  For example, the 2% 7-year Kommuninvest bond in Table 48 has an implied 
equivalent Swedish krone coupon of 2.713%.  If I conversely assume that Kommuninvest 
were to issue a 2.713% 7-year fixed rate bond in SEK, I calculate that the implied 
equivalent coupon in euros is 2.043%.  In other words, the market’s bid-offer spreads 
between paying and receiving swaps has extracted 4.3 basis points from the round trip.  
The market cost of the one direction multi-leg swap is 50% for this bond, which equals 
2.15 basis points and is buried within its price.  Such calculations ignore intermediaries’ 
actual trader pricing axes, which are their privileged information.  Across the sample of 
270 bonds, the round-trip mean average bid-offer difference is 7.3 basis points, which 
implies the market cost for a one direction trade is 3.65 basis points.  The median one 
direction cost is 2.16 basis points.  The bid-offer spreads of IDR and TRY swaps are much 
higher than those of other currencies.  Excluding swaps that are denominated in these 
currencies reduces the mean market bid-offer cost for a one direction trade to 1.36 basis 
points. 
A benchmark for the MBAs’ foreign currency cost savings 
The MBAs could decide to issue all of their bonds in their respective domestic currency.  
That is what the US Municipal Bond Banks do.  In this case, there would be no interest 
cost savings to discuss.  On the other hand, they could issue all of their foreign currency 
bonds in AUD or NZD, which are shown to be cheap relative to the relevant European 
currencies almost all of the time.  With carefully timed bond issuance, the MBAs would 
make interest costs savings all of the time, but their international bond issuance 
programme would not then be very diversified.   
My results regarding MBAs’ average interest savings are in-line with those of Du et al. 
(2016), who include estimates on high quality KfW bond issues (the German State-owned 
development bank with an annual bond issuance of €70 billion) over a similar time 
period.  Some MBAs have much higher success rates in generating interest savings than 
others (see page 151).  Focusing upon short-term trading, Rime et al. (2017) argue that 
only the top-tier banks are able to undertake CIP arbitrage opportunities all of the time.   
While a benchmark for the success rate of foreign currency municipal bond issuance is 
somewhat subjective, it is worth asking why the MBAs issue foreign currency bonds in a 
relatively expensive currency 33% of the time.  Alternative motivations are discussed at 




Comparing five-year sovereign bond yields  
To give a setting for the above results, I investigate how the covered interest cost 
differential of target foreign currencies evolves over time.  I compare the sovereign bond 
yields of the major currencies on a covered interest parity basis, with particular interest 
in the sovereign bond yields of the major currencies AUD, CHF, DKK, EUR, GBP, JPY, NOK, 
NZD, SEK and USD.  There are three issuing agencies within the Euro Area.  Thus, I include 
the sovereign bond yield curves of Finland and the Netherlands, in order to compare with 
respective domestic equivalent yields.  Furthermore, if the euro is seen as a possible 
currency of issue by a non-euro based agency, then it is likely that the issuer will be 
interested in the lowest risk and therefore lowest yielding Euro Area market for a 
relatively cheap cost of issuance.  Thus, I also include the German sovereign yield curve. 
The median duration of foreign currency fixed coupon bond issuance by European MBAs 
is 4.9 years over the period of this study.  I construct five-year basis swap spreads for  
a sovereign issuer against nine different currency pairs (as defined above).  For example, 
as a comparison with the Kommuninvest example in Table 48, on 30th September 2011 
the five-year point on the German (euro) yield curve had a yield-to-maturity of 1.163%.  
Undertaking the multi-leg cross-currency basis swap, defined in Figure 13, I calculate that 
the equivalent five-year SEK fixed rate is 1.969%.  Inspection of the Swedish sovereign 
curve on that date shows that the five-year point on the Swedish zero-coupon yield curve, 
in fact, had a yield to maturity of 1.459%.  Thus, it was 51 basis points more expensive for 
a Swedish sovereign issuer to issue a five-year fixed coupon bond in euros on that date, 
relative to issuing a hypothetical bond in its own currency.  This is confirmed by 
inspection of the generic five-year SEK-EUR curve within Figure 19 (the purple line).  This 
result is higher than the actual outcome for the Kommuninvest 2% bond, which has  
a 6.5 year duration (see discussion on page 135).  Differences in live MBA bond issue 
pricing to five-year reference bonds may also be due to market-makers’ pricing axes.  
If Covered Interest Parity were to hold, one would expect the equivalent five-year SEK 
fixed rate and the actual yield-to-maturity of the Swedish sovereign curve to track closely 
over time.  In fact, the following charts demonstrate that this is not the case.  All charts 
from Figures 15 to 19 inclusive are drawn on the same scale, which contrasts swap 
spreads across different issuers.  The data are calculated on a currency-hedged basis.  In 
effect, they are highlighting the deviation from Covered Interest Parity for the various 
currency pairs.  A negative spread indicates that a particular currency is cheap to issue in 




Figure 15: 5-year Cross-currency Deviations from CIP to the Dutch Sovereign Curve  
Source: Bloomberg, calculated; units of the y-axis are measured as percent 
Figure 16: 5-year Cross-currency Deviations from CIP to the Finnish Sovereign Curve  





Figure 17: 5-year Cross-currency Deviations from CIP to the Danish Sovereign Curve  
 
Source: Bloomberg, calculated; units of the y-axis are measured as percent 
Figure 18: 5-year Cross-currency Deviations from CIP to the Norway Sovereign Curve  
 




Figure 19: 5-year Cross-currency Deviations from CIP to the Swedish Sovereign Curve  
 
Source: Bloomberg, calculated; units of the y-axis are measured as percent 
On average it is cheap for Dutch and Finnish sovereign-rated issuers to issue in a foreign 
currency on a covered basis over time.  This was also the case for a Danish sovereign-
rated issuer, except between October 2013 and April 2014.  On the other hand, after 
March 2009 it was expensive on average for a Norwegian sovereign-rated issuer to issue 
in a foreign currency.  This was also the case for a Swedish sovereign-rated issuer over 
the full period, bar two months.  In detail: 
1. For a Dutch sovereign, the AUD, NZD and USD are always cheap to issue in relative 
to the home currency, while the CHF and JPY are expensive most of the time.   
2. For a Finnish sovereign, the AUD, NZD and USD are cheap currencies in which to 
issue, with the exception of one monthly reading each.  CHF and JPY are expensive 
most of the time.   
3. For a Danish sovereign, the AUD and NZD are always cheap to issue in.  The JPY is 
always expensive from October 2009 and the CHF is consistently expensive from 
May 2010. 
4. For a Norwegian sovereign, the AUD and NZD are cheap to issue in at least half of 
the time.  The CHF and JPY are consistently expensive. 
5. For a Swedish sovereign, all currencies are expensive to issue in at least half of the 




CIP and the cross-currency basis before the Global Financial Crisis 
Were CIP to hold, then the cross-currency basis should be close to zero over time and 
deviations would be difficult to arbitrage after costs.  However, a growing literature 
discusses how the CIP condition has been violated across currency pairs since 2008.  For 
example, Du et al. (2016) also study the 10-day moving average of the three-month Libor 
cross-currency basis for ten currency pairs with the USD and show that short-term 
interest rate deviations from CIP were greater after the GFC than before.   
I investigate the behaviour of the longer-term cross-currency basis of AUD, CHF, JPY, NZD 
and USD against the currencies of the European MBAs.  The analysis is extended back to 
January 2004, which represents a period of 3-4 years before the GFC arose.  I calculate the 
five-year cross-currency swap spread by assuming that a sovereign issues bonds in  
a given foreign currency and then comparing the resulting implied interest rate that is 
hedged into their domestic currency with the actual domestic five-year sovereign rate on 
the same date.  A positive spread shows that a currency was expensive for an investor to 
issue in, relative to the home base.  Figures 20 to 24 show the cross-currency deviations 
from CIP between the currencies of domicile of the six issuing European municipal bond 
agencies and the five major currencies in which they issued fixed coupon, fixed maturity 
bonds.  This contrasts with Figures 15 to 19, which show results by issuer.  Once again, 
the scales of all Figures are the same, contrasting swap spreads across different issuing 
currencies. 
Figure 20: AUD Cross-currency Deviations from Covered Interest Parity 




Figure 21: CHF Cross-currency Deviations from Covered Interest Parity 
Source: Calculated, Bloomberg; units of the y-axis are measured as percent 
Figure 22: JPY Cross-currency Deviations from Covered Interest Parity 







Figure 23: NZD Cross-currency Deviations from Covered Interest Parity 
Source: Calculated, Bloomberg; units of the y-axis are measured as percent 
Figure 24: USD Cross-currency Deviations from Covered Interest Parity 
Source: Calculated, Bloomberg; units of the y-axis are measured as percent 
Du et al. (2016) show that short-term deviations prior to mid-2007 were always less than 
20 basis points for all currency pairs against the USD.  CIP was better observed in shorter-
dated cross-currency instruments than longer-dated instruments.  The results of  
Figures 20 to 24  are quite different.  Over 2004-07 the deviation from zero on a covered 
basis was at least 20 basis points over time in 21 of the 25 currency pairs presented 
above.  This could provide an issuer with the opportunity to issue a bond favourably in 
certain foreign currencies relative to issuing in their respective domestic currency.  
However, even before 2008, CHF and JPY were expensive most of the time as currencies 




Which MBAs find foreign currency swap spreads favourable? 
Table 52 summarises the findings of Figures 15 to 19.  It shows the average covered 
interest cost differentials of foreign currencies relative to all the respective issuers’ 
currencies, sorted by issuer through monthly observations over 2009-16.  I calculate the 
five-year covered difference between the equivalent domestic rate of the foreign currency 
and the actual domestic rate of the respective issuer (the ‘currency spread’ or deviation 
from CIP).  It implies that Dutch, Danish and Finnish sovereigns find it cheap to issue on 
average in the foreign currencies listed on the left hand side of Table 50 relative to their 
domestic currency.  On the other hand, Norwegian and Swedish sovereigns find that 
foreign currency issuance is on average expensive relative to domestic currency issuance. 
Table 52: Which Sovereigns Find It Cheap to Issue in Foreign Currency on Average? 
Dutch Danish Finnish Norwegian Swedish 
-0.319 -0.201 -0.311 +0.350 +0.350 
Source: Bloomberg, calculated.  The units are basis points.  A negative figure indicates that the national issuer 
finds foreign currencies cheap to issue in, relative to its domestic currency on average.  A positive figure 
indicates that foreign currencies are expensive to issue in, relative to domestic currency on average 
Table 53 summarises the findings of Figures 20 to 24 and other currencies that are used 
for bond issuance.  It shows the average covered interest cost differentials of foreign 
currencies relative to issuers’ home currencies, sorted by issuing currency and by 
monthly observations over 2009-16.  Across all issuers on a currency hedged basis, the 
AUD and NZD emerge as currencies that are consistently cheap and the CHF and JPY are 
consistently expensive.  The USD is a cheap currency on average for Dutch, Danish and 
Finnish sovereign issuers, although it is an expensive currency on average for Norwegian 
and Swedish sovereigns to issue in on a currency hedged basis.   
Table 53: Average Foreign Currency Interest Cost Differential Against Issuers’ Domestic Currencies 
AUD CHF DKK EUR GBP JPY NOK NZD SEK USD 
-0.550 0.372 0.261 0.263 0.040 0.633 -0.400 -0.345 -0.395 -0.116 
Source: Bloomberg, calculated.  The units are basis points.  A negative figure indicates that a currency is cheap 
to issue in for a sovereign, relative to a domestic currency on average.  A positive figure indicates that a 




Descriptive analysis of the regression sample 
My regression sample includes all 164 bonds that were issued in domestic currency and 
472 bonds that were issued over 2009-16 in the five foreign currencies of Table 54.  The 
average spread of the foreign currency to home currency was negative in AUD, NZD and 
USD and positive in CHF and JPY when an issuer made a decision to issue a bond.  MBAs 
actually issued bonds in one of the five chosen foreign currencies when the ‘currency 
spread’ was in their favour 70.3% of the time in the five identified foreign currencies.  
This compares with my descriptive sample that covers a wider range of currencies on 
page 140, which claims that 67% of foreign currency bonds are issued more cheaply than 
their domestic equivalent yield-to-maturity in a wider range of foreign currencies.   
Table 54: Relative Value of the ‘Currency Spread’ for Bonds Issued 
 
Average spread 
for 636 bond issues 
Number of times issued in 
foreign currency when 
‘currency spread’ is negative 
Number of times issued in 
domestic currency when 
‘currency spread’ is negative 
AUD -0.618 143/157  160/164 
CHF 0.285 35/68    49/164 
JPY 0.345 7/9    14/164 
NZD -0.360 59/72 145/164 








Source: Bloomberg, calculated; the ‘currency spread’ is measured against the domestic currency of the actual 
bond issuer  
Table 55 divides the results of Table 54 into the average spread for bonds that were 
issued in the issuer’s respective domestic currency and the average spread for bonds 
issued in one of the highlighted foreign currencies on the day of issuance.  Average CHF 
and JPY spreads are marginally negative for foreign currency bonds issued in those 
currencies and they are positive when issuers used their domestic currency for bond 
issuance.  Average AUD, NZD and USD spreads were negative in both cases.  However, 
they were less negative on average when bonds were issued in each of these currencies 
than when bonds were issued in an issuer’s domestic currency, suggesting a possible lack 
of timing in the choice between domestic and foreign currency issuance.  The AUD and 
NZD spreads are very often more favourable than the CHF spreads to all issuers, yet the 






Comparing the second column of Table 55 when bonds were issued in these currencies, 
with Table 53’s average ‘currency spreads’ over the full eight years of the study, it is 
apparent that bonds were issued in CHF and JPY when the respective ‘currency spreads’ 
were more advantageous on average to an issuer than their long-term average.   
Table 55: Foreign ‘Currency Spread’ to Domestic Currency for Bonds Issued  
 
Average spread for foreign 
currency issues in this currency 
Standard 
Deviation 
Average spread at time 
of domestic issues 
Standard 
Deviation 
AUD -0.596 0.428 -0.679 0.396 
CHF -0.003 0.387 0.219 0.381 
JPY -0.123 0.380 0.327 0.246 
NZD -0.351 0.360 -0.432 0.364 
USD -0.082 0.391 -0.247 0.370 
Source: Bloomberg, calculated; the table splits the results of Table 54 into domestic currency bonds and 
foreign currency bonds issued 
Table 56 shows which MBAs observe the relative cheapness of foreign currencies, when 
issuing foreign currency bonds over 2009-16.  The euro is an attractive base currency: 
BNG and NWB have generated interest cost savings 90.5% and 91.7% of the time 
respectively by issuing in a foreign currency.  The other euro-based issuer, MuniFin, has 
sourced interest cost savings 94.7% of the time.  From a Danish krone base, 
Kommunekredit has sourced interest cost savings 93.3% of the time.   
However, Kommuninvest and KBN find issuing in a foreign currency to be expensive most 
of the time.  Each generates interest cost savings only 42.5% of the time.  Their respective 
success rates in selecting advantageous timing for USD bond issuance are low, unlike the 
other four MBAs.  They also both failed to generate interest cost savings whenever they 
issued single currency bonds in CHF.   
Table 56: Foreign Currency Issues When the ‘Currency Spread’ Is Negative by Issuer 
 
AUD CHF JPY NZD USD Total 
BNG 35/35 8/16 1/3 13/13 38/38 95/105 
NWB 14/14 12/17 5/5 1/1 23/23 55/60 
MuniFin 34/34 10/15 1/1 22/22 23/23 90/95 
Kommuninvest 19/23 0/7 0/0 6/11 6/32 31/73 
KBN 25/35 0/6 0/0 8/16 7/37 40/94 
Kommunekredit 16/16 5/7 0/0 9/9 12/13 42/45 
 
143/157 35/68 7/9 59/72 109/166 353/472 
Source: Bloomberg, calculated     




Table 57 shows the development of ‘currency spreads’ for issued bonds over time.  
Interest cost savings from issuing in a foreign currency were generated a little more than 
half of the time during 2011-12.  Following this period, issuance after 2013 was largely 
focused on three currencies – AUD, NZD and USD. 
Figures 21 and 22 show that CHF and JPY were relatively attractive currencies for Dutch, 
Finnish and Danish issuers in 2009, which reflects in activity in these currencies in that 
year.  However, each of the six MBAs issued bonds at least once in CHF after 2010 and a 
total of 18 such bonds were issued.  On only one occasion was the CHF spread favourable 
after April 2010, which raises the question of why MBAs are issuing in the CHF at all, 
when Swiss ‘currency spreads’ are often unfavourable relative to the domestic currency 
and other available foreign currencies.  However, with CHF covered interest costs to bond 
issuers relatively high 49% of the time over the full period (refer to  
Figure 21), bond issuance by all agencies has dwindled in this currency since 2010.   
Table 57: Foreign Currency Issues When the ‘Currency Spread’ Is Negative by Year 
 
AUD CHF JPY NZD USD Total 
2009 16/16 19/28 3/5 19/21 11/11 68/81  
2010 32/32 15/22 2/2 5/8 18/25 72/89 
2011 18/30 0/7 0/0 6/9 14/25 38/71  
2012 24/24 0/6 0/0 6/9 8/21 38/60  
2013 21/23 0/2 0/0 5/7 9/17 35/49  
2014 21/21 1/2 2/2 11/11 17/24 52/60  
2015 6/6 0/1 0/0 4/4 16/20 26/31  
2016 5/5 0/0 0/0 3/3 16/23 24/31  
 
143/157 35/68 7/9 59/72 109/166 353/472  





REGRESSION MODELS  
I model the MBA’s decision to issue a bond in a given foreign currency, based on the 
covered interest cost differential of the foreign currency relative to the issuer’s 
owncurrency and other variables.  This decision can be modelled as a joint decision to 
issue a bond and choose a foreign currency or as a decision to issue in a foreign currency, 
conditional upon the decision to issue a bond.  I present regression results for both 
outputs.  They are related as follows: 
I is the agency’s decision whether or not to invest: 
I =  1, if the agency decides to issue a bond 
    =  0, if the agency decides not to issue a bond 
C is the agency’s decision to issue in a given foreign currency: 
C =  1, if the agency issues in a given foreign currency 
      =  0, otherwise 
For each foreign currency:   
E [C.I] = E [C.I | I = 1] x Prob (I = 1) + E [C.I | I = 0] x Prob (I = 0) 
            = E [C | I = 1] x Prob (I = 1)               
To investigate the effect of currency swap spreads on the MBA’s choice of foreign 
currency, I undertake probit regressions of the decision to issue in that currency.  
Following Black and Munro (2010) and Mizen et al. (2012), the probit regression 
estimates the probability that an agency will issue a bond in a given month.   
The regression takes the form: 
Prob (BONDijt = 1) = αi + Xijt  βi  + Zijt  γi +  ϵijt  ;  ϵijt   ̴  IID (0, σϵ²) 
BONDijt, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if agency i issues a bond in foreign  
currency j  in month t  and equals zero otherwise. 
Xijt represents the covered interest cost differential of a foreign currency relative to the 
domestic currency of the issuer.  I compare the domestic currency equivalent of the five-
year foreign sovereign zero-coupon yield with the duration matched actual domestic 
currency sovereign yield.  This defines a ‘currency spread’ or deviation from CIP relative 




Zijt represents control variables that may include foreign market depth (size of available 
markets, liquidity and foreign investor base), bank credit default spreads (a proxy for 
counterparty risk) and benchmark bond redemption dummies (in the US).   
The signs of the β coefficients reveal the sensitivity of the issue decision to deviations 
from CIP.  A negative deviation for an issuer implies that the target foreign currency is 
attractive relative to its domestic currency.  For univariate regressions, I expect the β 
coefficients to be negative, if a ‘currency spread’ affects the decision to issue in a given 
foreign currency.  For multivariable regressions, I expect the β coefficients to be negative 
when the ‘currency spread’ is that of the currency of bond issuance and positive when the 
‘currency spread’ is of a different currency from the currency of bond issuance. 
Univariate probit models study the decision of each agency to issue a bond in a particular 
currency (1 = issue, 0 = do not issue).  This analysis is undertaken:   
(i) for the joint decision to issue a bond and choose a particular foreign currency and  
(ii) for the conditional foreign currency decision, given that an issuer has decided to issue 
a bond.  Results for the joint decision cases are shown from Tables 59 to 82.   
By comparison, in Tables 126 to 131 in the Appendix, I investigate the agencies’ decision 
to choose a foreign currency, conditional on first making a decision to issue a bond.  
Probit estimations of the conditional decision produce similar results.   
I extend the regressions to multivariable probit models, which introduce a vector of 
currency swap spreads of all relevant currency pairs.  This analysis is undertaken both  
(i) for the joint decision to issue a bond and choose a particular foreign currency and  
(ii) for the foreign currency decision, given that an issuer has decided to issue a bond.   
Results for the joint decision cases are included in Tables 83 to 106.  The results for the 
conditional cases, once the decision to issue a bond has been made, are included in Tables 
132 to 137 in the Appendix.   
A pooled multinomial model highlights the choice of five foreign currencies relative to the 
base domestic currency of respective issuers.  This is summarised in Table 108.  Marginal 
effects highlight the elasticity of the choice decision as a function of the currency swap 
spread and other control variables.  I look at six currencies for the choice of currency of 
issuance (including the issuer’s home currency) of fixed term, fixed coupon bonds.   
I include every fixed coupon, fixed maturity-date bond, issued by the six MBAs between 
January 2009 and December 2016.  These represent 636 bonds.  I am interested in five 




Individual agencies results: joint decision univariate probit regressions 
Initially, I look at univariate probit regressions on currency choice for a bond issue.  From 
Tables 59 to 82, I look at the joint decision of an agency both to issue a bond and in which 
foreign currency to issue.  I am interested in five currency pairs against the domestic 
currencies of the six agencies and present four tables for each MBA bond issuer: 
1. a probit regression that includes every bond that is issued; 
2. the average marginal effects of the above regression; 
3. a probit regression that includes every bond that is issued, even if more than one bond 
is issued in any month, with month fixed effects that eliminate seasonal factors; 
4. a linear regression that includes every bond that is issued, even if there is more than 
one bond issued in any one month; 
There are relatively few months when an agency issues more than one bond in  
a particular currency.  As an example, the issuer of the largest number of foreign currency 
bonds, BNG, issued fixed coupon bonds in 33 of the 96 months reviewed in AUD, in 13 
months in CHF and in 37 months in USD.  In total, BNG issued 35 fixed coupon bonds in 
AUD, 16 bonds in CHF and 38 fixed coupon bonds in USD. 
Table 58: Number of Foreign Currency Bonds Issued: January 2009 - December 2016 
Issuer AUD CHF JPY NZD USD 
BNG 35 16 3 13 38 
NWB 14 17 5 1 23 
KBN 35 6 0 16 37 
Kommunekredit 16 7 0 9 13 
Kommuninvest 23 7 0 11 32 
MuniFin 34 15 1 22 23 
Total 157 68 9 72 166 
Source: Bloomberg 
The dependent variable for a given currency in the regressions is one for every bond that 
is issued and zero in a month of no bond issue.  Observations are over 96 discrete months.  
A univariate analysis restricts the agency to looking at the ‘currency spread’ (i.e. the 
deviation from CIP) between its domestic currency and the respective foreign currency of 
issue.  It is comparing one foreign currency only to its domestic currency.  In a month 
when a bond is issued in a foreign currency, I calculate the ‘currency spread’ on the curve 
date for the respective bond issue.  If there is a month with no issue, I calculate the 
‘currency spread’ as the average of the month-start and month-end values.  The more 
negative a covered ‘currency spread’ is, the more attractive that currency is to issue in, 
relative to the issuer’s domestic currency.  Thus, I look for a negative and significant 




is sensitive to that spread.  Likewise, I look for the marginal effects coefficients to be 
negative. 
The power of the probit and linear regressions is not strong – McFadden R-squareds are 
low in general and the majority of regressors across the base probit regressions are not 
significant.  The McFadden R-squareds of regressions with month fixed effects are higher 
than those of the base probit regressions.  Regressions with fixed effects and linear 
regressions serve to confirm the findings of the base probit regressions, in general.  
Comments below refer to the base probit regressions: 
The strongest signal is for the CHF: for four of the MBAs, the regression coefficient on the 
CHF ‘currency spread’ is negative and significant.  The exceptions are KBN and 
Kommuninvest.   
Both Dutch issuers generate a significant and negative coefficient on deciding on bond 
issues in AUD, according to respective ‘currency spreads’.   In the case of KBN, the AUD 
coefficient is significant, but counter-intuitively positive.   
The NZD coefficient is not significant for any MBA.  NZD ‘currency spreads’ are nearly 
always in favour (i.e. negative) for European issuers, so it seems that agencies are not 
timing bond issues in this currency.   
The USD coefficient is significant only for Kommuninvest, where it is counter-intuitively 
positive.  The lack of significance of USD regressors might suggest a different motivation 
for timing bond issuance in the agencies’ most important foreign currency. 
The regression coefficient on the JPY ‘currency spread’ is negative and significant only for 
the Dutch issuers.  JPY regressions do not generate results for the four other issuers, 
which have made very few JPY bond issues. 
Of the agencies, NWB generates negative and significant regressors in four of its base 
probit regressions.  However, two of these are for currencies in which it made relatively 
few bond issues.  BNG generates negative and significant regressors in three of its base 
probit regressions.   
I repeat the above analysis, by including just the first bond issued in a month of multiple 







Table 59: Probit of BNG’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency 















    
CHF spread  
-2.322 ***  
(0.861) 
   








USD spread     
0.506 
(0.637) 
McFadden R-squared 0.021 0.091 0.273 0.004 0.005 
Number of observations = 1 35   16 3 13 38 
Number of observations = 0 63 83 93 84 59 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period is January 2009 to 
December 2016.  The McFadden R-squared measures the improvement of the regression fit against a 
regression on a constant only.  I use this definition in all relevant tables in Chapter 3 
Table 60: Marginal Effects of BNG’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency 




    
CHF spread  
-0.516 *** 
(0.159) 
   








USD spread     
0.193 
(0.248) 
Number of observations  98   99 96 97 97 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 




Table 61: Probit of BNG Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency - Month Fixed Effects 















    
CHF spread  
-2.951 ***  
(0.778) 
   








USD spread     
0.988 
(0.740) 
McFadden R-squared 0.169 0.161 0.458 0.123 0.185 
Number of observations = 1 35   16 3 13 38 
Number of observations = 0 55 43 13 52 43 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016  
Table 62: Linear Regression of BNG’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  













-0.273 *  
(0.160) 
    
CHF spread  
-0.615 *** 
(0.212) 
   








USD spread     
0.189 
(0.238) 
R-squared 0.028 0.090 0.108 0.003 0.007 
Number of observations = 1 35   16 3 13 38 
Number of observations = 0 63 83 93 84 59 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 




Table 63: Probit of NWB’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency 















    
CHF spread  
-4.144 *** 
(0.988) 
   








USD spread     
0.900 
(0.606) 
McFadden R-squared 0.044 0.249 0.224 0.351 0.014 
Number of observations = 1 14 17 5 1 23 
Number of observations = 0 83 84 92 95 74 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 64: Marginal Effects of NWB’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  




    
CHF spread  
-0.775 *** 
(0.150) 
   








USD spread     
0.274 
(0.184) 
Number of observations  97   101 97 96 97 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 




Table 65: Probit of NWB Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency – Month Fixed Effects 















    
CHF spread  
-4.819 *** 
(1.238) 
   








USD spread     
1.740 ** 
(0.720) 
McFadden R-squared 0.092 0.365 0.501 - 0.138 
Number of observations = 1 14 17 5 - 23 
Number of observations = 0 67 36 20 - 58 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 66: Linear Regression of NWB’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  













-0.245 *  
(0.143) 
    
CHF spread  
-0.982 *** 
(0.193) 
   








USD spread     
0.229 
(0.139) 
R-squared 0.039 0.236 0.102 0.032 0.013 
Number of observations = 1 14 17 5 1 23 
Number of observations = 0 83 84 92 95 74 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 




Table 67: Probit of MuniFin’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  













   








USD spread    
-0.081 
(0.651) 
McFadden R-squared 0.001 0.255 0.010 0.000 
Number of observations = 1 34 15 22 23 
Number of observations = 0 72 85 76 74 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 68: Marginal Effects of MuniFin’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  




   








USD spread    
-0.025 
(0.201) 
Number of observations  106   100 98 97 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 69: Probit of MuniFin’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency – Month Fixed Effects 













   








USD spread    
-0.151 
(0.778) 
McFadden R-squared 0.113 0.339 0.050 0.125 
Number of observations = 1 34 15 22 23 
Number of observations = 0 56 25 52 58 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 70: Linear Regression of MuniFin’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  













   








USD spread    
-0.026 
(0.211) 
R-squared 0.002 0.270 0.001 0.000 
Number of observations = 1 34 15 22 23 
Number of observations = 0 72 85 76 74 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 




Table 71: Probit of Kommuninvest’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  













   








USD spread    
0.821 
(0.538) 
McFadden R-squared 0.004 0.024 0.022 0.020 
Number of observations = 1 23 7 11 32 
Number of observations = 0 76 89 85 68 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 72: Marginal Effects of Kommuninvest’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  




   








USD spread    
0.288 
(0.181) 
Number of observations  99   96 96 100 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 73: Probit of Kommuninvest’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency – Month Fixed Effects 













   








USD spread    
1.238 ** 
(0.619) 
McFadden R-squared 0.118 0.057 0.085 0.192 
Number of observations = 1 23 7 11 32 
Number of observations = 0 44 41 53 60 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 74: Linear Regression of Kommuninvest’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  













   








USD spread    
0.285 
(0.177) 
R-squared 0.004 0.014 0.017 0.025 
Number of observations = 1 23 7 11 32 
Number of observations = 0 76 89 85 68 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 




Table 75: Probit of KBN’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  













   








USD spread    
0.526 
(0.446) 
McFadden R-squared 0.033 0.140 0.006 0.011 
Number of observations = 1 35 6 16 37 
Number of observations = 0 70 92 81 62 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 76: Marginal Effects of KBN’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  




   








USD spread    
0.288 
(0.181) 
Number of observations  105   98 97 99 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 77: Probit of KBN Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency - Month Fixed Effects 













   








USD spread    
0.649 
(0.476) 
McFadden R-squared 0.120 0.207 0.065 0.092 
Number of observations = 1 35 6 16 37 
Number of observations = 0 46 28 49 46 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 78: Linear Regression of KBN’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  













   








USD spread    
0.526 
(0.441) 
R-squared 0.043 0.052 0.005 0.011 
Number of observations = 1 35 6 16 37 
Number of observations = 0 70 92 81 62 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 




Table 79: Probit of Kommunekredit’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  













   








USD spread    
1.377 ** 
(0.640) 
McFadden R-squared 0.007 0.268 0.003 0.034 
Number of observations = 1 16 7 9 13 
Number of observations = 0 82 89 87 83 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 80: Marginal Effects of Kommunekredit’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  




   
CHF spread  
-0.314 ***  
(0.090) 
  




USD spread    
0.289 
(0.144) 
Number of observations  98   96 96 96 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 81: Probit of Kommunekredit’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency - Month Fixed Effects 













   








USD spread    
2.325 *** 
(0.879) 
McFadden R-squared 0.097 0.340 0.034 0.201 
Number of observations = 1 16 7 9 13 
Number of observations = 0 58 33 47 43 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 82: Linear Regression of Kommunekredit’s Joint Issue Decision in a Given Currency  













   








USD spread    
0.209 ** 
(0.091) 
R-squared 0.006 0.173 0.002 0.021 
Number of observations = 1 16 7 9 13 
Number of observations = 0 82 89 87 83 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 




Individual agencies results: joint decision multivariable probit regressions 
From Tables 83 to 106, I investigate the MBA’s joint decision to issue a bond and issue in a 
particular foreign currency, according to five different ‘currency spread’ regressors.  The 
dependent variable is one for every bond that is issued and zero in a month of no bond 
issue in a given currency.  If ‘currency spread’ is to predict a bond issue in a particular 
currency, I expect the regressors’ coefficients to be negative when the ‘currency spread’ is 
that of the currency of bond issuance and positive when the ‘currency spread’ is of a 
different currency from the currency of bond issuance.  I also include marginal effects of 
the base probit regressions, probit regressions with month fixed effects and linear 
regressions of the MBA’s decision.  Some of the probit models with month fixed effects fail 
to converge.  Columns where there are insufficient data or no activity in a particular 
currency choice are omitted.  The McFadden R-squareds of regressions with fixed effects 
are higher in general than those of the base probit regressions. 
BNG shows evidence of a relationship between the ‘currency spreads’ and the decision to 
issue in AUD: here the AUD regressor is negative and significant and the NZD and USD 
spread coefficients are positive and significant.  However, for BNG’s decision to issue in 
other currencies, the regressor on the leading diagonal (e.g. CHF spread for CHF choice, 
etc.) is not significant and few other regressors are significant.  Kommunekredit generates 
a significant and negative AUD spread coefficient for the decision to issue in AUD and  
a significant and negative CHF spread coefficient for the decision to issue in CHF, but 
there are few other significant regressors.  Other MBA results are not compelling: 
Kommuninvest even generates a positive and significant NZD spread regressor for the 
decision to issue in NZD.  Interestingly, not one regression model returns a negative and 
significant regressor for the decision to issue a bond in USD.  Linear regression models 
provide comparison with the non-linear models.  Even here, there are few significant 
regressors.   
The above results raise questions, such as whether the small number of significant 
regressors is a factor of a relatively low number of positive monthly decision outcomes or 
whether the MBAs are not focusing on the relative value of foreign currencies for timing 
of bond issuance, especially given that AUD and NZD (two of the most popular currencies) 






Table 83: Probit of BNG’s Joint Decision  













































































McFadden R-squared 0.132 0.362 0.484 0.056 0.061 
Number of observations 98 99 96 97 97 
Number of observations = 1 35 16 3 13 38 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 84: BNG’s Joint Decision – Marginal Effects 





























































Number of observations 98 99 96 97 97 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 




Table 85: Probit of BNG’s Joint Decision with Month Fixed Effects 
















































































McFadden R-squared 0.335 0.511 - 0.170 0.289 
Number of observations 90 59 - 65 81 
Number of observations = 1 35 16 - 13 38 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 86: Linear Regression of BNG’s Joint Decision  













































































R-squared 0.165 0.362 0.235 0.039 0.077 
Number of observations 98 99 96 97 97 
Number of observations = 1 35 16 3 13 38 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 




Table 87: Probit of NWB’s Joint Decision  
































































McFadden R-squared 0.234 0.421 0.627 0.038 
Number of observations 97 101 97 97 
Number of observations = 1 14 17 5 23 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 88: NWB’s Joint Decision – Marginal Effects 



















































Number of observations 97 101 97 97 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 




Table 89: Probit of NWB’s Joint Decision with Month Fixed Effects 






































































McFadden R-squared 0.322 - - 0.166 
Number of observations 81 53 25 81 
Number of observations = 1 14 17 5 23 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 90: Linear Regression of NWB’s Joint Decision  













































































R-squared 0.160 0.362 0.181 0.073 0.040 
Number of observations 97 101 97 96 97 
Number of observations = 1 14 17 5 1 23 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 




Table 91: Probit of MuniFin’s Joint Decision  
































































McFadden R-squared 0.215 0.348 0.100 0.012 
Number of observations 106 100 98 97 
Number of observations = 1 34 15 22 23 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 92: MuniFin’s Joint Decision – Marginal Effects 



















































Number of observations 106 100 98 97 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 




Table 93: Probit of MuniFin’s Joint Decision with Month Fixed Effects 
































































McFadden R-squared 0.349 0.511 0.195 0.142 
Number of observations 90 44 74 81 
Number of observations = 1 34 15 22 23 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 94: Linear Regression of MuniFin’s Joint Decision  
































































R-squared 0.257 0.339 0.112 0.013 
Number of observations 106 100 98 97 
Number of observations = 1 34 15 22 23 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 




Table 95: Probit of Kommuninvest’s Joint Decision  
































































McFadden R-squared 0.055 0.474 0.206 0.051 
Number of observations 99 96 96 100 
Number of observations = 1 23 7 11 32 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 96: Kommunivest’s Joint Decision – Marginal Effects 



















































Number of observations 99 96 96 100 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 




Table 97: Probit of Kommuninvest’s Joint Decision with Month Fixed Effects 



































































McFadden R-squared 0.203 - 0.206 0.250 
Number of observations 67 - 96 92 
Number of observations = 1 23 - 11 32 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 98: Linear Regression of Kommuninvest’s Joint Decision  
































































R-squared 0.132 0.243 0.169 0.063 
Number of observations 99 96 96 100 
Number of observations = 1 23 7 11 32 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 




Table 99: Probit of KBN’s Joint Decision  



















































McFadden R-squared 0.136 0.073 0.021 
Number of observations 105 97 99 
Number of observations = 1 35 16 37 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 100: KBN’s Joint Decision – Marginal Effects 









































Number of observations 105 97 99 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 




Table 101: Probit of KBN’s Joint Decision with Month Fixed Effects 



















































McFadden R-squared 0.294 0.112 0.104 
Number of observations 81 65 83 
Number of observations = 1 35 16 37 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 102: Linear Regression of KBN’s Joint Decision  
































































R-squared 0.165 0.318 0.371 0.028 
Number of observations 105 98 97 99 
Number of observations = 1 35 6 16 37 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 




Table 103: Probit of Kommunekredit’s Joint Decision  
































































McFadden R-squared 0.129 0.307 0.215 0.092 
Number of observations 98 96 96 96 
Number of observations = 1 16 7 9 13 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 104: Kommunekredit’s Joint Decision – Marginal Effects 



















































Number of observations 98 96 96 96 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 




Table 105: Probit of Kommunekredit’s Joint Decision with Month Fixed Effects 
































































McFadden R-squared 0.322 0.363 0.515 0.287 
Number of observations 74 40 56 56 
Number of observations = 1 16 7 9 13 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Table 106: Linear Regression of Kommunekredit’s Joint Decision  
































































R-squared 0.083 0.198 0.128 0.056 
Number of observations 98 96 96 96 
Number of observations = 1 16 7 9 13 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 




The power of the data 
Given that relatively few ‘currency spread’ regressors are significant in the above results,  
I undertake linear regressions to test the power of the data.  The dependent variable is the 
ordered choice of the six currencies for the pooled sample of 636 bond issues (0 for home 
currency, 1 for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for JPY, 4 for NZD and 5 for USD). 
Table 107: Linear Regression of the Joint Issue Decision in One of Six Currencies 
































































R-squared 0.041 0.050 0.180 0.188 
Number of observations 636 636 636 636 
Issuer FE no yes no yes 
Month FE no no yes yes 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 
1 for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for JPY, 4 for NZD and 5 for USD.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
All ‘currency spread’ regressors except JPY are significant in the base model and the 
model with issuer fixed effects.  In general, the linear regressions underline some 
predictive power in the AUD, CHF, NZD and USD spread data.  The JPY data may suffer 
from a relatively small number of observations.  However, once month fixed effects are 
introduced to the models, only the CHF spread remains a significant regressor, even 
though the R-squared of these regressions improves.  Similar results are generated if  




Multinomial regression: currency choice relative to home currency 
To investigate the issuer’s choice between different foreign currencies, relative to issuing 
at home, I create a multinomial probit regression of the pooled sample of all 636 bond 
issues.  None of the regressors ― AUD spread for AUD issuance, CHF spread for CHF 
issuance, JPY spread for JPY issuance, NZD spread for NZD issuance and USD spread for 
USD issuance ― is significant.  Three of the regressors in the choice of CHF over home 
issuance are significant.  However, the signs of the coefficients of the AUD and JPY spreads 
are negative.  Three of the regressors in the choice of NZD over home issuance are 
significant.  However, the sign of the coefficient of the USD spread is negative.   
Table 108: Multinomial Probits of Currency Choice on ‘Currency Spread’ 




Month Fixed Effects  
Standard Error with 




c -0.083 0.272 0.637 0.695 
Spread AUD -0.415 0.473 -0.611 0.491 
Spread CHF -0.400 0.516 -0.574 0.530 
Spread JPY 0.689 0.428 0.736 0.449 
Spread NZD 0.728 ** 0.370 0.767 ** 0.383 




c -0.661 * 0.358 -12.994 *** 0.767 
Spread AUD -1.827 *** 0.658 -1.710 *** 0.656 
Spread CHF -0.429 0.630 -0.250 0.648 
Spread JPY -1.218 ** 0.526 -0.929 * 0.556 
Spread NZD 2.644 *** 0.552 2.654 *** 0.552 
Spread USD -0.367 0.760 -0.674 0.829 






c -0.170 0.786 -10.411 *** 1.510 
Spread AUD 4.029 *** 1.478 5.068 * 2.907 
Spread CHF -2.585 1.615 -3.556 ** 1.774 
Spread JPY 0.080 0.986 -4.835 ** 2.359 
Spread NZD -0.424  0.731 -4.034 * 2.202 
Spread USD -2.650 * 1.357 -1.570 2.470 
New Zealand dollar 
  
  
c -0.453 0.321 0.305 0.794 
Spread AUD 1.350 ** 0.573 1.087 * 0.591 
Spread CHF 0.993 * 0.569 0.794 0.586 
Spread JPY 0.204 0.468 0.164 0.507 
Spread NZD 0.090 0.399 0.225 0.422 




c -0.247 0.263 -0.198 0.741 
Spread AUD 0.841 * 0.476 0.745 0.490 
Spread CHF 1.271 ** 0.509 1.111 ** 0.514 
Spread JPY 0.127 0.426 0.379 0.445 
Spread NZD -0.544 0.382 -0.547 0.393 
Spread USD -0.731 0.685 -0.483 0.703 
Source: Calculated, robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 
1 for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for JPY, 4 for NZD and 5 for USD.  Observation period Jan 09-Dec 16; observations 636, 




There is little additional information in the model with monthly fixed effects (not 
reported).  Regressors reflect those of the base probit model.  The results of Table 108 are 
repeated by individual issuer in Tables 138 to 143 in the Appendix.   
Marginal effects of the multinomial probit model 
Marginal effects indicates how the probability of the dependent variable changes when  
I change the value of a regressor, holding all other regressors constant across the pooled 
sample of Table 108.  None of the coefficients of change in CHF spread for CHF bond 
issuance, change in JPY spread for JPY issuance, change in NZD spread for NZD issuance 
and change in USD spread for USD issuance relative to home issue are significant.  Only 
the change in AUD regressor for AUD issuance is significant, and it is negative.  As this 
‘currency spread’ becomes more negative, the agencies are more likely to issue in AUD.  
All of the other spread regressors for the decision to issue in AUD are significant and three 
of the four non-AUD spread regressors are positive, which I would expect (as non-AUD 
spread regressors become more positive, so the agencies are more likely to issue in AUD). 
Table 109: Multinomial Probit Marginal Effects on Changes in ‘Currency Spreads’ 
























































Source: Calculated, robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 1 
for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for JPY, 4 for NZD and 5 for USD.  Observation period is Jan 09-Dec 16; observations 636; 





Other motivations for foreign currency choice 
Does the size of the bond issue matter?  
A further question is whether the size of the bond that the MBAs wish to issue is related to 
their choice of issuing-currency?  Both the size and currency of a bond issue are choice 
variables, so establishing causality is not straightforward.  I arbitrarily assume that the 
MBAs first decide on the size of their bond issue and then decide to issue in a given 
foreign currency.  Table 110 summarises a pooled regression of the choice of currency 
relative to the home currency of the issuer on the amount issued in euros.  This excludes 
‘currency spreads’.  Every ‘amount issued’ regressor of interest except the USD is 
significant and negative; and every coefficient within the marginal effects table is 
significant.   
The marginal effects results of Table 111 suggest that as the size of bond issue increases, 
an MBA is less likely to issue in AUD, CHF, JPY or NZD and more likely to issue at home or 
in USD, assuming they have first decided on its size.   
Table 110: Multinomial Probit of Currency Choice on Amount Issued 
Currency Mode Coefficient Standard Error P-value 
Australian dollar 
   
c 0.681 *** 0.107 0.000 
Amount issued -0.003 *** 0.000 0.000 
Swiss franc 
   
c -0.009 0.121 0.939 
Amount issued -0.002 *** 0.000 0.000 
Home (base outcome) 
 
Japanese yen 
   
c -1.061 *** 0.202 0.000 
Amount issued -0.002 ** 0.001 0.018 
New Zealand dollar 
   
c 0.320 ** 0.128 0.013 
Amount issued -0.006 *** 0.001 0.000 
US dollar 
   
c -0.155 0.109 0.154 
Amount issued 0.000  0.000 0.111 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 
1 for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for JPY, 4 for NZD and 5 for USD.  Observation period Jan 09-Dec 16; observations 636; 
log likelihood -872.6 
 
Table 111: Multinomial Probit Marginal Effects on Currency on Amount Issued 














Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 





Does the size of available markets matter? 
The size of a foreign market is exogenous.  Should the size of the available market be a 
good regressor?  As a preliminary, I undertake an OLS regression of size of bond issued on 
size of market chosen.  The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) definition for 
available foreign bond markets is followed, namely, ‘national issuers/other financial 
corporations/debt securities issued and amount’.  I create a quarterly time series over 
2009-16.  The USD market is much the largest relevant market with an average size of 
US$1,616 billion, followed by AUD at US$102 billion, JPY at US$76 billion, CHF at US$37 
billion and NZD at US$10 billion.  The USD is also the MBAs’ largest currency of bond 
issuance.  By the end of 2016, 44.8% of all outstanding bonds of European MBA issuers 
were denominated in US dollars – more than their combined home currency issuance.  
Table 112 suggests a positive and significant relationship between the size of markets and 
the size of the bond issue. 





Size of chosen market 0.266 *** 
 (0.023) 
number of observations 636 
R-squared 0.177 
F-statistic 136.2 
Source: Calculated; key: robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  
amount issued and market size both measured in euros, the former in millions, the latter in billions 
Mizen et al. (2012) argue for a market depth hypothesis, namely that the choice of market 
for corporate bond issuance is determined by its ability to accommodate borrower 
demands.  In light of this, I investigate the size of foreign bond markets as a regressor to 
the choice of the foreign currency of issuance, in addition to ‘currency spread’.  I repeat 
the multinomial regression of Table 108 in Table 113 with market size added as a control 
variable.  I follow Chinn and Ito (2000), and include the log (market size in € million) of 
the respective available foreign currency bond markets as an instrument.  There is little 
improvement in the significance of the ‘currency spread’ regressors from Table 108 to 
113.  None of the coefficients of the AUD spread for AUD issuance, CHF spread for CHF 
issuance, JPY spread for JPY issuance or NZD spread for NZD issuance is significant.  USD 
spread for USD issuance regressor is significant and negative.  Most market size 
regressors are significant in the choice of AUD over home issuance, but not the AUD 




Table 113: Multinomial Probit of Currency Choice on ‘Currency Spread’ and Market Size  




 C -9.414 49.604 -10.486 50.890 
Spread AUD 0.492 0.720 0.588 0.740 
Spread CHF 0.564 0.680 0.298 0.720 
Spread JPY -0.113 0.557 0.015 0.579 
Spread NZD 1.059 0.807 0.701 0.840 
Spread USD -2.305 ** 0.939 -1.862 * 1.022 
log size AUD 6.667 7.760 8.775 8.043 
log size CHF 2.961 * 1.547 2.707 * 1.589 
log size HOME -0.179 *** 0.065 -0.193 *** 0.066 
log size JPY -5.625 ** 2.602 -4.008  2.754 
log size NZD 0.686 ** 0.312 0.598 * 0.336 




 C 0.575 60.056 -14.495 68.202 
Spread AUD -1.548  0.950 -1.638  1.099 
Spread CHF -0.177 0.850 0.350 0.959 
Spread JPY -1.696 ** 0.718 -1.295 * 0.720 
Spread NZD 2.991 *** 1.014 3.423 *** 1.177 
Spread USD -1.543 1.076 -2.590 * 1.245 
log size AUD 11.306 10.204 8.243 10.811 
log size CHF -0.274 1.901 1.423 2.244 
log size HOME -0.102 0.084 -0.135 0.089 
log size JPY -2.955 3.883 -7.435 4.893 
log size NZD 0.334 0.387 0.461 0.408 
log size USD -5.349 9.893 -1.419 10.505 
Home (base outcome)  
 Japanese yen 
  
 
 C 46.916 146.005 367.351 - 
Spread AUD 6.538 *** 1.616 9.280 *** 2.871 
Spread CHF -0.649 2.113 2.387 6.146 
Spread JPY -0.695 1.654 -10.403 8.820 
Spread NZD -3.232 2.120 -10.966 ** 4.295 
Spread USD -3.955 ** 1.691 0.689 3.979 
log size AUD 7.348 11.258 25.432 33.680 
log size CHF 5.602 * 3.147 6.661 4.982 
log size HOME 0.565 *** 0.185 2.071 2.049 
log size JPY 5.193 8.438 31.913 ** 16.262 
log size NZD -0.368 0.740 -2.603 1.726 
log size USD -17.271 20.323 -90.528 * 39.686 
New Zealand dollar 
  
 
 C 36.176 58.038 59.844 64.032 
Spread AUD 2.744 *** 0.843 2.967 *** 0.908 
Spread CHF 1.787 ** 0.775 1.415 * 0.843 
Spread JPY 0.430 0.608 0.638 0.656 
Spread NZD -1.617 0.987 -2.534** 1.133 
Spread USD -3.200 *** 1.052 -2.147 * 1.212 
log size AUD 11.155 8.260 20.457 ** 8.788 
log size CHF 2.515 1.668 1.694 1.777 
log size HOME -0.185 ** 0.073 -0.182 ** 0.076 
log size JPY -2.263 3.146 0.874 3.623 
log size NZD -0.204 0.377 -0.607 0.448 




 C -60.643 51.066 -73.239 55.525 
Spread AUD 0.919 0.716 0.740 0.758 
Spread CHF 1.821 ** 0.719 1.478 * 0.759 
Spread JPY -0.364 0.557 -0.090 0.575 
Spread NZD -0.020 0.854 -0.077 0.898 
Spread USD -2.187 ** 0.978 -1.769 * 1.059 
log size AUD 15.375 ** 7.754 18.038 ** 8.245 
log size CHF -1.027 1.437 -1.672 1.543 
log size HOME -0.098 0.064 -0.120 * 0.066 
log size JPY -5.578 ** 2.740 -5.093 * 2.922 
log size NZD 0.570 * 0.325 0.574 0.354 
log size USD 2.256 7.451 2.353 8.037 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 
1 for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for JPY, 4 for NZD and 5 for USD.  Observation period Jan 09-Dec 16; observations 675; 




I include a marginal effects analysis below.  There is little additional information in this 
table, except that the marginal effects of the NZD spread regressor and NZD market size 
regressor for NZD currency issuance relative to home issuance choice are both significant.   
Table 114: Probit Marginal Effects of Currency Choice: Market Size Included 
 




























































































































Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the data measure the marginal change in the decision to 

















Other robustness checks 
1. CDS spreads are tested to see if counterparty risk is a factor in currency choice.  The 
MBAs collateralise all interest rate and cross-currency basis swaps, so I do not expect 
global bank credit default swap spreads to be significant regressors.  The univariate 
regressions of Table 59 to 82 are repeated by adding the global bank CDS (not reported).  
At no stage is this regressor significant and its inclusion only improves the significance of 
the ‘currency spread’ regressor in the cases of Kommuninvest’s decision to issue CHF 
bonds.  Table 115 shows the results of multinomial regressions with Bank CDS added to 
the usual ‘currency spread’ regressors.  The only global bank CDS regressor that is 
significant is for the choice to issue in USD.  It is negative, which suggests that when CDS 
spreads are rising, then MBAs are less likely to seek the USD for issuance.  In general the 
‘currency spread’ regressors of Table 115 are no more significant than those of Table 108.  
2. Does USD benchmarking influence currency choice?  All of the MBAs issue large 
benchmark bond issues to populate and enrich a municipal bond yield curve or replace 
maturing benchmark bonds in USD, as well as in some of their respective domestic 
currencies.  USD benchmark programmes represent a large percentage of the USD funding 
of BNG, MuniFin and Kommuninvest.  As highlighted from Tables 59 to 82, the coefficient 
of the USD covered ‘currency spread’ is not significant for five MBAs and only significant 
for Kommuninvest within their respective univariate probit regressions.  It is positive for 
the latter, which is to say the worse the ‘currency spread’, the more likely Kommuninvest 
is to issue in USD – a counter-intuitive result.  If the timing of USD benchmark bonds 
issuance is determined by the redemption or refunding of existing benchmark 
constituents, might these influence issue-timing?  The effect of replacing benchmark 
bonds at redemption on the timing of fixed coupon bond issues in USD is investigated by a 
probit regression analysis.  I lack available disclosure to tag USD bond benchmark issues, 
so to find a suitable regression instrument, I identify all fixed coupon USD-denominated 
bonds with an issue value of at least US$500 million as a proxy for benchmark bonds.  In 
practice, there may be fewer benchmark bonds than these.  I then create a dummy 
variable of whether an MBA has issued a USD bond within 30 days of the redemption of 
one of these bonds.  Table 117 shows these regressors are not significant for BNG and 
NWB.  On the other hand, the regressors are positive and significant for Kommuninvest 
and KBN.  These MBAs have often issued bonds in USD when the covered ‘currency 
spread’ was against them. The regressions are repeated with ‘was a bond issued less than 




3. Is there a delay in the decision-making process to base the currency choice on ‘currency 
spread’?   McBrady and Schill (2007) suggest that decision makers may use lagged data to 
inform their decision to issue in a foreign currency.  I substitute a one-week lag of the 
foreign ‘currency spreads’ into the regressions of Table 108.  I show the results of the 
multinomial regression in Table 118 and marginal effects in Table 119.  The significance 
of the spreads coefficients is practically unchanged from Tables 108 to 118 and the 
latter’s coefficients are close to the coefficients within Table 108.  At least three 
coefficients are significant in each of the CHF, NZD and USD sections of the marginal 
effects table and all coefficients are significant in the AUD section.  However, only the 
change in the AUD spread regressor is negative in the AUD choice; while the equivalent 
changes in CHF, NZD and USD spread regressors are not significant within their 
respective CHF, NZD and USD choice sections.  For decision-makers to react to lagged 
data, I would expect these particular regressors to be negative and significant.  
4. All five foreign currencies belong to countries ranked within the top 34 globally for ease 
of doing business by the World Bank over 2009-16.  I investigate whether the currency 
choice of the MBA bond issuers is influenced by relative changes in the ease of doing 
business over time.  These rankings are only updated on an annual basis.  When adding 
‘ease of doing business’ regressors by country to the usual ‘currency spread’ regressors 
and undertaking multinomial regressions, only the NZD regressor is significant across-
currency choices (results not reported).  
5. Do Euro Area issuers act differently from non-Euro Area issuers?  Does grouping 
issuers by those with and without joint and several guarantee generate different results?  
Relative to the multinomial probit regression of Table 108, I undertake regressions that 
include dummies for euro-domiciled issuers and ‘joint and several guarantee’ issuers to 
determine whether these issuers exhibit different behaviours.  Neither regressor is 
significant in their respective regressions (results not reported). 
6. Do MBAs issue where they already have a large presence of bonds outstanding?   
I investigate whether an MBA will issue in a particular currency, dependent upon how 
much bond issuance they have already undertaken in that currency.  This is measured 
relative to the available market size, as defined by the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS).  NWB, MuniFin, Kommuninvest and Kommunekredit publish outstanding bonds 
analysis.  I regress these MBAs’ currency choice dummy on foreign ‘currency spread’ and 
the percentage of bonds outstanding in that currency, relative to the BIS available market 














with Month FE 




c -0.092 0.268 0.642 0.696 
Spread AUD -0.172 0.540 -0.449 0.563 
Spread CHF -0.830 0.629 -0.842 0.647 
Spread JPY 0.552 0.442 0.659 0.463 
Spread NZD 0.613 0.400 0.709 * 0.418 
Spread USD 0.785 0.742 0.974 0.769 
Global bank CDS 0.003  0.002 0.002 0.002 
2 Swiss franc 
  
  
c -0.657 * 0.358 -12.756 *** 0.771 
Spread AUD -1.833 *** 0.686 -1.962 *** 0.724 
Spread CHF -0.447 0.849 0.174 0.823 
Spread JPY -1.224 ** 0.545 -0.883 0.569 
Spread NZD 2.651 *** 0.562 2.831 *** 0.0597 
Spread USD -0.345 0.941 -1.083 0.961 
Global bank CDS 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
3 Home (base outcome)  
4 Japanese yen 
  
  
c 0.110 0.993 -9.600 - 
Spread AUD 3.515 *** 1.310 3.055 3.005 
Spread CHF -1.876 1.517 -2.395 1.534 
Spread JPY 0.069 1.059 -3.204 2.270 
Spread NZD -0.096 0.870 -2.050 2.283 
Spread USD -3.576 ** 1.587 -3.351 2.857 
Global bank CDS -0.007 0.005 -0.014 * 0.007 
5 New Zealand dollar 
  
  
c -0.479 0.311 0.311 * 0.790 
Spread AUD 1.653 ** 0.658 1.269 0.681 
Spread CHF 0.529 0.687 0.509 0.725 
Spread JPY 0.045 0.480 0.073 0.514 
Spread NZD -0.123 0.460 0.109 0.481 
Spread USD -1.576 * 0.838 -1.371 0.899 
Global bank CDS 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
6 US dollar 
  
  
c -0.231 0.273 -0.180 0.742 
Spread AUD 0.309 0.547 0.121 0.571 
Spread CHF 1.894 *** 0.608 1.786 *** 0.610 
Spread JPY 0.389 0.458 0.633 0.481 
Spread NZD -0.232 0.404 -0.189 0.423 
Spread USD -1.214 0.747 -0.986 0.766 
Global bank CDS -0.004 * 0.002 -0.005 * 0.002 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 
1 for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for JPY, 4 for NZD and 5 for USD.  Observation period Jan 09-Dec 16; observations 636, 










Table 116: Marginal Effects of the Probit of Currency Choice: Bank CDS Included 
 















































































Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 
1 for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for JPY, 4 for NZD and 5 for USD.  Observation period Jan 09-Dec 16; the data measure 
the marginal change in the decision to issue in a given currency, given a change in the respective variable 
 
Table 117: Probit of USD Issue Decision on Proximity to Benchmark Bond Redemptions and 
Deviation from CIP  








































Spread AUD   



























































Log likelihood -52.6 -48.0 -39.5 -35.8 -41.1 -40.2 -42.1 -36.6 
McFadden R-
squared 
0.002 0.088 0.012 0.105 0.075 0.096 0.036 0.161 
Number of 
observations = 1 
38 38 23 23 37 37 32 32 
Number of 
observations = 0 
38 38 37 37 28 28 31 31 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for no issue in that 
currency in a month when the MBA issued a foreign currency bond, 1 for an issue in that currency.  



















with Month FE 




c -0.052 0.280 0.670 0.704 
Lag spread AUD  -0.529 0.466 -0.766 0.487 
Lag spread CHF -0.442 0.504 -0.646 0.522 
Lag spread JPY 0.567 0.436 0.572 0.459 
Lag spread NZD 0.782 ** 0.369 0.838 ** 0.384 
Lag spread USD 0.556 0.683 0.964 0.712 
2 Swiss franc 
  
  
c -0.728 ** 0.363 -13.324 *** 0.562 
Lag spread AUD -2.029 *** 0.648 -1.820 *** 0.645 
Lag spread CHF -0.364 0.618 -0.159 0.640 
Lag spread JPY -1.351 *** 0.525 -1.062 * 0.544 
Lag spread NZD 2.698 *** 0.559 2.670 *** 0.544 
Lag spread USD -0.203 0.749 -0.600 0.820 
3 Home (base outcome) 
 
4 Japanese yen 
  
  
c -0.338  0.733 -10.585 *** 1.292 
Lag spread AUD 3.200 ** 1.348 3.686 2.586 
Lag spread CHF -2.328 1.521 -3.943 ** 1.830 
Lag spread JPY -0.010 0.943 -2.806 2.184 
Lag spread NZD -0.197 0.766 -1.589 1.518 
Lag spread USD -2.191 1.425 -1.362 2.682 
5 New Zealand dollar 
  
  
c -0.417 0.330 0.348 ** 0.804 
Lag spread AUD 1.504 *** 0.573 1.313 0.603 
Lag spread CHF 1.059 * 0.563 0.955 0.587 
Lag spread JPY 0.185 0.478 0.126 0.520 
Lag spread NZD 0.035 0.393 0.144 0.416 
Lag spread USD -2.164 *** 0.769 -1.895 ** 0.851 
6 US dollar 
  
  
c -0.188 0.268 -0.136 0.752 
Lag spread AUD 0.775 * 0.471 0.690 ** 0.487 
Lag spread CHF 1.176 ** 0.499 0.999 0.509 
Lag spread JPY 0.060 0.436 0.276 0.453 
Lag spread NZD -0.503 0.380 -0.521 0.394 
Lag spread USD -0.579 0.678 -0.292 0.705 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 
1 for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for JPY, 4 for NZD and 5 for USD.  Observation period Jan 09-Dec 16; observations 636, 
log likelihood -929.5 for base model, -877.6 for fixed effects model 
Table 119: Marginal Effects of the Probit of Currency Choice: Lags of Spreads Included 
 
HOME   AUD   CHF  JPY NZD   USD  

































































Source: Calculated; robust standard errors; key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 
1 for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for JPY, 4 for NZD and 5 for USD.  Observation period Jan 09-Dec 16; the data measure 





The majority of European MBA bonds are issued in a foreign currency.  This is the first 
study to measure the effectiveness of such a policy of bond issuance.   
Covered Interest Parity has failed to hold for many five-year cross-currency basis swaps 
since at least 2004, providing an opportunity to reduce interest costs when timing foreign 
currency bond issuance.  Most of the time, European MBAs do take advantage of lapses in 
CIP.  However, probit regressions suggest that currency deviations from CIP rarely 
influence their timing of decisions to issue bonds in a foreign currency.  For example, MBA 
bond issuers do not appear to be concerned about timing issues in AUD and NZD, where 
covered ‘currency spreads’ are nearly always favourable relative to their respective 
domestic currencies.  Furthermore, bonds are often issued in the most popular foreign 
currency, the USD, when covered ‘currency spreads’ with the AUD and NZD are more 
favourable.  The exception is the CHF, where MBAs are sensitive to swap spreads when 
timing bond issuance.  Yet the ‘currency spread’ here is often against them, which 
presents a puzzle as to why an MBA should issue bonds in a currency that often had an 
unfavourable deviation from CIP from 2011 and when AUD and NZD spreads were 
frequently more attractive?     
Do other funding objectives override CIP considerations?  I identify a relationship 
between the size of bond chosen and the size of foreign currency market of issue.  
Furthermore, each agency maintains benchmark bonds in USD, and replacing maturing 
benchmark constituents influences the timing of the USD bond issuance of KBN and 
Kommuninvest.  However, the USD ‘currency spread’ is often against KBN, which rarely 
makes interest cost savings relative to hypothetical domestic bond issuance when issuing 
USD denominated bonds.   
Over an eight-year observation window, the adopted sample of fixed maturity-date bonds 
for regression analysis represents 44% of all MBA bonds issued in 23 currencies.  Most of 
the exclusions include dual currency bonds, exotic pay-off bonds, and currencies with no 
swap data or insufficient issuance activity for meaningful regression results.  While four 
MBAs generate interest cost savings over 90% of the time, I find limited evidence that 
MBA bond issuers act optimally in timing the issuing of foreign currency bonds through 
the failure of CIP.  If interest savings are the prime motivation for foreign bond issuance, 





Univariate joint decision to issue in one currency – first bond issue of a month  
 Tables 120 to 125 present the agency’s joint decision to issue a bond and to issue in a 
given foreign currency.  In this case, probit regressions include just the first bond issued 
in a month, when more than one bond has been issued in the same currency, which 
contrasts with the analysis of Table 59, for example, which includes all bonds issued in 
the period of review.  A univariate regression restricts the agency to looking at the 
‘currency spread’ of just one foreign currency relative to its domestic currency.  In a 
month when a bond is issued in a foreign currency, the ‘currency spread’ is calculated on 
the curve date for the first respective issue.  If there is a month with no issue, the 
‘currency spread’ is calculated as the average of the month-start and month-end values.  
The more negative a ‘currency spread’ is, the more attractive that currency is to issue in 
relative to the domestic currency.   Thus, I look for a negative and significant regression 
coefficient to indicate that an issuer’s decision to issue in that foreign currency is sensitive 
to that spread.  Results closely reflect those of Tables 59 to 82. 
Table 120: Probit of BNG’s Joint Decision in a Particular Currency  
(observing only the first issue in a month of issue) 















    
CHF spread  
-2.407 ** 
(0.957) 
   








USD spread     
0.491 
(0.637) 
McFadden R-squared 0.019 0.090 0.273 0.005 0.005 
Number of observations = 1 33   13 3 12 37 
Number of observations = 0 63 83 93 84 59 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 




Table 121: Probit of NWB’s Joint Decision in a Particular Currency  
(observing only the first issue in a month of issue) 















    
CHF spread  
-3.329 *** 
(1.039) 
   








USD spread     
0.837 
(0.776) 
McFadden R-squared 0.045 0.167 0.192 0.351 0.012 
Number of observations = 1 13 12 4 1 22 
Number of observations = 0 83 84 92 95 74 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
 
Table 122: Probit of MuniFin’s Joint Decision in a Particular Currency  
(observing only the first issue in a month of issue) 













   








USD spread    
-0.022 
(0.634) 
McFadden R-squared 0.001 0.150 0.005 0.000 
Number of observations = 1 24 11 20 22 
Number of observations = 0 72 85 76 74 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
 
Table 123: Probit of Kommuninvest’s Joint Decision in a Particular Currency  
(observing only the first issue in a month of issue) 













   








USD spread    
1.104 ** 
(0.559) 
McFadden R-squared 0.003 0.024 0.022 0.036 
Number of observations = 1 20 7 11 28 
Number of observations = 0 76 89 85 68 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 




Table 124: Probit of KBN’s Joint Decision in a Particular Currency  
(observing only the first issue in a month of issue) 













   








USD spread    
0.447 
(0.470) 
McFadden R-squared 0.021 0.099 0.003 0.007 
Number of observations = 1 26 4 15 34 
Number of observations = 0 70 92 81 62 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
 
Table 125: Probit of Kommunekredit’s Joint Decision in a Particular Currency  
(observing only the first issue in a month of issue) 













   








USD spread    
1.377 ** 
(0.946) 
McFadden R-squared 0.008 0.265 0.003 0.034 
Number of observations = 1 14 7 9 13 
Number of observations = 0 82 89 87 83 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a 
month when a bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation 
period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
The univariate conditional decision to issue in one currency 
Table 126 toTable 131 present the agency’s decision to issue a bond in a given foreign 
currency, conditional upon issuing a bond in that month.  A univariate regression restricts 
the agency to looking at the ‘currency spread’ of just one foreign currency relative to its 
domestic currency.   
In a month when a bond is issued in a foreign currency, the ‘currency spread’ is calculated 
on the curve date for the respective issue.  If there is a month with no issue, the ‘currency 
spread’ is calculated as the average of the month-start and month-end values.  If there is 
more than one issue in a month, all observations are included.   
The more negative a ‘currency spread’ is, the more attractive that currency is to issue in 
relative to the domestic currency.  Thus, I look for a negative and significant regression 
coefficient to indicate that an issuer’s decision to issue in that foreign currency is sensitive 




Table 126: BNG’s Conditional Decision to Issue in a Particular Currency 















    
CHF spread  
-2.635 *** 
(0.968) 
   








USD spread     
0.879 
(0.739) 
Log likelihood -52.1 -35.3 -9.0 -34.7 -52.0 
McFadden R-squared 0.018 0.107 0.287 0.001 0.013 
Number of observations = 1 35   16 3 13 38 
Number of observations = 0 42 62 72 63 38 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
The negative and significant coefficients on CHF spread and JPY spread indicate that BNG 
is spread-aware in timing its bond issues in these currencies, albeit the JPY sample is very 
small.  BNG does not consider spreads to time issuance in AUD, NZD or USD. 
Table 127: NWB’s Conditional Decision to Issue in a Particular Currency 















    
CHF spread  
-4.571 *** 
(1.239) 
   








USD spread     
1.362 
(0.905) 
Log likelihood -31.3 -27.2 -13.2 -3.4 -38.7 
McFadden R-squared 0.039 0.266 0.230 0.338 0.031 
Number of observations = 1 14 17 5 1 23 
Number of observations = 0 46 47 55 58 37 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
NWB finds AUD, NZD and USD ‘currency spreads’ negative most of the time and Table 127 
suggests that NWB does not consider spreads to time issuance in these currencies.   





Table 128: MuniFin’s Conditional Decision to Issue in a Particular Currency 















    
CHF spread  
-2.792 *** 
(0.818) 
   








USD spread     
0.451 
(0.683) 
Log likelihood -49.0 -28.1 -5.0 -40.8 -40.7 
Mcfadden R-squared 0.004 0.201 0.025 0.001 0.005 
Number of observations = 1 34 15 1 22 23 
Number of observations = 0 37 50 60 41 39 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
MuniFin is spread aware in timing bond issuance in CHF.  There is a strong and negative 
relationship with the CHF ‘currency spread’.  Otherwise, no relationship between the 
timing of its decision to issue in other currencies and ‘currency spreads’ is suggested. 
Table 129: Kommuninvest’s Conditional Decision to Issue in a Particular Currency 













   




JPY spread     




USD spread    
1.399 ** 
(0.578) 
Log likelihood -40.9 -21.0 -28.0 -40.6 
McFadden R-squared 0.000 0.024 0.012 0.071 
Number of observations = 1 23 7 11 32 
Number of observations = 0 39 52 48 31 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
The USD regressor is significant and positive, which is counter-intuitive.  Otherwise, there 
is little to suggest a relationship between the decision to issue in other currencies and 





Table 130: KBN’s Conditional Decision to Issue in a Particular Currency 













   




JPY spread     




USD spread    
0.277 
(0.506) 
Log likelihood -47.7 -16.3 -34.8 -44.3 
McFadden R-squared 0.031 0.163 0.026 0.003 
Number of observations = 1 35 6 16 37 
Number of observations = 0 36 58 47 28 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
KBN is spread aware in timing bond issuance in CHF.  There is a strong and negative 
relationship between the decision to issue in CHF and the CHF ‘currency spread’.  The 
AUD regressor is significant and positive, which is counter-intuitive.   
Table 131: Kommunekredit’s Conditional Decision to Issue in a Particular Currency 













   




JPY spread     




USD spread    
1.746 * 
(0.939)  
Log likelihood -27.2 -14.1 -21.1 -23.1 
McFadden R-squared 0.025 0.239 0.012 0.083 
Number of observations = 1 16 7 9 13 
Number of observations = 0 26 33 31 27 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 in a month when a 
bond is issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period Jan 2009-Dec 2016 
Kommunekredit is spread aware in timing bond issuance in CHF.  There is a strong and 
negative relationship between the decision to issue in CHF and the CHF ‘currency spread’.  





Multivariable conditional decision to issue in one currency 
From Tables 132 to 137, I look at the agency’s decision to issue a bond in a given foreign 
currency, conditional upon issuing a bond in that month.  The probit regression analyses 
the decision to issue in a particular currency relative to a vector of ‘currency spreads’ for 
five different currencies, which an agency sees simultaneously.  For each agency, the 
months when it does and does not issue are identified.  If there is more than one issue in 
any month, all the observations within that month are included.  I do not include marginal 
effects or linear regressions here, as these essentially replicate the results that are shown 
within Tables 83 to 106. 
In general, there is limited evidence that issuers are spread aware in their currency 
choice.  For BNG, there is evidence of a relationship between the ‘currency spreads’ and 
its decision to issue in AUD.  The AUD spread coefficient is significant and negative and 
the NZD and USD spreads are significant and positive.  While two regressors are 
significant in BNG’s decision to issue in CHF, the CHF ‘currency spread’ is not significant 
and the coefficients of AUD spread and JPY spread are negative.  There is little evidence of 
relationships within the decisions to issue in JPY, NZD, although two regressors are 
positive in the USD bond issue regression.   
Three of the ‘currency spread’ regressors are significant for NWB’s decision to issue in 
CHF, although the CHF spread is not significant and two of the significant coefficients are 
negative.  Neither of the JPY or NZD regressions produce an output.  For MuniFin and 
KBN, three regressors for the decision to issue in AUD are significant and two of these are 
positive.  However, the AUD ‘currency spread’ is not significant for either issuer.   
In general, the results for MuniFin, Kommuninvest, KBN and Kommunekredit offer limited 
evidence of a relationship between the decisions to issue in a given currency and 
‘currency spreads’.  Where some results had been significant in the univariate regressions 










Table 132: BNG’s Decision to Issue in a Particular Currency – Multiple Variables 








































































Log likelihood -45.4 -24.7 -4.4 -33.5 -48.1 
McFadden R-squared 0.145 0.375 0.650 0.038 0.087 
Number of observations 77 78 75 76 76 
Number of observations = 1 35 16 3 13 38 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period is January 2009 to 
December 2016 
Table 133: NWB’s Decision to Issue in a Particular Currency  











































Log likelihood -24.9 -16.5 -36.0 
McFadden R-squared 0.235 0.554 0.100 
Number of observations 60 64 60 
Number of observations = 1 14 17 23 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 





Table 134: MuniFin’s Decision to Issue in a Particular Currency  























































Log likelihood -40.7 -24.6 -36.9 -38.9 
McFadden R-squared 0.171 0.300 0.095 0.049 
Number of observations 71 65 63 62 
Number of observations = 1 34 15 22 23 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period is January 2009 to 
December 2016 
Table 135: Kommuninvest’s Decision to Issue in a Particular Currency  























































Log likelihood -38.5 -11.6 -24.0 -37.3 
McFadden R-squared 0.058 0.458 0.155 0.145 
Number of observations 62 59 59 63 
Number of observations = 1 23 7 11 32 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 





Table 136: KBN’s Decision to Issue in a Particular Currency  











































Log likelihood -43.0 -32.0 -43.7 
McFadden R-squared 0.125 0.103 0.018 
Number of observations 71 63 65 
Number of observations = 1 35 16 37 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 
issued in respective foreign currency, 0 if a month of no issue.  Observation period is January 2009 to 
December 2016 
Table 137: Kommunekredit’s Decision to Issue in a Particular Currency  























































Log likelihood -22.4 -13.6 -17.3 -18.8 
McFadden R-squared 0.199 0.266 0.187 0.253 
Number of observations 42 40 40 40  
Number of observations = 1 16 7 9 13 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 1 when a bond is 





Multinomial probit regressions by issuer 
I repeat the exercise of Table 108 in the following tables, dividing the analysis by issuer.  
Multinomial tables for NWB, MuniFin, Kommuninvest, KBN and Kommunekredit do not 
include the JPY choice, due to lack of data.  
While a number of the spread coefficients are significant across the six sets of regressions, 
the message in the following tables is not strong: 
Table 138: Multinomial Probit of Currency Choice Relative to BNG Home Currency  
Currency Mode Coefficient Standard Error P-value 
Australian dollar 
   
c -0.090 0.658 0.892 
Spread AUD -0.688 0.910 0.450 
Spread CHF -0.410 1.665 0.805 
Spread JPY -0.147 1.408 0.917 
Spread NZD 1.451 * 0.853 0.089 
Spread USD -0.189 1.403 0.893 
Swiss franc 
   
c 0.872 0.967 0.367 
Spread AUD -0.872 1.265 0.491 
Spread CHF 3.482 * 1.919 0.070 
Spread JPY -5.226 *** 1.827 0.004 
Spread NZD 2.550 ** 1.155 0.027 
Spread USD -0.190 1.701 0.911 
Home (base outcome) 
  
Japanese yen 
   
c -2.447 ** 1.105 0.027 
Spread AUD 6.109 ** 2.459 0.013 
Spread CHF 1.378 3.303 0.677 
Spread JPY 0.899 1.753 0.608 
Spread NZD -2.077 2.067 0.315 
Spread USD -7.896 *** 1.620 0.001 
New Zealand dollar 
  
c -0.770 0.748 0.304 
Spread AUD 0.413 1.063 0.697 
Spread CHF 3.751 ** 1.753 0.032 
Spread JPY -1.409 1.524 0.355 
Spread NZD 1.344 0.941 0.154 
Spread USD -2.643 * 1.579 0.094 
US dollar 
   
c 0.350 0.629 0.578 
Spread AUD 1.560 * 0.944 0.098 
Spread CHF 2.426 1.581 0.125 
Spread JPY -0.591 1.500 0.693 
Spread NZD 0.605 0.842 0.473 
Spread USD -2.518 * 1.514 0.096 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 
1 for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for JPY, 4 for NZD and 5 for USD.  Observation period is January 2009 to December 







Table 139: Multinomial Probit of Currency Choice Relative to NWB Home Currency  
Currency Mode Coefficient Standard Error P-value 
Australian dollar 
   
c -3.286 *** 1.108 0.003 
Spread AUD 0.127 1.790 0.943 
Spread CHF 0.138 1.966 0.944 
Spread NZD -5.148 ** 2.239 0.021 
Spread USD 2.487 2.735 0.363 
Swiss franc 
   
c -1.469  0.899 0.102 
Spread AUD -3.679 *** 1.426 0.010 
Spread CHF -2.099 1.775 0.237 
Spread NZD 4.397 *** 1.442 0.002 
Spread USD -0.119 2.090 0.954 
Home (base outcome) 
  
New Zealand dollar 
   
c -15.470 *** 4.035 0.001 
Spread AUD -14.972 *** 5.721 0.009 
Spread CHF -4.602 * 2.598 0.077 
Spread NZD -5.936 5.096 0.244 
Spread USD 21.000 ** 9.490 0.027 
US dollar 
   
c 0.279 0.845 0.742 
Spread AUD 0.748 1.308 0.567 
Spread CHF 2.385  1.487 0.109 
Spread NZD 0.805 1.457 0.581 
Spread USD -1.012 1.863 0.587 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 
1 for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for NZD and 4 for USD.  Observations 87, log likelihood -96.4 
Table 140: Multinomial Probit of Currency Choice Relative to MuniFin Home Currency 
Currency Mode Coefficient Standard Error P-value 
Australian dollar 
   
c -0535 0.702 0.447 
Spread AUD -0.616 1.364 0.652 
Spread CHF 2.861 ** 1.464 0.051 
Spread NZD -0.557 1.001 0.578 
Spread USD -0.215 1.724 0.901 
Swiss franc 
   
c -1.896 * 0.937 0.043 
Spread AUD -2.507 1.754 0.153 
Spread CHF -0.671 1.612 0.677 
Spread NZD -0.101 1.404 0.943 
Spread USD 1.281 1.759 0.467 
Home (base outcome) 
  
New Zealand dollar 
   
c -0.638 0.705 0.366 
Spread AUD 1.912 1.373 0.164 
Spread CHF 3.495 ** 1.598 0.029 
Spread NZD -2.460 *** 0.989 0.013 
Spread USD -1.987 1.759 0.259 
US dollar 
   
c -1.088 0.685 0.112 
Spread AUD 0.318 1.376 0.817 
Spread CHF 3.266 ** 1.496 0.029 
Spread NZD -2.789 ** 1.102 0.011 
Spread USD 0.193 1.811 0.915 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 




Table 141: Multinomial Probit of Currency Choice Relative to Kommuninvest Home Currency   
Currency Mode Coefficient Standard Error P-value 
Australian dollar 
   
c -0.318 0.760 0.967 
Spread AUD -3.613 *** 1.409 0.010 
Spread CHF -2.049 1.361 0.132 
Spread NZD 1.826 * 1.024 0.075 
Spread USD 3.069  1.869 0.101 
Swiss franc 
   
c -3.494 2.257 0.122 
Spread AUD -8.336 * 4.579 0.069 
Spread CHF -0.622 1.581 0.694 
Spread NZD 9.420 ** 4.486 0.036 
Spread USD -1.932 1.889 0.306 
Home (base outcome) 
  
New Zealand dollar 
   
c -0.444 1.099 0.686 
Spread AUD -2.000 1.752 0.254 
Spread CHF -0.629 1.429 0.660 
Spread NZD 3.121 ** 1.099 0.005 
Spread USD -0.941 1.914 0.623 
US dollar 
   
c -1.085 0.706 0.124 
Spread AUD -3.131 ** 1.327 0.018 
Spread CHF -0.360 1.351 0.790 
Spread NZD -0.297 1.029 0.773 
Spread USD 3.322 * 1.881 0.077 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 
1 for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for NZD and 4 for USD.  Observations 98, log likelihood -124.5 
Table 142: Multinomial Probit of Currency Choice Relative to KBN Home Currency  
Currency Mode Coefficient Standard Error P-value 
Australian dollar 
   
c 0.977 0.586 0.095 
Spread AUD 1.913 1.503 0.203 
Spread CHF -0.278 1.229 0.821 
Spread NZD -0.750 0.941 0.426 
Spread USD 0.519 1.728 0.764 
Swiss franc 
   
c -11.076 ** 4.820 0.022 
Spread AUD -13.117 ** 6.202 0.034 
Spread CHF 2.468 2.893 0.394 
Spread NZD 20.418 ** 8.498 0.016 
Spread USD -9.631 * 5.119 0.060 
Home (base outcome) 
  
New Zealand dollar 
   
c 0.430 0.736 0.559 
Spread AUD 5.254 *** 1.865 0.005 
Spread CHF 1.828 1.328 0.169 
Spread NZD -3.056 *** 0.984 0.002 
Spread USD -2.566 1.864 0.169 
US dollar 
   
c 0.160 0.584 0.784 
Spread AUD 2.035 1.652 0.218 
Spread CHF 1.623 1.258 0.197 
Spread NZD -1.942 ** 0.946 0.040 
Spread USD -0.858 1.735 0.621 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 




Table 143: Multinomial Probit of Currency Choice Relative to Kommunekredit Home Currency  
Currency Mode Coefficient Standard Error P-value 
Australian dollar 
   
c 1.154 1.186 0.330 
Spread AUD 1.088 1.580 0.491 
Spread CHF 0.832 1.966 0.672 
Spread NZD 0.535 1.949 0.784 
Spread USD -0.228 2.477 0.927 
Swiss franc 
   
c 1.878 1.208 0.120 
Spread AUD 2.516 1.770 0.155 
Spread CHF -2.612 2.888 0.366 
Spread NZD 2.118 2.595 0.414 
Spread USD -2.883 2.530 0.255 
Home (base outcome) 
  
New Zealand dollar 
   
c 1.832 1.255 0.144 
Spread AUD 3.334 * 1.900 0.079 
Spread CHF -1.909 2.096 0.362 
Spread NZD 0.433 1.857 0.816 
Spread USD -2.982 2.621 0.255 
US dollar 
   
c 0.406 1.199 0.735 
Spread AUD 3.426 * 1.753 0.051 
Spread CHF 4.482 * 2.398 0.062 
Spread NZD -0.261 2.213 0.906 
Spread USD -4.098 2.975 0.168 
Source: Calculated; robust standard errors   key: the dependent variable takes the value 0 for home currency, 
1 for AUD, 2 for CHF, 3 for NZD and 4 for USD.  Observation period is January 2009 to December 2016; 
observations 55, log likelihood -71.0 
I estimate multinomial probit regressions for each issuer that include time fixed effects 
(not reported), but on each occasion, these fail to converge.  Stopping the regressions 
after 1,000 iterations, these generate very few significant regressors for the variables of 
interest.  This may be due a relatively small number of positive outcomes over the period 
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SUMMARY AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS 
 
The thesis examines the financial innovation of developed market SNGs to raise private 
funds.  It studies aspects of the potential advantage of credit-pooling in SNG bond 
issuance by comparing three important alternative means for raising long-term 
municipality debt.  Chapter 1 addresses whether direct government-backed lending or 
funding from credit-pooling agency backed bond issues best suits SNGs.  Chapter 2 
analyses which of individual bond issues and municipal credit-pooling agency backed 
bond issues is best suited for US municipalities.  Chapter 3 examines the potential interest 
cost savings from issuing foreign versus domestic currency denominated bonds for MBAs.   
My research is motivated by the launch of a new UK municipal credit-pooling agency.  If it 
is to thrive, it must issue bonds at a competitive yield, which will fund long-term loans to 
local authorities more cheaply than if they were to borrow directly from government-
backed agencies, banks or even issue bonds themselves.   
Contribution to the literature 
I address clear gaps in the existing literature, as I offer policy guidance to the newly 
created UKMBA.  Chapters 1 and 3 focus on the activities of the six largest European MBAs 
― in the former chapter, there is one just recent European paper (Schnitzler, 2017) of 
relevance.  While there is a literature on the failure of Covered Interest Parity and surveys 
of high quality bond issuers in different currencies, the closest paper to Chapter 3 focuses 
on the high quality German bond issuer, KfW (Du et al., 2016).  This is the only paper to 
address European MBA bond issues in foreign currency.  The US literature underlying 
Chapter 2 is far from recent and depends on small survey samples.  I create a much larger 
sample of detailed bond and bond participant data that gives a more accurate input to my 
empirical work. 
The contributions of all three chapters are based on substantial and recent data sets, 
which I have assembled from available sources.  These are discussed in detail within each 








In Chapter 1, I show that the bond issues of a counterfactual UK MBA can generate 
interest cost savings relative to a synthetic Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) bond issuer.  
That said, the actual UK Municipal Bond Agency (UKMBA) competes against a strong 
incumbent loans company, which is 100% owned by central government and is the 
dominant force in the UK market for local authority long-term funding.  Recent evidence 
shows that the PWLB’s loan pricing is responsive to competitive pressures from the 
UKMBA (see below).   
In Chapter 2, a municipality’s credit rating and required size of long-term funding 
determine whether to participate in the bond issuance programme of a US MBB.  
Participation has a significant and negative effect on a municipality’s interest costs.  
However, the interest cost savings seem to be insufficient to convince the larger and 
better credit-rated municipalities to commit to an MBB bond issue programme, when 
taking into account the greater flexibility of timing bond issues for individual higher 
credit-rated municipalities than participating within a pool of bond issues.   
In Chapter 3, the failure of Covered Interest Parity (CIP) provides European MBAs with an 
opportunity to reduce interest costs when timing foreign currency bond issuance.  Most of 
the time, MBAs do take advantage of lapses in CIP.  But deviations from CIP rarely 
influence their timing of decisions to issue bonds in a foreign currency.  I find limited 
evidence that MBA bond issuers use the failure of CIP to optimally time the issuing of 
foreign currency bonds, with the exception of the Swiss franc.   
Implications for the UK Municipal Bond Agency 
In October 2019, the UKMBA announced that it was restructuring, in order to readdress 
the borrowing needs of local authorities.  This occurs five years after launching, having 
attracted a membership that accounted for just 15% of UK local authorities and having 
failed to issue a single bond.  The proposed revised framework eliminates the existing 
unconditional element of the bonds guarantee, which has proved a stumbling block to 
many local authorities that may wish to borrow from the agency.  Under the proposed 
new business model, local authorities will guarantee bonds issued by the UKMBA in 
proportion to their borrowings from it.  ‘Joint and Proportional’ guarantees will 
incorporate a contributions mechanism, whereby if a local authority in the UKMBA’s 
lending programme falls into financial distress, the guarantee of other borrowers is only 
proportional to the level of their own borrowings, but the agency can ask all other local 




local authority.  This differs from the six mature European MBAs, whose respective 
business models rest upon either a members’ joint and several guarantee or implicit 
government guarantee of their bond issues.  Differences in the UK from the collectivist 
culture of the Dutch and Nordic MBAs seem to hamper local authority buy-in to a business 
model that has proved successful elsewhere.  
A further hurdle for the UKMBA is that it competes directly with a mature and specialist 
lender.  UK local authorities can borrow on demand relatively large sums from the PWLB, 
the leading provider of funding to local councils by on-lending government borrowing, 
on terms of up to 50 years at a fixed spread over the par gilt curve.  Indeed, most UK local 
authorities have enjoyed a relationship with the PWLB for many years and there may be 
an element of anchoring by many of them to this provider.  Such competing agencies are 
not so significant in the European countries where MBAs are active, other than France. 
My thesis follows an ‘ideal world’ counter-factual that a synthetic UK MBA, credit-ranked 
pari passu with the European MBAs, can issue bonds in public markets and distribute 
loans to its member local authorities.  While I identify modest interest cost savings 
relative to the PWLB’s loan rates in basis points terms, the UK’s 515 local authorities had 
total outstanding borrowings of £97.2 billion for capital investment programmes at 
September 2018, according to the UK Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government.  Were a hypothetical 10 basis point saving to be achieved on all current 
interest costs, this would represent just under £100 million per annum for local 
authorities in the long run.  In the real world, having acquired a credit rating from 
Moody’s that is one notch below that of the UK government, the actual UKMBA must build 
a rigorous credit process to allow local authorities to take advantage of market interest 
rates, while being subject to market discipline.  To date, only a small number of UK local 
authorities has been attracted to its business model ― structural issues offset potential 
financial savings.   
One consequence within days of the announced restructuring of the UKMBA was a hike of 
20 basis points in the ‘Certainty Rate’ fixed margin to 100 basis points over gilts offered 
by the Public Works Loan Board to UK local authorities.  This body last reduced its margin 
to 80 basis points in November 2012, just as the UKMBA was taking form.  The UKMBA’s 
impact on the interest costs of UK local authority funding to date has been indirect, via its 





Are credit-pooling agencies under-utilised? 
MBAs have proved successful in some developed countries.  Their excellent long-term 
records of avoiding credit distress are reflected in strong credit ratings and competitive 
loan pricing for their member SNGs.  However, this business model is active in just a 
dozen developed markets and it struggles in the UK and North America.  Despite a long 
and successful history in parts of Europe and Japan, the concept of municipal credit-
pooling agencies does not have deep roots on a global basis.  There are few developed 
countries where municipal bond agencies or municipal bond banks are active.  Evidence 
from the US and Canada shows that providers of credit to SNGs via municipal bond banks 
or municipal finance agencies are struggling to make more than a minor contribution to 
the overall municipal bond market.  The UK and US experiences would argue that MBAs 
and MBBs have yet to convincingly carve a role in public finance in many global 
environments.  Just seven developed countries are supporting thriving municipal bond 
agencies for long-term SNG finance.  Only New Zealand and France have launched 
significant municipal bond agencies within the last 10 years.   
Policy implications 
The credit-pooling agency whose bond issues are based on a joint and several guarantee, 
succeeds in some countries and not in others.  MBAs operate through a coinsurance 
design, whereby financially stronger SNGs subsidise weaker ones.  They indirectly 
leverage on their country’s borrowing capacity, so they require supportive institutions 
including a highly credit-rated national government, a legal system that allows 
interventions if an SNG falls into financial distress, and prudent borrowing by subnational 
governments.  Most importantly, they require the collective buy-in of a peer group that 
wishes to use this agency to reduce the cost of borrowing for the common good.  The UK 
is a country, where local authorities are reluctant to provide a joint and several guarantee 
for their liabilities and therefore the original MBA model fails.     
 
